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This dissertation consists of three essays on public policy related to renewable energy,
economic growth and tax policy. Each chapter is implemented with a different econometric
method to investigate the policy question of interest. The first chapter studies the effect of
renewable energy utilization on many food price categories in relation to the Energy Policy
Act of 2005. The second chapter investigates the link between public education expenditures
and long term economic growth in the context of countries’ institutional quality, while the
third chapter focuses on the impact of the 2012 Kansas tax reform on state employment
across industries.
The first essay, co-authored with Dr. Bebonchu Atems, examines the link between re-
newable energy consumption and consumer food prices in recent years. The Energy Policy
Act of 2005 increased the amount of biofuel that must be mixed with commercial gasoline
sold in the U.S. to 7.5 billion gallons by 2012. The Energy Independence and Security Act
of 2007 further increased this requirement to 36 billion gallons by 2022. This increase in
the production and consumption of biofuels, in particular, and renewable energy sources, in
general, may compel farmers to divert significant quantities of cropland away from food and
feed crops, which, in turn may lead to a rise in crop prices, feed prices, meat and poultry
prices, and hence, overall food prices. Employing structural vector autoregression (SVAR)
models and monthly U.S. data for the period 1974:01 to 2019:12, this paper examines, empir-
ically, the impact of renewable energy consumption on food prices. We find, in general, that
renewable energy shocks have no significant impact on food prices. For the period since the
passage of the Energy Policy Act, however, shocks to biomass and wind energy consumption
raise food prices significantly and persistently.
In the second econometric essay, co-authored with Dr. William Blankenau, we utilize
panel and cross sectional data to explore the link between education spending and long
run growth among countries with different institutional quality. The economics literature
suggests that education spending and strong institutions both positively affect economic
growth. However, their combined effect has received considerably less attention. To explore
this, we derive a growth regression from an endogenous growth model constructed to map
the link between education spending, institutional quality and growth outcomes. It would
be natural to expect that the marginal effect of education spending increases with strong
institutions. Our results suggest that education spending and strong institutions instead
operate as substitutes in generating growth, especially in rich and developing countries.
The explanation could be that growth can arise from better skills due to higher education
spending or from enhanced economic activity due to stronger institutions. This relationship
could suggest a certain redundancy especially when countries with high institutional quality
also invest substantially in education spending. We emphasize that the implication is not
that one is less important or has a negative effect on growth.
In the third essay, which is co-authored with Dr. Ross Milton, we revisit the impact of one
of the largest state tax reforms in history. In 2012, the state of Kansas eliminated taxation for
business income and lowered marginal tax rates on other personal income sources. Contrary
to predictions of the new legislation’s proponents, prior work has established that the tax
reform had no significant impact on the aggregate state employment or real economic activity.
In this study, we ask whether the effect was the same for high pass-through industries and
other sub-samples of interest to policymakers. Overall, we find no aggregate employment
increase but rather job losses in a few industry groups. We find that even after excluding
the aircraft manufacturing, the oil and energy industries as well as the agricultural sector,
the aggregate state employment did not increase. We further test whether industries with a
high concentration of pass-through employment experienced more job gains. We find that
while a positive link exists between high pass-through concentration and job gains, the link is
never significant regardless of time horizons or specifications while income re-characterization
cannot be ruled out.
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Abstract
This dissertation consists of three essays on public policy related to renewable energy,
economic growth and tax policy. Each chapter is implemented with a different econometric
method to investigate the policy question of interest. The first chapter studies the effect of
renewable energy utilization on many food price categories in relation to the Energy Policy
Act of 2005. The second chapter investigates the link between public education expenditures
and long term economic growth in the context of countries’ institutional quality, while the
third chapter focuses on the impact of the 2012 Kansas tax reform on state employment
across industries.
The first essay, co-authored with Dr. Bebonchu Atems, examines the link between re-
newable energy consumption and consumer food prices in recent years. The Energy Policy
Act of 2005 increased the amount of biofuel that must be mixed with commercial gasoline
sold in the U.S. to 7.5 billion gallons by 2012. The Energy Independence and Security Act
of 2007 further increased this requirement to 36 billion gallons by 2022. This increase in
the production and consumption of biofuels, in particular, and renewable energy sources, in
general, may compel farmers to divert significant quantities of cropland away from food and
feed crops, which, in turn may lead to a rise in crop prices, feed prices, meat and poultry
prices, and hence, overall food prices. Employing structural vector autoregression (SVAR)
models and monthly U.S. data for the period 1974:01 to 2019:12, this paper examines, empir-
ically, the impact of renewable energy consumption on food prices. We find, in general, that
renewable energy shocks have no significant impact on food prices. For the period since the
passage of the Energy Policy Act, however, shocks to biomass and wind energy consumption
raise food prices significantly and persistently.
In the second econometric essay, co-authored with Dr. William Blankenau, we utilize
panel and cross sectional data to explore the link between education spending and long
run growth among countries with different institutional quality. The economics literature
suggests that education spending and strong institutions both positively affect economic
growth. However, their combined effect has received considerably less attention. To explore
this, we derive a growth regression from an endogenous growth model constructed to map
the link between education spending, institutional quality and growth outcomes. It would
be natural to expect that the marginal effect of education spending increases with strong
institutions. Our results suggest that education spending and strong institutions instead
operate as substitutes in generating growth, especially in rich and developing countries.
The explanation could be that growth can arise from better skills due to higher education
spending or from enhanced economic activity due to stronger institutions. This relationship
could suggest a certain redundancy especially when countries with high institutional quality
also invest substantially in education spending. We emphasize that the implication is not
that one is less important or has a negative effect on growth.
In the third essay, which is co-authored with Dr. Ross Milton, we revisit the impact of one
of the largest state tax reforms in history. In 2012, the state of Kansas eliminated taxation for
business income and lowered marginal tax rates on other personal income sources. Contrary
to predictions of the new legislation’s proponents, prior work has established that the tax
reform had no significant impact on the aggregate state employment or real economic activity.
In this study, we ask whether the effect was the same for high pass-through industries and
other sub-samples of interest to policymakers. Overall, we find no aggregate employment
increase but rather job losses in a few industry groups. We find that even after excluding
the aircraft manufacturing, the oil and energy industries as well as the agricultural sector,
the aggregate state employment did not increase. We further test whether industries with a
high concentration of pass-through employment experienced more job gains. We find that
while a positive link exists between high pass-through concentration and job gains, the link is
never significant regardless of time horizons or specifications while income re-characterization
cannot be ruled out.
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Chapter 1
The impact of renewable energy
consumption on food prices: the role
of the Energy Policy Act of 2005
1.1 Introduction
Between 1974 and 2005, U.S. real retail food prices experienced a persistent decline. In
contrast, real retail food prices paid by American consumers have generally trended upward
since 2006. Figure (1.1) plots these trends in U.S. consumer prices from January 1974 to
June 2020. The graph shows aggregate U.S. food prices, as well as eight subcategories of food
consumed by U.S. households. The figure shows that overall food prices fell by more 16%
between January 1974 and December 2005. Over the same period, the prices of meat and
poultry, dairy products, alcoholic beverages, and overall food at home displayed even larger
declines, decreasing by as much as 41%, 32%, 25%, and 20%, respectively. Consumer prices
of the remaining food items fell at a slower pace, with fruits and vegetable prices falling
by 12%, nonalcoholic beverages by 6%, cereals and baked goods by 5%, and overall food
consumed away from home by 4%. Since 2006, however, U.S. consumer prices have risen by
over 5% in the aggregate, driven primarily by the increase in meat and poultry prices, prices
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of food consumed away from home, and cereals and baked goods, which respectively rose by
14%, 13%, and 4%. Other food prices have continued to trend downward since 2006, but at
a much slower rate than during the 1974 to 2005 period. Overall, then, U.S. real retail food
prices have behaved quite differently before and after 2006.
This rise in U.S. retail food prices has been attributed to a multitude of factors, including
the depreciation of the U.S. dollar in the late 2000s and early 2010s, trade policy, oil and
other commodity price shocks, financial speculation, and U.S. monetary policy. Abbott et
al. (2011), for example, point out that a depreciating U.S. dollar relative to the currencies
of its trading partners increases imported food prices, making U.S. retail food prices more
expensive1. Giordani et al. (2016), Anderson and Martin (2011) and Bouet et al. (2012)
argue that trade policy aimed at protecting the domestic market from, say, positive price
shocks emanating from the global food market may have a multiplier effect in that these
actions may further disrupt international food markets. Foreign governments, in turn, may
respond to these food market disruptions by implementing protective trade measures, which
further escalates food prices. Using structural VAR models, Anzuini et al. (2013), and
Hammoudeh et al. (2015) provide evidence that a U.S. contractionary monetary policy
shock leads to positive and persistent increases in food prices, but a fall in beverage prices.
A causal link from oil prices to food prices is expected as higher oil prices may increase food
production, processing, packaging, and distribution costs (Baumeister and Kilian (2014)2).
While the factors discussed above may have contributed to the recent rise in food prices,
many observers have also argued that the recent rise in biofuels production and consump-
tion, in particular, and renewable energy sources, in general, may in part be responsible for
escalating food prices. Figure (1.2) provides the rationale for this view. The percent of total
renewable energy as a share of total U.S. primary energy was smaller in 2006 than in 1974.
Since 2006, however, total U.S. renewable energy production and consumption has soared
from about 6% of total primary energy to almost 12% in 2020. This rise has been primarily
1For example, in January 2002, a Euro cost $0.88. At its weakest point in April 2008, a Euro cost about
$1.60. While the dollar has, in general, appreciated since its low in mid-2008, it still remains weak relative
to the Euro, with one Euro costing $1.12 at the time of this writing.
2Specifically, transportation costs, as well as costs associated with plastic and foam packaging can lead
to substantial increases in food prices.
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Figure 1.1: U.S. real retail food prices: 1974:01-2019:12



























































































































































































Notes: Real food prices are the U.S. consumer price index (CPI) for the respective food item, deflated by
U.S. core CPI. The vertical line identifies January 2006.
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Notes: Data collected from the Energy Information Administration (EIA). The vertical line identifies
January 2006.
driven by the rise in the production and consumption of biomass, wind, and solar energy
sources. Biomass rose from almost 3% in 2006 to about 6% in 2020, wind from 0.25% to
about 3% over the same time period, while solar production and consumption rose twenty-
fold, from 0.06% to 1.4%. Equally important, Figures (1.1) and (1.2) illustrate that while
there in no apparent link between food prices and renewable energy sources before 2006, a
clear positive correlation is evident for the period from January 2006 to June 2020.
This paper is motivated by the trends shown in Figures (1.1) and (1.2). We seek to
investigate whether the correlation (or lack thereof, depending on the sample period under
consideration) between renewable energy consumption and production, and food prices rep-
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resents a causal link. There are compelling reasons to believe that changes in production
and consumption of some renewable energy sources may have causal impacts on food prices.
Consider the case of biofuels. First, corn, sugar cane, soybeans, and other oil seeds are used
both as food and as inputs to produce ethanol, biodiesel, or other biofuels. The diversion of
food crops to biofuels leads to a clear “food versus fuel” trade-off (Gilbert (2010)), resulting
in a leftward shift of the food supply curve, and raising food prices. Second, corn, soybeans,
sorghum, oats, and barley are the primary ingredients used in commercially prepared feed.
This shift from feed-related crops to biofuels raises the cost of producing meat, poultry, and
dairy products, and consequently an increase in their prices. Third, competition between
agricultural commodities and the raw materials used for biofuels (corn, soybean, and other
oil seeds) for land, water, fertilizers, and other scarce resources, puts further upward pressure
on food prices. In addition, the extent to which diesel and other biofuels are used to power
farm machinery and equipment will impact food prices.
Biofuels are but one example of a renewable energy source that may directly impact food
prices. There are also reasons to believe that an expansion of other renewable energy sources
may raise food prices. Like biofuels, competition between wind farms and agricultural land
may lead to a diversion of land from the latter to the former. To the extent that this happens,
food prices are expected to rise. Furthermore, while farmers do not operate windmills, they
lease or sell the land required for their installation, receiving compensation that typically
surpasses agricultural land lease and sale prices (Myrna et al. (2019)). Given the ample
evidence that land parcels and prices tend to be spatially correlated ((Kostov (2009), Wasson
et al. (2013)), the value of agricultural lands adjoining wind farms is expected to rise,
leading to an increase in agricultural prices. A similar argument can be made with respect
to geothermal, hydropower, and solar energy sources, although in these cases, the link to
food prices is less clear, and ultimately an empirical question.
This paper is not the first to examine the link between renewable energy consumption
and food prices. Serra and Zilberman (2013) summarizes the broader literature and key
findings of the research of the impact of biofuels on food prices. Other papers that examine
this research question applying time-series approaches, include Peidong et al. (2009), Zhang
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et al. (2010), Serra et al. ((2011a), (2011b)) and Janda et al. (2011). One concern with
these papers is that they rely on atheoretical time series models, making it difficult to at-
tribute a causal interpretation to the (generally) positive correlations documented. These
atheoretical models, for example, may not address potential simultaneity bias, since changes
in the consumption of biofuels and other renewable energy sources may impact food prices,
but changes in food prices are also expected to impact renewable energy consumption. There
may be further endogeneity problems that arise from external factors that simultaneously de-
termine movements in food prices and renewable energy consumption. For example, a global
economic expansion is likely to lead to an increase in both renewable energy consumption
and food prices, making it misleading to invoke the ceteris paribus assumption when exam-
ining the “effect” of renewable energy consumption on food prices. Therefore, the increases
in food prices cannot be attributed to increases in renewable energy consumption only. Put
differently, food prices would have responded quite differently if, say, federal, state, and local
government policies had been responsible for an increase in renewable energy consumption
of the same magnitude as the increase resulting from the economic expansion.
Cognizant of the above-mentioned complications, this paper attempts to estimate the
impact of shocks to U.S. renewable energy consumption on retail food prices paid by U.S.
consumers. Our econometric approach relies on structural vector autoregressions (SVAR), a
methodology typically employed in modern empirical macroeconomics to estimate dynamic
causal effects (see e.g. Cristiano et al. (1999), Kilian and Park (2009), Atems et al. (2015)).
Applying this methodology to U.S. monthly data for the period 1974:01 to 2020:12, we find no
significant evidence to support the hypothesis that shocks to renewable energy consumption
increase food prices. In contrast, for the period since the passage of the Energy Policy Act,
specifically, from 2006:01 to 2020:06, we find evidence that shocks to biomass and wind
energy consumption lead to significant, and persistent increases in aggregate food prices, as
well as other important retail food prices. We find no evidence that shocks to geothermal,
hydropower, and solar energy consumption impact food prices before, or since the passage
of the Energy Policy Act. However, our results show that shocks to the various renewable
energy sources considered explain a larger proportion of the fluctuations in food prices in
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the period since the Energy Policy Act than before.
This paper is related to the broader literature that employs structural dynamic econo-
metric models to investigate the relationship between energy and food prices. Baumeister
and Kilian (2014) apply an SVAR model to examine the impact of oil price shocks on food
prices, concluding that “there is no evidence that oil price shocks have been associated with
more than a negligible increase in U.S. retail food prices in recent years” (page 691). Haus-
man et al. (2012) apply an SVAR model to analyze the response of U.S. crop prices to
shocks in acreage supply, reporting that a negative shock in own acreage raises soybean and
corn prices. Other papers that apply SVAR models to the “food versus fuel” debate include
among others, Carter et al. (2016), Qui et al. (2012), and Anzuini et al. (2013).
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 1.2 provides a brief review of the
literature on the effect of biofuels in particular, and renewable energy in general, on food
prices. Section 1.3 provides some background on the Energy Policy Act and how it possibly
changed the relationship between renewable energy consumption and food prices. In Section
1.4, we present the data and discuss some stylized facts about renewable energy and food
prices. In the next section, we conduct tests for unit roots and structural breaks in the data.
In Section 1.6, we discuss theoretical mechanisms through which changes in renewable energy
consumption may impact food prices. The empirical methodology and main results of the
analysis are presented in Section 1.7 and 1.8. Section 1.11 presents concluding remarks.
1.2 Related literature
The topic of renewable energy has gained growing attention both from the public and eco-
nomic researchers in recent years. The concern for fossil fuels sustainability has led many
large economies to orient their energy policy toward more clean and renewable alternatives.
Biofuels stand out both for their current importance and future possibilities in this debate.
The literature addressing the impact of renewables energies on food prices has produced
several papers with mixed results.
Ajanovic (2011) focuses on biofuels’ production originating from the first generation of
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feedstock such as corn, wheat, and sugar cane, asking whether the then moderate increase in
biofuels production had any significant effect on agricultural commodity prices. The study
focuses on biofuels’ production, land use, yields, and feedstock as well as crude oil prices.
Two main approaches are used throughout. First, the basic relationship between quantities
of crops output, costs of production and expected market prices is used. Second, the paper
provides a review of the most relevant literature around the “food versus fuel” debate. The
paper suggests that despite the modest but constant increase in bio-energy reliant fuels,
feedstock production has increased as well and kept up. Altogether, the author concludes
that biofuels and food commodities can cohabitate but emphasizes that a complete shift
to biofuels would be impossible because of land limitations. Janda et al. (2012) contrasts
this view by providing an overview of the motivating forces behind the increased use of
biofuels and reports that they are primarily policy driven and the first generation of biofuels
is economically viable. The study highlights the existence of heavy government subsidies
enabling this orientation (except for Brazil, with its developed sugar cane based ethanol).
The study further emphasizes that the environmental implication of these policies are for the
most part ambiguous. They also undertake a review of the methods used in the literature.
They report that more theory-based studies evaluating the impact of biofuels rely on partial
equilibrium or computable general equilibrium models (CGE) with among others Rajagopal
and Zilberman (2007) who provide a substantial overview of biofuels related models. Reduced
form models linking prices in agricultural market and energy, as does Serra and Zilberman
(2012). Carter et al. (2017) estimates that corn prices were about 30% higher between
2006 and 2014 compared to the expected levels if the Energy Independence and Security
Act of 2007 did not create a surge in demand. Their method involves a partially identified
structural vector autoregressive model.
Mueller et al. (2008) also find that the increase in food prices and biofuels production
could not be interpreted as causal. Then, their findings show that the contribution of the
biofuels’ production is at best modest but mostly non-existent for food prices. Tangermann
(2008) makes the argument that based on competing land requirements for biofuels pro-
duction and food commodities there was a serious risk to the global food supply based on
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this emerging trade-off. Taking the examples of India and China, the paper supports that
speculators were not the culprit in the food prices surge observed, but that it was rather the
biofuels’ production which was a significant element in the price increase. Likewise, Rath-
mann et al. (2010) provides further evidence that a competitiveness exists in land uses with
regard to biofuel crops and traditional food commodities. The paper also reports short run
increases in food prices as a result of increased biofuel production.
More recently, Mitchell (2010) supports this view and also concludes that the most im-
portant factor in the observed increase emanated from the U.S. and European Union policy
shift with respect to biofuels. Berndes et al. (2003) in a review of 17 studies not only finds
also mixed results but argues as well that the explanation lies in the uncertainty and di-
verging opinions in regard to land yields and energy crops production. Serra et al. (2013)
provides another substantial survey of the biofuels and time series related literature with an
exposition of the main methods used. Some theoretical modelling papers as Ciaian (2011)
and Wright (2011) emphasize that these advances have not led to a consensus for modelling
food prices volatility. These studies conclude that long run agricultural price levels are driven
by energy prices, and that instability in the latter is transferable to food markets.
Serra et al. (2011) use a non-linear approach to address a similar question. With a
smooth transition vector error correction model, the paper investigates price relationships
within the U.S. ethanol industry. They study daily prices between mid 2005 and 2007.
Their results suggest that ethanol, corn and oil prices have equilibria and that only ethanol
prices adjust in a non-linear way to long-run parity deviations. Furthermore, they find that
ethanol prices respond to shocks to either oil or corn prices reaching a peak after 10 days
which fades approximately after a month. Other studies have found that to keep up with
the world population growth and its demand in food supply, crop production must at least
double by 2050. Yet, Ray and Mueller (2013) find that these expectations could not be met
with the recorded yield levels worldwide. They further make the case that this difference
between the reality and policymakers’ expectations could make the trade-off a major concern
much earlier than 2050 when considering the increasing production of biofuels.
Another question in the literature is the extent to which the consumption of U.S. biofuels
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reflects it domestic production. Ireland (2018) reports that the U.S. is the world’s largest
exporter of wood pellets (categorized under biofuels) and that the largest share of its inter-
national trade occurs with European countries. However, the volume is largely influenced
by the European Union (EU) climate change regulations.
Biofuels production is not the only point in this debate and the role of the other sources
of renewable energy has also been extensively discussed in the literature. Zhang et al.
(2010) presents an overview of the status of renewable energy development in China, and
the targets for 2050. The country is arguably one of fastest growing economies of the past
century but also the second-largest emitter of carbon dioxide in the world according to the
authors. Highlights of the paper include the China’s “Renewable Energy Law” passed by
congress in February 2005 with renewable energy covering already 23.4% of total installed
power capacity. Qiu et al. (2012) deals with similar questions. Sayigh and Milborrow (2019)
provides a thorough analysis of the cost of wind energy and its prevalence in recent years.
The paper reports that wind energy is one of the cheapest in the renewable category. Lantz
et al. (2016) shows that this alternative was not only cheaper, but supplied already up
to 4.7% of the total U.S. electricity generation, a noteworthy growth considering that this
number was essentially zero two decades earlier.
1.3 U.S. energy policy and background
Historically, U.S. food prices had been decreasing since the 1970s but experienced a surge
midway through the first decade of the new millennium. A multitude of factors can explain
this reversal, but many papers in the literature re-emphasize (see Carter et al. (2017), Janda
et al. (2012)) that the shift in energy policy is a major factor. Two outstanding policy acts
involving renewable energy consumption and production happened around that time and in
this section we will explore each in more details.
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1.3.1 The Energy Policy Act of 2005
In response to an increase in volatility of oil prices, U.S. dependence on foreign energy,
and the environmental consequences of carbon emissions and climate change, among other
factors, the Energy Policy Act of 2005 was passed by the United States Congress in July
2005 and signed into law by President George W. Bush in August of the same year3. The
purpose of the policy, therefore, was to enhance U.S. energy security, while ameliorating the
environmental and sustainability concerns related to climate change. Most provisions of the
bill were to be enacted between 2005 and 2009. Among these are provisions4 pertaining to
but not limited to:
• Renewable Fuels Standard (RFS): This provision required that gasoline sold in the
United States had to contain an increasing amount of renewables starting in 2006 (for
example biodiesel or ethanol). Motor fuels had to contain at least 4 billion gallons of
the renewables in 2006 with a target of 7.5 billion by 2012 under a yearly increment of
700 million gallons.
• Domestic energy: The act encourages production of energy on federal lands through
reduced royalty and increased access for drilling activity and other energy projects.
• Tax reduction: A target of a $14.5 billion decrease over 11 years to encourage domestic
energy production.
• Electricity: Several standing acts were repealed and the Federal Energy Regulatory
Commission (FERC) was authorized to certify a national Electric Reliability Organi-
zation (ERO) to enforce reliability standards.
The Energy Act of 2005 was the first omnibus5 bill signed in the U.S. in more than a
decade. Due to their size and the scope of key topics they cover, these bills have faced
3According to the Congressional Research Service, the 2005 Energy Act came during a period of all-time
high crude oil prices which hit $63 per barrel and gasoline reaching $2.4 per gallon. At the time, the U.S.
imported 58% of its oil. The U.S. energy Information Administration predicted that imports would grow to
68% of the domestic demand by 2025. https://www.everycrsreport.com/reports/RL33302.html/.
4congress.gov/bill/109th-congress/house-bill/6/.
5Omnibus bills are laws proposal that covers many often unrelated topics. They are single documents
accepted in a single vote by a legislature but packages together several subjects.
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criticism in the past (see Massicotte (2013)). Nevertheless, the Energy Act provided financial
incentives for homeowners to make changes to their energy consumption. Another element
was the tax credit offered to drivers of hybrid vehicles and the increased competition among
car manufacturers for fuel efficient vehicles to meet the demand. In retrospective, these
provisions reduced the reliance on fossil fuels both in the short and long run.
1.3.2 The Energy Independence and Security Act (EISA) of 2007
This following act was signed on December 19, 2007 by President Bush to further address the
goals of the 2005 act. Among others, it was aiming to provide the U.S. with a greater energy
independence and security, enhance the production of clean energy resources and protect
consumers6. The EISA aimed to solidify the original target and bring more aggressive
requirements through three main provisions summarised here7:
• Corporate Average Fuel Economy (CAFE): The setting of 35 miles per gallon as target
for the combined fleet of cars and light trucks by model year 2020.
• Renewable Fuels Standards (RFS): The 2005 RFS was modified, now requiring U.S.
motor fuels to contain at least 9.0 billion gallons of renewables in 2008 and rising to
36 billion gallons by 2022.
• Energy Efficiency Equipment Standards: The law includes various new standards for
lighting and for residential and commercial appliance equipment. The equipment in-
cludes residential refrigerators, freezers, refrigerator-freezers, metal halide lamps, and
commercial walk-in coolers and freezers.
A notable decision was also the repealing of two tax subsidies in order to offset the estimated





1.4.1 Data on renewable energy consumption
The data on renewable energy production and consumption come from the U.S. Department
of Energy’s Energy Information Administration (EIA). The agency provides a number of
measures of energy production and consumption at different frequencies and geographic level.
For our purposes, we utilized the data on total renewable energy and various disaggregate
measures, namely biomass, wind power, geothermal, hydroelectric power, and solar power.
All data are available in British Thermal Unit (BTU) for comparability across sources. The
data are monthly, and cover the period from January 1974 to June 2020, except for wind
and solar that start respectively in January 1983 and January 1984. All the measures of
renewable energy are expressed as a share of total primary energy consumption, and further
expressed in per capita terms by dividing by monthly U.S. population, collected from the
Federal Reserve Economic Data (FRED). Expressing the data in this format is common in
the literature (see Sadorsky (2009), Mishra et al. (2009), Kumar (2020), Liu et al. (2020)).
Figure 1.2 displays the trends in U.S. renewable energy consumption as a percent of
total primary energy consumption from January 1974 to June 2020. Except for hydropower,
which displays a downward trend, consumption of most renewable energy sources in the
U.S. has risen since 1974, but this rise is most apparent after 2005. In the figure, we
include a vertical line in January 2006 to make this difference in the consumption of various
renewable energy sources even clearer. In fact, since January 2006, the total U.S. renewable
energy consumption as a share of total U.S. primary energy consumption doubled from
about 6% to 12%. This doubling in total renewable energy consumption has been fueled by
the consumption of biomass, which includes biodiesel, biogas, wood, wood waste, ethanol,
municipal solid waste and landfill gas. While the consumption of geothermal energy has
more than quadrupled since 1974, it still comprises a negligible proportion of total primary
energy consumption. On the other hand, consumption of solar and wind energy, which each
stood at around 0% in 2006, now reach approximately 1.2% and 3% of the primary energy
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consumption, respectively.
The literature has suggested a number of reasons for this expansion of renewable energy
consumption. Rentschler (2013) suggests that the increased volatility and prices of oil and
other non-renewable energy sources has played a significant role. Bowden and Payne (2010)
attribute it to the U.S. dependence on non-renewable energy sources finding a bidirectional
Granger-causality between commercial and residential non-renewable energy consumption
and real GDP. Zweibel et al. (2008) argue that the environmental consequences of carbon
emissions and climate change have, in part, been responsible for the shift away from fossil
fuels to alternative energy sources. These factors have led to U.S. government policies and
programs that provide incentives in the form of subsidies, tax credits, and rebates for choosing
to produce renewable energy contributing to the pattern. Chief among these policies have
been the Energy Policy Act of 2005 and the Energy Independence and Security Act of 2007.
1.4.2 Data on food prices
The data on food prices are also monthly, from January 1974 to June 2020. We use the
Consumer Price Index (CPI) of the food item as the measure of food prices for that item.
All the food prices are collected from FRED, and are expressed in real terms by deflating
using the U.S. CPI excluding both food and energy (core CPI). To measure aggregate food
prices, we use the U.S. city average food and beverages CPI for all urban consumers. In
addition to aggregate food prices, we consider eight important food prices, namely cereals
and bakery products; meats, poultry, fish, and eggs (meat and poultry, henceforth); dairy
and related products; fruits and vegetables (fruits, henceforth); alcoholic beverages; non-
alcoholic beverages; food at home; and food away from home. These food prices have been
considered by Baumeister and Kilian (2014) in their study of the impact of oil shocks on
food prices.
As shown in Figure 1.1, aggregate U.S. retail food prices displayed a downward trend
until the mid 2000s, after which they started rising, peaking in January 2015. While real
food prices in the aggregate began to fall in 2015, they still exceed their January 2006 levels.
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Prices of cereals and baked products, meat and poultry, and food away from home generally
mimic aggregate food prices. However, not all food prices have trended similarly. Prices of
fruits and vegetables have declined persistently since 2009, while prices of dairy products,
alcoholic beverages, and non-alcoholic beverages are below their 2006 levels.
1.4.3 Additional control variables
In the robustness section, we include measures of global crude oil production, global real
economic activity (REA), and crude oil prices into our baseline econometric model. The
data on crude oil production is collected from the EIA. The REA index is constructed
by Lutz Kilian and is available publicly8. To measure crude oil prices, we use the refiner
acquisition cost of imported crude oil as in Kilian (2009). We express crude oil prices in real
terms by dividing by core CPI. In addition, we gather data on ethanol producer price index
(PPI) that we later use as a proxy for renewable energy prices.
1.5 Time series properties
In this section, we examine the time series properties of our data by conducting a series of
tests for unit root and structural breaks.
1.5.1 Unit root and stationarity testing
There are many tests for stationarity but for this analysis, we will use the Augmented Dickey
Fuller (ADF) test and the Phillips-Perron Test. The first takes the general form:
∆yt = α + βt+ γyt−1 + δ1∆yt−1 + ...+ δp−1∆yt−p+1 + εt (1.1)
where α is a constant, β is the coefficient on the time trend, γ is the coefficient on the one
period lagged value, δ1 is the coefficient on the one period lagged first difference, p is the
lag length, δp−1 is the coefficinet on the p − 1 period of the first difference lag at the same
8https://drive.google.com/file/d/169Nj256wQ27xOnuVEllfj jbb7JNGrlQ/view/.
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period, yt is the value of the series of interest at time t, ∆yt is the first different of yt and εt is
a normally distributed error term. The null hypothesis of this test is that a unit root exists
in the time series. The alternative is different depending on the version of the ADF test,
that is whether we consider a constant, a linear trend, or both. We usually decide between
stationarity and trend stationarity. The ADF statistic is a negative number and the more
negative it is, the stronger the null can be rejected. When both α and β in Equation (1.1)
are zero, we are running an ADF without a drift or trend. When β alone is zero in Equation
(1.1), we are running an ADF test with drift but no linear trend. The idea is that if the
series actually has a unit root then the lagged yt−1 will provide no relevant information to
predict the change in yt beyond the one coming from ∆yt−p+1 where p− 1 is the lag length





where DF is the Dickey-Fuller test statistic and SE denotes the standard error. The value of
the test statistic is then compared to the critical values from the Dickey Fuller t-distribution.
On the other hand, the Phillips-Perron (PP) test (Phillips and Perron (1988)) differs from
the ADF test mainly in how it deals with serial correlation and heteroskedasticity in the
errors. The PP test proceeds by estimating the model:
yt = α + βt+ Πyt−1 + εt (1.2)
where yt is the value of the series at time t, yt−1 its value in the previous period, t is the time
trend, α is a constant, β is the coefficient on the time trend and εt is a normally distributed
error term. The Phillips-Perron test fits Equation (1.2) and the results are used to calculate
the test statistic. The test statistic can be thought of as an autocorrelation-robust Dickey-
Fuller statistic. Davidson and Mackinnon (2004) report that the ADF test preforms better
than the PP test in finite samples. As emphasized by Bierens (2001), regressions estimated
with data that contain unit roots are likely to be spurious. In addition, there may exist
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Table 1.1: Unit root tests
linear combinations of two or more nonstationary series which are stationary, meaning that
these linear combinations may be interpreted as long-run relationships. For these reasons,
we conduct both tests discussed above on all series and report the results in Table 1.1.
Our tests for stationarity show that all energy measures are stationary. The aggregate and
disaggregated measures of food prices are shown to be non-stationnary in levels. To avoid
the sort of spurious regressions problems documented by Granger and Newbold (1974) when
using a mixture of I(0) and I(1) variables, we follow Atems et al. (2015) and use first
log difference of our food prices measures. We proceed with a first log difference of both
categories and obtain stationary series.
1.5.2 Testing for structural breaks
Looking at Figures 1.1 and 1.2 it is apparent that renewable energy production and food
prices behaved very differently before and after the mid 2000s. In particular, U.S. retail food
prices decreased persistently until the mid 2000s, after which they experienced a significant
rise. Similarly, U.S. consumption of renewable energy was generally low before the mid
2000s, but have more than doubled since then. This raises the question of whether there
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has been a structural break in these series, and whether this potential break may impact
the relationship between renewable energy consumption and food prices. Baumeister and
Kilian (2014) emphasize that there is no consensus as to a clear date when the relationship
between energy and food prices may have changed.
The Energy Policy Act was signed into law by President Bush in August 2005, making
that date a plausible candidate. Using the Narayan and Popp (2010) test, Mishra and
Smyth (2014) estimate a structural break in U.S. natural gas consumption in December
2005, and attribute this break to the Energy Policy Act of 2005. Carter et al. (2013) states
that informed market participants would have known by late 2006 of a coming surge in
ethanol production, suggesting a structural break in late 2006. Avalos tests for, and finds, a
structural break in U.S. food prices in May 2006. What is evident from this discussion is that
many papers agree that the underlying structure of U.S. renewable energy and food prices
dynamics changed some time between August 2005 and 2006, but there is no consensus as
to the exact date.
In this paper, we select January 2006 as a candidate break data, and use the Chow test
to confirm this date. Table A.7 presents the results of the Chow test. For five of the six
renewable energy consumption measures considered, the test rejects the null hypothesis of
no structural break confirming the conjecture of a break in January 2006. Similarly, at the
5% level, the test supports our conjecture of a break in January 2006 for aggregate food
prices, fruits and vegetables, non-alcoholic beverages, alcoholic beverages, and food away
from home. The test also rejects the null hypothesis of no structural break in 2006 for meat
and poultry prices at the 10% level. However, for cereal and baked goods, dairy products,
and food at home, the hypothesis of a break in January 2006 is rejected.
1.6 The link between renewable energy and food prices
An overwhelming proportion of the findings and opinions in the literature point to a growing
competition for land use allocation between biofuels and traditional crops used for food.
Rathmann, Szklo and Schaeffer (2010) analyze the literature and find evidences that the
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emergence of biofuels had altered the dynamics of land use but only in the short run. More
recently, Muscat et al. (2020) review 75 studies dealing with the question of competition.
The review suggests that the allocative dilemma is supported by evidence and requires a
holistic analysis. Rather than a Hecksher-Ohlinian decision at trading geographical units, it
appears that it is individual farmers regardless of their crops or regional specialization who
have progressively moved towards the production of renewable energy type sources. The
food versus fuel debate is often considered the main channel of transmission between the
two markets. In the case of ethanol, for example, as it becomes more profitable for farmers
to produce corn suitable for biomass production, we could expect the supply of nutritious
corn to decrease leading to higher food prices especially in categories that use corn as inputs.
The involvement in this energy harvest has greatly varied among farmers plausibly for two
reasons. First, renewable energy harvesting has a high upfront opportunity cost. Taking the
example of solar energy, there is a very large requirement of land for relatively small energy
output. It takes 3,500 acres of land to produce about 392 megawatts. In perspective, if the
U.S. were to rely on solar energy alone, it would require an area of 22,000 acres or the size of
the Mojave Desert9. Secondly, besides the case of biomass (generated from a particular strand
of corn), getting started in the renewable energy field could mean abandoning traditional
crops for which farmers already have both physical and human capital. Once the Energy
Policy Act of 2005 was introduced, the ethanol composition of commercial gas became a
monitored requirement and the demand for suitable biofuels increased. This sudden increase
in the demand for such crops most likely caused a short run surge in the biofuel market price
with its short term inelastic supply. Over time, in reaction to these prices, the producers of
these biofuel crops have had an opportunity to expand their operations and newcomers to
enter this now lucrative market.
We believe that these dynamics have strongly affected the supply of food crops and in
turn the food items for which they are inputs. Taking the case of wind then, the perception
of farms growing crops and also benefiting from sporadic installation of windmills is not
9The National Renewable Energy Laboratory state that 3.4 acres of panels are needed to produce one
gigawatt hour over a year. The estimated need for the U.S. is about 4 pettawatts of electrity for a year.
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/rankorder/2233rank.html/.
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accurate. In practice, the installation of a windmill operation requires multiple GPS trackers
and the creation of new roads to properly install the machines. In other words, the loss in
land is not only the columns seen from afar. The Illinois Agricultural Aviation Association
(IAAA) states “Farmers with wind generators may lose the option of aerial application of
farm protection products, seeds, fertilizers, etc. on their farm ground. The fact is, it is
dangerous to fly within the confines of a wind generator farm10.” Nevertheless, even after
accounting for these losses, the share of land that is lost to windmill operations is arguably
small. Another theory that can explain the impact of wind energy production on food prices
is the income effect for farmers. Given that wind energy revenue is a more stable source
of income for farmers, it could disincentivize or limit farmers’ production of feed crops if
they are able to achieve comparable income with the new revenue. This would mean a lower
supply of crops and higher food prices.
The reliability of wind turbines has also been making improvement in recent years, but
they still constitute a danger for farmers who potentially work around them on a daily basis.
This hazard makes this trade-off between crops production and wind energy highly pressing
as more and more rural localities have their revenue funded by wind electricity production.
An extreme example is Sheldon, New York which fully eliminated local taxes because revenue
from wind energy sufficed for the local budget11. This double-edged reliance could lead the
farmers to shift toward full time wind production and decrease or abandon altogether food
inputs production as a source of income.
1.7 Empirical methodology
This section provides the details of the econometric methodology used in this paper. Specif-
ically, we present a VAR model to evaluate the impact of renewable energy shocks on food
prices. We incorporate the various measures of renewable energy and food prices into the




For each measure of renewable energy consumption and food prices, we estimate the













where Rt is the percentage change in the measure of renewable energy consumption, Ft
represents the percentage change in the measure of food prices12. In Equation (1.3), L is the
lag operator, A(·) is a polynomial in L, εR,t and εF,t are the reduced form residuals for each
equation. The lag order, L, is chosen by minimizing the Akaike Information Criteria (AIC).
Hirotugu Akaike (1974) proposed this estimator of prediction error and quality of model-
ing. Provided with different models for a set of data, the AIC criterion estimate the quality
of each model by relying on a trade-off between the goodness of fit and the simplicity of the
model. It is formulated as:
AIC = 2k − 2ln(L)
where k is the number of estimated parameters and L the maximum value of the likelihood
function for the model. Given a number of models with varying lags, the preferred model is
the one with the minimum AIC value.
Then, let uR,t and uF,t respectively denote the structural shocks to renewable energy
consumption and food prices. We assume that the reduced-form residuals and the structural







where B0 is a non-singular matrix that describes the contemporaneous relationship between
the two variables:
12Expressing the variables in percentage change is supported by many unit root tests. Those tests results






Further restrictions must be imposed on B0 in order to identify the structural shocks uR,t and
uF,t. In this paper, we impose the assumption that shocks to renewable energy consumption
impact food prices contemporaneously, whereas it takes at least a month for shocks to food

























We use this identified VAR model to construct impulse response functions and perform
forecast error variance decomposition analyses.
1.8 Empirical results
In this section, we present the responses of aggregate and disaggregate measures of food prices
to a 1% shock in energy consumption. Energy consumption is either the total renewable
consumption or the disaggregate measures, namely biomass, geothermal, hydropower, solar,
and wind. We report these responses for the entire sample period (1974:1-2019:12), as well
as two subsample periods, namely 1974:1-2005:12, and 2006:2-2019:12. This sample split is
supported by a Chow test for structural breaks. The latter period is intended to capture the
effects, if any, that shocks to renewable energy consumption have on food prices, following the
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energy policy shift after 2005. The solid lines in the impulse response functions represent the
cumulative impulse response estimates, with the dotted lines depicting the 90% confidence
bands obtained through a wild bootstrap procedure (Goncalves and Kilian (2004)) with 1000
repetitions. We also report forecast error variance decomposition to assess the quantitative
importance of the various renewable energy shocks for movements in food prices.
1.8.1 Impulse responses and variance decomposition for aggregate
food prices
The response of aggregate food prices to a shock to each of the various renewable energy
consumption measures for the entire sample period (1974:1-2019:12) is shown in Figure 1.3.
It is apparent from the figure that none of the renewable energy shocks exert an impact on
aggregate real food prices that is significantly different from zero at any time horizon. To
evaluate the quantitative importance of the various renewable energy consumption shocks
for the overall variance of aggregate real retail food prices, Table 1.2 provides results of
decomposition of variance analyses.
The table reveals that shocks to renewable energy consumption have minimal explanatory
power for the short and long run movements in U.S. real retail food prices over the period
1974:1-2019:12. Shocks to biomass and hydropower consumption, which display the largest
explanatory power, still explain only about 5% of variance of aggregate U.S. real retail food
prices after three years. The other renewable energy shocks each explain less than 4% at
any forecast horizon.
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Figure 1.3: The impact of renewable energy consumption on aggregate food prices
Notes: Solid lines are the cumulative impulse response functions, while dashed lines are
the 90% confidence bands based on the Wild bootstrap with 1000 replications. The sample
period is 1974:01-2019:12.
.
The finding that renewables in general, but biomass in particular, have no significant
impacts on food prices while also contributing little to overall fluctuations in food prices
is rather surprising, given the multitude of papers (see e.g. Serra and Zilberman (2013),
Peidong et al. (2009), Zhang et al. (2010), Serra et al. (2011a), Janda et al. (2011)) that
report a positive correlation between biofuels and food prices.
As mentioned before, however, one concern with previous studies that apply time series
methods is their empirical reliance on atheoretical models, making it difficult to attribute a
causal interpretation of their findings.
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Table 1.2: Percent contribution of shocks to renewable energy consumption to the variability
of aggregate food prices: Sample period, 1974:1-2019:12
Notes: Forecast error variance decomposition based on structural VAR model.
In particular, atheoretical models may not address potential simultaneity bias, since
changes in the consumption of biofuels and other renewable energy sources may impact food
prices, but changes in food prices are also expected to impact renewable energy consumption.
Subsample analyses
Figure 1.4 shows the results for the early subsample (1974:1-2005:12) while Figure 1.5 shows
the food price responses for the late subsample (2006:2-2019:12). The impulse responses
for the 1974:01-2005:12 period mimic those of the entire sample: that is, the response of
food prices is not different from zero statistically at any horizon. After 2005, however, an
increase in biomass consumption is followed by a rise in aggregate food prices for the first
24 months. This increase is significantly different from zero between months 3 to 10 and
around month 20. The largest aggregate food price response occurs after twenty-two months
with a cumulative impact of approximately 0.22% suggesting that a 1% transitory shock to
biomass energy consumption leads to a cumulative aggregate food price increase of about
0.2% after eight months. This result is consistent with recent findings linking biofuels and
food prices, including Mitchell (2008), Chen and Önal (2016), and Hochman et al. (2014).
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Figure 1.4: The impact of renewable energy consumption on aggregate food prices: Subsam-
ple analysis
Notes: Solid lines are the cumulative impulse response functions, while dashed lines are the
90% confidence bands based on the Wild bootstrap with 1000 replications.
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This finding that an increase in biomass consumption increases food prices is not sur-
prising because producers, in order to increase supply to meet the increase in demand for
biomass, must divert large quantities of cropland away from food and feed crops to biomass
production. This diversion, all else equal, decreases the supply of food crops and animal
feed, leading to a rise in crop prices, feed prices, and hence, meat prices. Figure 1.8 further
shows that for the period since 2006, a shock to wind energy consumption raises aggregate
food prices by as much as 0.21% after eleven months, and 0.18% after twenty two months.
Myrna et al. (2019), using data for Germany from 2007 to 2016, report that a higher
cumulative capacity of wind turbines in communities leads to higher farmland transaction
prices, with farmland prices per hectare rising by 0.4% following a doubling of the average
cumulative capacity of wind turbines per community. In addition, they find that farmlands
that are directly affected by a wind turbine experience stronger price increases. These
increases in farmland prices raise food prices, as they raise the cost of production for farmers.
Table 1.3: Percent contribution of shocks to renewable energy consumption to the variability
of aggregate food prices: Subsample analysis
Notes: Forecast error variance decompositions based on structural VAR model.
Table 1.3 shows the percent of the forecast error variance of aggregate food prices ex-
plained by the various renewable energy sources based on the SVAR model described in
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Section (1.4). Panel A shows that each of the shocks to the various renewable energy sources
does not have much explanatory power for the variability of food prices during the early
sample period. As in Table 1.2, we see that biomass and hydropower have the largest ex-
planatory power during this period, respectively explaining 8.4% and 8%. The decomposition
of variance analysis for the later sample period shown in Panel B reveals that the explana-
tory power of renewable energy consumption for unpredictable movements in food prices
has increased considerably, with shocks to biomass, geothermal, hydropower, and wind en-
ergy consumption respectively explaining roughly 9%, 12.8%, 10.9%, and 8.5% of the overall
variability of food prices.
Based on the results discussed so far, the rest of the analysis will focus on the food
price responses to shocks to renewable energy consumption for the period 2006:2-2019:12.
Results for the early subsample generally mimic the corresponding responses to a total
renewable energy shock (see Table A.1 to A.6). That is, impulse response functions are
generally statistically indistinguishable from zero, while decomposition of variance analyses
suggest that the shocks explain very small proportions of the variance of various food prices
considered. These detailed results are available upon request.
1.8.2 Impulse responses for disaggregate food prices
To understand the finding above that a shock to biomass and wind energy increase food prices
for the period since February 2006, this section examines the responses of disaggregate food
price indexes to the two shocks. In addition, while shocks to geothermal, hydropower, and
solar energy consumption may not impact aggregate food prices (as shown above), they
may have effects on the prices of specific food products. We focus on eight food products
whose prices are likely to be impacted by shocks to renewable energy consumption (especially
biomass and wind), namely cereals and baked goods, meat and poultry, dairy, fruits, alcoholic
and non-alcoholic beverages, food at home and food away from home. These food price
measures are the same ones examined by Baumeister and Kilian (2014) in their study of
the impact of oil price shocks on food prices. As with the aggregate food price measure,
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all disaggregate food prices are deflated by the core CPI to express them in real terms.
Recall that the analysis here focuses on the period 2006:2-2019:12. For each disaggregate
food price index and each renewable energy source, we estimate a series of bivariate VAR
models containing the renewable energy source and the food price measure of interest. We
maintain the assumption that a shock to renewable energy consumption impacts food prices
contemporaneously, whereas food prices impact renewables with a lag of at least a month.
As before, the solid lines depict the cumulative impulse response estimates, while the dashed
lines are the 90% confidence bands obtained via the Wild bootstrap with 1000 repetitions.
Figure 1.5 presents the impulse responses of each of the eight disaggregate food price
measures to a shock of 1% to biomass consumption. The figure shows that a biomass shock
raises food prices, with the increase being statistically different from zero for meat and poul-
try, fruits, alcoholic and non-alcoholic beverages, and food away from home. This rise in
food prices following a biomass shock over the January 2006 to December 2019 period is
exactly what one would expect. To face growing domestic demand for biofuels, U.S. biomass
production has increased tremendously in recent years. A large share of the biomass is con-
verted to ethanol and biodiesel for transportation purposes. In 2001, the U.S. produced only
3 billion bushels of soybean, with only a small proportion going to biodiesel production. By
2018, the production had risen to 4.5 billion bushels, with over a quarter used for biofuels
according to the United Soybean Board13. Between 2010 and 2018, the share of total soybean
oil consumed as biodiesel doubled from 15% to 30%14. A 2019 Energy Information Admin-
istration (EIA) report, in fact, revealed that soybean oil now comprises the largest share of
U.S. biodiesel production15. Similarly, the U.S. Department of Agriculture’s National Agri-
culture Statistics Services reported in its annual crop production summary of 2019 that corn
production rose from 9.5 to 14.42 billions bushels between 2001 and 2018 (a 52% increase),
while the share going to bio-fuels production increased from 7% to almost 40%16. These
developments in biomass production are crucial especially when considering that corn and
13https://www.nass.usda.gov/Newsroom/archive/2019/02-08-2019.php: :text=Soybean%20production%20for/.
14The Energy Information Administration reported in May 2019 that the share of soybean oil in biodiesel




soybean also represent the largest cost share of animal feed. This unprecedented increase
in the demand for biofuels has decreased the portion of land dedicated to growing food and
feed-related crops, thereby raising crop, animal and poultry feed, meat, and poultry prices,
and hence, overall all food prices. This finding is also consistent with recent findings linking
biofuels and food prices, including Mitchell (2008), Chen and Önal (2016), and Hochman et
al. (2014).
Figure 1.5: The impact of a shock to biomass consumption on disaggregate food prices
Notes: Solid lines are the cumulative impulse response functions, while dashed lines are the
90% confidence bands based on the Wild bootstrap with 1000 replications.
Figures 1.6, 1.7, 1.8, and 1.9 display the disaggregate food price responses to shocks to
geothermal, hydropower, wind, and solar energy consumption, respectively. The impulse
responses of Figures 1.6 and 1.8 reveal that shocks to geothermal and wind energy con-
sumption raise prices of alcoholic and non-alcoholic beverages, as well as prices of food away
from home. On the other hand, hydropower (Figure 1.7) and solar energy (Figure 1.9) elicit
responses which are not statistically different from zero at any horizon.
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Table 1.4: Percent contribution of shocks to renewable energy consumption to the variability
of disaggregate food prices
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We conjecture that the finding that increased geothermal and wind energy consumption
raise certain food prices because like biomass, competition between wind farms and agricul-
tural land may lead to a diversion of land from the latter to the former. To the extent that
this happens, food prices are expected to rise.
Furthermore, while farmers do not operate windmills and geothermal power plants, they
lease or sell the land required for their installation, receiving compensation that typically
surpasses agricultural land lease and sale prices (Myrna et al. (2019). Given the good deal of
empirical evidence that land parcels and prices tend to be spatially correlated (Kostov (2009),
Wasson et al. (2013)), the value of agricultural lands adjoining wind farms is expected to
rise, leading to an increase in agricultural prices.
To quantify the average importance of the various renewable energy shocks for move-
ments in the distinct food price measures, Table 1.4 displays the forecast error variance
decompositions. It is immediately apparent that for all the food prices considered, there is
an increase in the explanatory power of renewable energy consumption shocks overtime, but
this increase varies considerably for the various food price measures. After three years, a
shock to wind energy consumption explains 20% and 14% of the variation in prices of non-
alcoholic beverages and food away from home, respectively. The contribution of biomass to
fluctuations in the same food prices is approximately 13% each, while solar and geothermal
have much less contribution.
Geothermal consumption, however, is shown to have the largest explanatory power for
variations in prices of cereals and baked goods, explaining as much as 25% of its variability.
This exercise demonstrates that renewable energy consumption shocks can have considerable
explanatory power for the unpredictable movements in aggregate and disaggregate measures
of U.S. real retail food prices.
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Figure 1.6: The impact of a shock to geothermal consumption on disaggregate food prices
Notes: Solid lines are the cumulative impulse response functions, while dashed lines are
the 90% confidence bands based on the Wild bootstrap with 1000 replications. The sample
period is 2006:2-2019:12.
Figure 1.7: The impact of a shock to hydropower consumption on disaggregate food prices
Notes: Solid lines are the cumulative impulse response functions, while dashed lines are
the 90% confidence bands based on the Wild bootstrap with 1000 replications. The sample
period is 2006:2-2019:12.
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Figure 1.8: The impact of a shock to wind consumption on disaggregate food prices
Notes: Solid lines are the cumulative impulse response functions, while dashed lines are
the 90% confidence bands based on the Wild bootstrap with 1000 replications. The sample
period is 2006:2-2019:12.
Figure 1.9: The impact of a shock to solar consumption on disaggregate food prices
Notes: Solid lines are the cumulative impulse response functions, while dashed lines are




1.9.1 Are the results driven by an unreasonable identification re-
striction?
Figure 1.10: The impact of renewable energy consumption on aggregate food prices: Reverse
ordering of variables.
Notes: Solid lines are the cumulative impulse response functions, while dashed lines are
the 90% confidence bands based on the Wild bootstrap with 1000 replications. The sample
period is 1974:01-2019:12.
There is a concern that our results may be driven by the specific identification restriction
of the VAR model. Our identification strategy, which relies on the Choleski decomposition,
attempts to side step this problem by imposing the identification restriction that shocks to
renewable energy consumption affect food prices on impact, but that shocks to food prices
impact renewable energy consumption with a delay of at least a month. This assumption,
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however, may be subject to some debate.
As a result, Figure 1.10 plots impulse response functions resulting from an estimated
SVAR model in which identification is achieved by assuming that changes in food prices af-
fect renewable energy consumption contemporaneously, but that shocks to renewable energy
consumption impact food prices with a lag (i.e. the reverse ordering). Figure 1.10 confirms
the findings reported in Figure 1.3, suggesting that the statistical insignificance of the re-
sponses of food prices to the various renewable energy consumption shocks is not the result of
an unreasonable identification restriction. Variance decompositions (not reported) continue
to show that the contribution of shocks to renewable energy consumption to fluctuations in
food prices is minimal.
1.9.2 Are the results driven by omitted variable bias?
Another concern with our findings in Figure 1.3 is that the impulse response functions result
from a bivariate VAR model. Our main reason for relying on a bivariate VAR model is that
below we split our data into two subsamples following results from a structural break test.
The resulting smaller samples, together with the long lag order selected by the AIC (in all
cases 12 lags) raises degrees of freedom concerns since the VAR parameters increase as the
square of the number of variables is higher (Stock and Watson (2001)).
Nevertheless, it is possible that the insignificance of the responses in Figure 1.3 are in part
due to endogeneity problems arising from the omission of factors that simultaneously deter-
mine movements in food prices and renewable energy consumption. For example, changes
in global economic conditions are likely to lead to changes in both renewable energy con-
sumption and food prices: a global economic boom is likely to lead to higher demand for
renewables and higher food prices. Similarly, changes in oil prices, which are often associated
with changes in agricultural and commodity prices, are also likely to impact the consumption
of renewables.
To address this concern, we add global crude oil production, global real economic activity,
and crude oil prices to the baseline bivariate VAR model. The ordering of these variables
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follows Kilian (2009). In addition, we order these variables before U.S. renewable energy
consumption and food prices because changes in U.S. variables are unlikely to impact the
global economy instantaneously whereas changes in the global oil market and global eco-
nomic activity are likely to have an immediate impact domestically. Figure 1.11 shows that
controlling for these variables has little effect qualitatively and quantitatively on the esti-
mated impulse responses. Consequently, the impulse response functions shown hereafter are
based on the multivariate VAR model with the maintained assumption that food prices re-
spond to shocks to renewable energy consumption with a delay of at least a month, whereas
renewable energy consumption shocks have a contemporaneous effect on food prices.
Figure 1.11: The impact of renewable energy consumption on aggregate food prices: Addi-
tional controls.
Notes: Solid lines are the cumulative impulse response functions, while dashed lines are
the 90% confidence bands based on the Wild bootstrap with 1000 replications. The sample
period is 1974:01-2019:12. The VAR model controls for global crude oil production, global
real economic activity, and real oil prices.
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1.9.3 The role of renewable energy prices: The case of the ethanol
production price index
An additional consideration is the role of energy prices in the link between renewable energy
consumption changes and the impact on food price categories. We address this concern
in the case of biomass consumption by bringing into the analysis the Ethanol Production
Price Index (PPI). Nonetheless, as renewable energy consumption has had a relatively short
history, data on prices are less readily available. The measure obtained is only recorded from






















where Pt represents the real ethanol producer price index
17, Rt is the biomass share of
primary energy consumption and Ft is the measure of real food prices. B0 is our lower-
triangular coefficient matrix conveying our identification restriction. We assume that real
ethanol PPI can impact itself and other variables contemporaneously. Figure 1.12 presents
the food price response of aggregate food prices, alcoholic beverages and food away from
home. Earlier, the three categories showed significant increases a few months after a shock to
biomass consumption (see Figure 1.4 and Figure 1.5). In the upper panel we show the results
including the ethanol PPI and those without in the lower panel. After including ethanol PPI,
the shock to biomass no longer displays a significant positive effect on aggregate food prices.
However, alcoholic beverages prices still record the same spikes 8 months and 17 months
after. Furthermore, the confidence interval is smaller after the inclusion. Finally, in the case
of food away from home, the results is similar. A shock to renewable energy consumption in
the biomass category causes a positive significant increase in prices 6 months and 17 months
after a shock.
17We deflate the Ethanol PPI by the aggregate producer price index to obtain real values.
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Figure 1.12: The impact of biomass consumption on food prices: Inclusion of ethanol price
index.
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Notes: Solid lines are the cumulative impulse response functions, while dashed lines are
the 90% confidence bands based on the Wild bootstrap with 1000 replications. The sample
period is 1974:01-2019:12. The VAR model controls for global crude oil production, global
real economic activity, and real oil prices.
1.10 Policy implications
Our results broadly support that increased U.S. consumption of renewable energy has im-
pacted food prices especially in recent years. This renewable consumption surge is largely
policy driven (Janda et al. (2012)) with heavy government subsidies and production goals
that have modified the incentive structure faced by farmers. We have explicitly shown that
this occurs after the 2005 Energy Act even after taking into consideration the global crude
oil production, the global real activity as well as the crude oil prices. This policy change has
affected the supply of food crops through a variety of mechanisms depending on the energy
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source considered.
Domestically, it is important to recognize that the passing of the second Energy Act
of 2007 shows a long term commitment of the American government to move toward more
renewable energy production in particular bio-fuels. These energy acts have already con-
tributed to higher U.S. food prices which raise concerns about poverty, and food security.
This energy orientation will likely persist and continue to increase domestic food prices if
government subsidies continue to encourage energy crops.
Another crucial consideration is the extent of these effects on foreign food prices. As the
food price increases have been recorded in the U.S., they nevertheless represent a compara-
tively small share of the per-capita income of the average American household. This is not
so for developing countries. The United States is the world’s largest exporter of corn totaling
about 38% of the global exports in 2019 with Argentina in second place with less then half
this share (about 12.8%)18. The same year, about 40% of U.S. corn production went to
ethanol19. In other words, any change in the U.S. food markets is likely going to affect the
global food markets. Hundred of millions of consumers in these developing countries rely
on U.S. corn20 for food security and have felt the food prices pressure emerging from larger
ethanol production.
This research suggests that the substantial increase in renewable energy production and
consumption in the U.S. has lead to higher food prices through croplands substitution effects
accentuated by large federal subsidies. If the effect is measurable but modest for domestic
consumers, there are reasons to suspect that lower income foreign consumers could have been






Since the passage of the Energy Policy Act of 2005, there has been a substantial increase in
total U.S. renewable energy production and consumption, particularly biomass, solar, and
wind. This period has also coincided with significant increases in food prices paid by U.S.
consumers. This positive correlation has raised the question of the increase in U.S. renewable
energy production and consumption has causal impacts on food prices. There are a number of
theoretical reasons to believe that an increase in the production and consumption of certain
renewable energy sources may increase food prices. Consider the case of biofuels. Corn,
sugar cane, soybeans, and other oil seeds are used both as food and as inputs to produce
ethanol, biodiesel, or other biofuels. From a supply point of view, therefore, a diversion of
food crops to biofuels results in a leftward shift of the food supply curve, leading to a rise in
food prices. Second, corn, soybeans, sorghum, oats, and barley are the primary ingredients
used in commercially prepared feed. This shift from feed-related crops to biofuels raises the
cost of producing meat, poultry, and dairy products, ultimately leading to an increase in
their prices. Third, competition between agricultural commodities and the raw materials
used for biofuels for land, water, fertilizers, and other scarce resources puts further upward
pressure on food prices. In addition, the extent to which diesel and other biofuels are used
to power farm machinery and equipment will impact food prices.
There are also reasons to believe that an expansion of other renewable energy sources
may raise food prices. Like biofuels, competition between wind farms and agricultural land
may divert land from the latter to the former. To the extent that this happens, food prices
are expected to rise. Furthermore, while farmers do not operate windmills, they lease and
sell the land required for their installation, receiving compensation that typically surpass
agricultural land lease and sale prices. If land parcels and prices are spatially correlated, the
value of agricultural lands adjoining wind farms is expected to rise, leading to an increase in
agricultural prices. A similar argument can be made with respect to geothermal, hydropower,
and solar energy sources, although in these cases, the link to food prices is less clear.
Using an SVAR model and monthly U.S. data for the period 1974:01-2019:12, this pa-
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per examines the impact of shocks to renewable energy consumption on food prices. The
identification of structural shocks relies on the assumption that shocks to renewable energy
consumption impact food prices contemporaneously, whereas it takes at least a month for
shocks to food prices to affect renewable energy consumption. Our results provide no sig-
nificant evidence to support the hypothesis that shocks to renewable energy consumption
increase food prices for the entire sample period. However, for the period since the passage
of the Energy Policy Act, specifically, from 2006:2 to 2019:12, we find evidence that shocks
to biomass and wind energy consumption lead to significant increases in food prices in the
aggregate, as well as other important retail food prices. Hydropower and solar energy con-
sumption have no impact on food prices before, or since the passage of the Energy Policy
Act. We do, nevertheless, find that shocks to the various renewable energy sources consid-
ered explain a larger proportion of the fluctuations in food prices in the period since the
Energy Policy Act than before.
The results of this paper raise important policy considerations. In response to the in-
creased volatility of oil and other non-renewable energy prices, the U.S. dependence on for-
eign energy, the environmental consequences of carbon emissions and climate change, U.S.
federal, state, and local government officials have enacted policies that provide subsidies, re-
bates, and tax credits for renewable energy production, the installation of renewable energy
systems, renewable energy portfolio standards, and the creation of markets for renewable
certificates. A rise in biomass and wind energy production and consumption increases food
prices and could be a concern about poverty, hunger, and food security, which must be taken
into consideration when promoting biofuels, wind, and other renewable energy programs.
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Chapter 2
Education spending and growth: The
role of institutional quality
2.1 Introduction
Many variables influence the differences between countries’ economic growth. Among these,
education spending and economic institutions have consistently occupied important ranks in
the attempts to better understand the patterns of growth over time and between different
countries. Different governments dedicate different shares of their Gross Domestic Product
(GDP) to develop their human capital through education. Moreover, they have built a wide
variety of institutions. For poorer countries, education spending has historically been lower
than for the rest of the world (Blankenau, Simpson and Tomljanovich (2005)). While many
explanations populate the economics literature, policymakers and researchers still strive to
better understand the role of education spending and institutions in generating growth.
Economic theory provides much motivation to this inquiry. On the one hand, the link
between government education expenditures, human capital and long term economic growth
has been thoroughly formalized in the endogenous growth literature1. On the other hand, in
their seminal paper on “The Colonial Origins of Comparative Development: An Empirical
1Examples include Cassou and Lansing (1998) and Glomm and Ravikumar (1997).
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Investigation”, Acemoglu and Robinson (2001) emphasize the critical role that good insti-
tutions play for economic development through property rights and argue that the current
global development disparities can be largely attributed to the colonial influence and its
inherited government structures. While the role of education spending has been shown to
be important by many authors (Blankenau and Simpson (2004)), the majority of economic
models ignore the institutional context in which these expenditures are made. We believe
that this approach is incomplete and that a realistic picture of the impact of education
spending on growth can be better captured in light of the existing institutional quality.
Our results show that both education spending and institutions positively contribute to
long run growth especially in rich and developing countries. However, the positive effect of
education spending seems to vary greatly depending on the existing institutional quality.
In particular, the marginal benefit of increased education spending decreases with better
institutional quality. This suggests a possible substitute relationship between the two in
terms of economic growth. In other words, as education spending and institutions both
have a positive and significant impact on growth, their combined change seems to create a
somewhat redundant effect.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2.2, provides a brief background
of the related literature on growth. Section 2.3 introduces the concept of institutions, their
creation and why they persist. Section 2.4 develops a simple endogenous growth model,
Section 2.5 presents a detailed exposition of the data used, while Section 2.6 describes the
resulting empirical specifications. Section 2.7 presents the results, and Section 2.8 conducts
a sensitivity analysis. We conclude in Section 2.9.
2.2 Related literature
2.2.1 Institutions and growth
Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson (2004) develop an empirical and theoretical framework
arguing that economic institutions are a fundamental engine of long run growth. The study
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relies on two historical quasi-experiments with the division of Korea into two parts with
different institutions and the 15th century European colonization of many areas of the world.
The paper makes the case that economic institutions determine the incentives experienced
by economic actors. Further, economic institutions encouraging economic growth can only
emerge when political institutions allocate power to groups with interest in property rights
enforcement. Institutions must create constraints on power holders and there must be few
rents to be captured. This paper shows the importance and status of institutional quality
in a new light. Institutions are central to growth, but they can change when the right set of
conditions exist.
Similarly, Aisen and Veiga (2013), using a GMM estimator in a panel of 169 countries
between 1960 and 2004 find that higher degrees of political instability are associated with
lower growth rates of GDP per capita. Regarding the channels of transmission, they find
that political instability adversely affects growth by lowering productivity and, to a smaller
degree, physical and human capital accumulation. Finally, they find that economic free-
dom and ethnic homogeneity are beneficial to growth, while democracy may have a small
negative effect. By and large, the recent economics literature has endorsed the idea that
national institutions are indeed important to understand development patterns. With more
investment in human and physical capital and less distortionary policies, nations get to use
their resources more efficiently and achieve a greater level of income and growth.
Payen and Ronde (2020) present a detailed treatment of institutions and their definition in
recent years as well as several alternatives for their measurements. Institutions as measured
by property rights can determine growth because of the incentives they generate (North
(1981)). Calderon and Chong (2020) use a causal analysis method and show the link between
institutions and economic growth. The study uses a yearly panel of 44 developing countries
between 1965 and 1995 with a reduced form approach controlling for simultaneity and reverse
causality. They also show how the impact of institutional change takes time to be visible.
In other words, the more time is given, the stronger the effect of institutional changes on
economic growth can be.
In the literature, there are different perspectives on institutions and their nature, for
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example, political as opposed to economic institutions. Some studies have focused only on
the direct relationship between political institutions alone and economic growth. For the
most part, they find that political regimes which promote participation may be expected to
have positive and long-term economic growth. Rodrik (2000) is a landmark study with this
perspective. The author emphasizes the importance of private initiative and incentives in
the context of strong institution building. Henisz (2000) extends this paper and shows that
the relationship is not linear.
Despite the general orientation of the literature to confirm this institution to growth
relationship, it is necessary to note that a number of authors question the finding. A well
known study by Glaeser, La Porta, Lopez-De-Silanes and Shleifer (2000) contradicts the
previous studies. They suggest that the measure of institutions in use are unable to pro-
vide the perspective that researchers need. Instead, their results support growth theories
which emphasize the spillover effect of human capital as opposed to institutional quality.
Their findings suggest that a country will emerge from poverty through the accumulation of
physical and human capital allowed by the government (be it a dictatorship or a democracy)
which in turn leads to change in institutions allowing the achievement of even further growth
in a virtuous cycle. In many regards, the Glaeser et al. (2000) study presents a perspective
of institutions which is far more fluid than Acemoglu and Robinson (2001) where institutions
have a tendency to persist over decades and even centuries. Another theory provided by Auer
(2013) suggests that geography has influenced colonization policies and in turn institutional
outcomes more than is usually shown in the literature. The study argues that Acemoglu et
al. (2001) overestimates the importance of institutions for economic growth by 28% and that
La Porta et al. (2009) underestimates the importance of colonization imposed institutions
by 63% because Britain tended to colonize countries away from Europe.
We see that the literature on growth and institutions is not unanimous. Nevertheless,
researchers have attempted to unify the different views by introducing other variables. Lee
and Kim (2009) show that the effect of institution and human capital on growth varies
depending on the initial level of development. They show that developed countries must
promote higher education and technological innovations while emerging economies should
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focus on primary education and the development of stronger institutions.
Overall, we take from this brief analysis of the literature that the positive impact of in-
stitutions on growth is robust but can be influenced by several additional variables including
the country’s original level of development, geography and political stability.
2.2.2 Education spending and growth
Human capital has long been recognized as a critical determinant of economic growth. Ed-
ucation spending allows countries to build this capital but great disparities still exist in
education spending between rich and developing countries.
The hypothesis that more education spending promotes growth has been supported by
theoretical and empirical studies alike even in some developing countries (Pradhan (2009),
Tamang (2011)). For example, Owusu-Nantwi (2015), uses data on education spending and
growth from Ghana from 1970 to 2012 and shows that this positive relationship exists also
in this emerging economy. Hong Sang and Thorbecke (2003) simulate a computable general
equilibrium model in Tanzania and Zambia showing not only that education spending can
improve growth but also that an optimally targeted spending level can also reduce poverty.
Hussin et al. (2012) use a vector autoregression model (VAR) for the Malaysian economy
between 1970 and 2012 and find that GDP growth is positively cointegrated with fixed capital
formation, education expenditures and labor force participation. Nevertheless, studies on
this question have not produced consistent results in all part of the world and at all growth
stages.
Pradhan (2009) investigates the same link in India between 1951 and 2001. The author’s
findings suggests a unidirectional causality from economic growth to education expenditures.
The econometric model was an Vector Error Correction Model (VECM). Other studies have
found a negative or even no such relationship such as Devarajan, Swaroop, and Zou (1996)
and Blis and Klenov (2000). Devarajan et al. (1996) studies a sample of 43 countries over 20
years and finds a negative influence of education expenditures on growth. Blis and Klenov
(2000) argues that the link was too weak to support significance. Their study involves 52
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countries between 1960 and 1990.
Many other studies have explored this relationship between education spending and eco-
nomic growth with mixed results even in more developed countries. Fisher (1997) provides
a review of the literature and concludes that the link between education spending and eco-
nomic growth is relatively weak. The review features 19 studies done between 1985 and 1995
investigating this link also at the U.S. state level. Some studies used spending on either K-12
or higher education or in some cases both. Among the studies, only 6 showed a positive and
significant impact on growth. We note that most of these studies do not control for general
equilibrium changes and do not control for state or local government budget constraints.
Blankenau and Simpson (2004) provide a theoretical framework explaining that the mixed
empirical results observed in the literature could be attributed to general equilibrium effects.
Practically, this means that productive education spending can nonetheless lower growth
due to the negative growth effect of taxation. If the decrease in real economic activity
due to higher taxes is larger than the increase due to more education spending, a negative
relationship will be observed. Deskins, Hill and Ullrich (2010) study this link using a U.S.
state panel approach from 1992 to 2002 and separately analyze higher and K-12 education
spending. They also account for possible spillover effects due to increased neighbors’ states
spending. They conclude that increased spending on higher education consistently exhibits a
large negative effect on private sector employment and state growth when financed through
own resource revenue. They do not identify a significant relationship between K-12 education
spending and growth. The results also rules out cross-state spillover effects.
Blankenau, Simpson and Tomljanovich (2005) address this gap by considering the same
link and developing a theoretical model leading to a growth equation. After estimation in a
panel of rich countries, they find that a positive link exists between public education expen-
ditures on growth for developed countries once the national budget constraint is imposed.
They argue that the lack of consensus in the literature emanates from a failure to consistently
account for the source of financing of increased education spending.
Given that a purpose of education spending is to improve a country’s human capital, other
studies have focused on the human capital link to long run growth. Hanushek and Woes-
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man (2012) develop a new metric of educational achievement distribution across countries
to better track cognitive skills. Their cross-country regressions show a close relationship
between cognitive skills and GDP growth which is robust to several sensitivity checks of
time period, country samples and specifications. Another study by Angelopoulos, Malley
and Philippopoulos (2008) calibrates a dynamic general equilibrium model where human
capital fuels long run endogenous growth. Their results suggest that while more education
spending raises growth, welfare does not necessarily increase. The relation between public
expenditures and long run growth as well as the lifetime utility has an inverted-U shape.
As public expenditures crowd out private consumption, increased public spending enhances
welfare only if there is a change in the government tax-spending schedule.
Furthermore, other research has shown that changes in education spending take time
to be affect economic growth. Atems and Blankenau (2020) shows that output can have a
delayed response to public education spending because it takes time for impacted students to
enter the labor force. The paper uses a stochastic overlapping generation model to track the
dynamics of the economy when it is responding to higher education spending. The study is
done at the U.S. state level between (1963-2016) with a panel structural VAR methodology.
The identification assumption is that shocks to output affect education spending with a lag.
Furthermore, their results align with their model prediction and show that output responds
to education spending with peaks occurring between 3 and 13 years after the spending shock.
Another finding is that shocks to education spending explain a relatively large share of the
long run variation in output.
2.2.3 The interaction of education spending and institutions
The current literature on education spending and growth finds a positive link2 especially
among developed countries (Blankenau et al. (2005)) and a consistent positive impact of
institutions has also been documented (Rodrik (2008)). This abundance of related stud-
ies contrasts greatly with the limited attention given to the combined effects of these two
2Bose, Haque and Osborn (2007).
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important forces in achieving long term economic growth. Most studies have explored the
impacts of education spending on growth as if they were detached from the countries’ in-
stitutional environment. Conversely, other studies of growth have focused on institutions
without accounting for the role of the education spending lever. A gap exists in their com-
bined consideration.
Keefer and Knack (2008) investigate the role of public expenditures for growth and shows
an inverse relationship to productivity due to government quality. In other words, limited
public investment could be more productive given a lower quality of government. Weak
governments with high spending face the risk of inefficiency and waste. A limitation of these
results in our context, is that the study investigates public spending in general without focus-
ing on the education share. Nevertheless, these findings are consistent with previous results
showing that the method of financing matters because of spending reallocation (Deskins, Hill
and Ullrich (2010)). A weaker government plausibly runs the risk of more inefficiencies and
waste. Butkiewicz and Yanikkaya (2008) expand on this question by exploring different cat-
egories of government expenditures between developing and developed countries. Although
education spending is not separately investigated, the study shows that public consumption
spending has a negative effect on growth in developing nations and no effect in developed
ones. The mixed results show that the growth impact of government spending can suffer
from failure to account for government quality.
Our hypothesis is that a similar attention to institutions is necessary to properly estimate
the impacts of education spending on growth especially when general equilibrium effects are
not accounted for. We explore this question by using education expenditures and several
indexes of countries’ institutional quality via panel and cross-sectional approaches. Given
previous specifications in the literature, we study separate samples for rich, middle income
and developing countries as well as all countries collectively.
50
2.3 The creation of institutions and their persistence
Acemoglu and Robinson (2001) argues that institutions are inherited from early historical
events and persist for long periods of time. The study focuses on the climate and disease
shocks experienced by the European colonists when accessing different territories. The idea
is that the environment essentially molded the kind of institutions Europeans established.
For example, malaria and yellow fever contributed to more than 80% of European deaths
in colonies, while gastrointestinal diseases (such as diarrhea, dysentery and others) only ac-
counted for 15% of the deceased (Curtin (1989)). Colonies which did not have these diseases,
such as New Zealand, were actually healthier than Europe since tuberculosis, pneumonia and
small pox, among others, were quite rare in the new territories even if they still existed in
Europe (Curtin (1989)).
Both malaria and yellow fever are transmitted by mosquito vectors3. In West Africa,
individuals can get many hundred bites per year and this from an early age4. To a person
without developed immunity, malaria is often lethal. European settlers were in this situation
and many died in Africa, India and the Caribbean. In these colonies, Europeans created
institutions geared toward extracting resources instead of promoting free market operations
through property rights. In contrast, historians (Cain (1993)) have documented the de-
velopment of “settler colonies”. In such colonies, Europeans settled in large numbers and
modeled life after the home country customs. These settlers demanded institutions which
allowed them to acquire what they wanted through freedom and private ownership. An
example is Australia. Most of the early settlers in Australia were ex-convicts and the lands
were mostly owned by ex-jailers and there was no protection against arbitrary landowners’
decisions. In 1788, Australia started as a penal colony. Great Britain sent its convicts to be
imprisoned and to provide free labor. Later, they received freedom when Australia was es-
tablished. However, in the earlier phase, due to residual powers, the ex-jailors now assumed
the role of landowners requiring rents and taxes as well as other arbitrary demands from
the newly freed population. Despite early resistance from Great Britain, the settlers argued
3Anopheles gambiae and funestus and Aedes aegypti.
4https://www.vectorbase.org/organisms/anopheles-gambiae.
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that they were British as well and deserved jury trials, freedom from arbitrary arrests and
electoral representation, which they obtained eventually (Hughes (1987)).
This depiction is in sharp contrast with the experience of other colonies. For instance,
in Latin America during the seventeenth and eighteenth century, the main objective of the
Spanish and Portuguese colonists was to obtain gold and other valuable resources. Therefore,
they organized a complex mercantilist system of monopolies and trade customs aiming to
extract resources from the Latin American colonies (Lang (1975)). In Africa, the logic behind
the slave trade was similar. Before the mid-nineteenth century, the colonists were on the
coasts and focused on the slave trade, gold and other commodities including ivory. This
explains the naming of some territories as “Gold Coast” now Ghana or “The Ivory Coast”
with the latter having kept the suggestive name. One of the most extreme cases of extraction
was Belgium with King Leopold who forbade the market economy in Congo and instead set
up a compulsory system of cultivation of crops to be sold and distributed by the state at
controlled prices. Peemmans (1975) estimates that the tax rate on Africans in the Congo
climbed as high as 60 percent of their income between 1920 and 1930.
Acemoglu and Robinson (2001) argue that these conditions explain why certain institu-
tions were created during the colonial era and have persisted even to this day. An example of
this persistence is the monetary structure in many old French colonies in West Africa. After
the independence in the 1960’s, many French-speaking African nations kept their currency
tied to the French central bank, limiting their monetary policy tools. Another example of
inherited procedures was Zaire, now Congo. Mobutu Sese Seko then the president reinstated
forced labor long after the European colonists had left.
Acemoglu and Robinson (2001) emphasize that the extractive institutions can persist
due to two main mechanisms: First, creating new institutions which place restrictions on
government, require accountability, legal equity and enforcement of property right is expen-
sive and time demanding. In contrast, the marginal benefit of the status quo is likely higher
than the costs for the new elite of the newly independent countries. The inherited system is
already in favor of the ruling class. They can avoid these “transformation” costs by simply
carrying on with the inherited extractive institutions and processes. Second, if agents have
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already made investments that are complementary to the old extractive institutions, it will
not be in their favor to switch to the other kind.
2.4 Model
Our investigation of the literature generally supports that both education spending and
institutional quality exert a positive effect on economic growth. We also find that their
combined effect is essentially unexplored. Our next objective is therefore to develop an
economic model that ties them together in the growth generating process.
We use an overlapping generation model of growth which shares features with Blanke-
nau, Simpson and Tomljanovich (2005) to investigate the relationship between education
spending and growth in the context of institutional quality. Our model economy consists
of three-period-lived homogeneous agents, a representative firm producing a single good, a
government and a technology for producing human capital. The model is set up to produce
a closed-form solution leading to a growth equation which we later estimate. The main dis-
tinction of our model is the interaction of national institutions with education expenditures
within this technology.
2.4.1 The agents’ problem
A continuum of agents, normalized to 1, is born in each period. The initial old are endowed
with Ko units of physical capital. The period t learners (agents in their first period of life)
receive an endowment of public education inputs given by Et. The initial old are endowed
with K0 units of physical capital and the original earners has h0 units of human capital.
Public inputs, Et, combine with the human capital of the previous generation’s, ht, in order







where µ is between 0 and 1 and ξ > 0. We will later set ξ ≡ ξ(q, e) where q and e represent
institutional quality and a measure of education expenditures. For ease of notation, we
currently express this as ξ. The parameter µ governs the relative importance of public
education expenditures and human capital in the formation of future human capital and ξ
acts as a scaling effect.
Agents inelastically supply their one unit of human capital endowment to the represen-
tative firm and receive after tax lifetime income in proportion to their human capital level.
In particular, agents receives wt+1ht+1(1− τt) where wt+1 is the period t+1 wage, ht+1 is the
human capital in period t+1 and τt is the income tax rate. Earners either consume their net
wage income or save for the third period through capital accumulation. The capital holding
for the period t learner at the end of period t + 1 is Kt,t+2 emphasizing that this capital
is productive in period t + 2. A unit of capital purchased in period t returns rt+1(1 − τt)
in period t + 1. Ct,t+1 and Ct,t+2 respectively denote the consumption by agents born in
time t in period t+ 1 and subsequently in period t+ 2. Preferences are logarithmic in both
consumption levels with discount rate 0 ≤ β < 1. The representative agent’s problem is:
max
Ct,t+1,Ct,t+2,Kt,t+2
ln Ct,t+1 + β lnCt,t+2 (2.2)
subject to
Ct,t+1 +Kt+2 ≤ wt+1ht+1(1− τt)
Ct,t+2 ≤ rt+2Kt+2(1− τt)
Ct,t+j ≥ 0, j = 1, 2.







Ct,t+2 = [wt+1ht+1(1− τt)− Ct,t+1] rt+2(1− τt).
Substituting this expression of Ct,t+2 into Equation (2.2) and taking first order condition



























[wt+1ht+1(1− τt)] . (2.3)
2.4.2 Firms
A representative firm combines human capital and physical capital to generate a single final
good. As is common in the growth literature, we assume that output is a Cobb-Douglas
combination of physical and human capital. The parameter A denotes the effectiveness of
labor with A > 0. The share parameter α is between 0 and 1. We define Yt as the total
output and Ht the total human capital hired by the firm. We also define kt and yt respectively












The market for inputs and output are competitive. Thus, the firm takes prices as given and




wt = A(1− α)kαt . (2.6)
where rt is the rental rate of capital and wt is the wage of workers both in period t.
2.4.3 Government
Government spends a share e of output on public education expenditures and we define
ẽ ≡ exp(e). Expenditures are related to educational inputs by
Et = ẽYt. (2.7)
An additional share of output, gt, is spent by the government on items other than education
and which have no impact on productivity. All expenditures are financed through taxes on
labor and capital income and the tax rate is given by τt. Revenues and expenditures must
balance in each period. Government policy then is the set {τt, et, gt} such that:
τt(wtht + rtKt) = (et + gt)Yt. (2.8)
2.4.4 Equilibrium and balanced growth path
Definition 1: A competitive equilibrium in this environment is a sequence of consumption
levels and portfolio holdings {Ct,t+1, Ct,t+2, Kt,t+2}t=∞t=0 chosen by the representative agents of
each generation, a sequence of outputs and inputs chosen by the representative firm in each
period {Yt, Kt, Lt}t=∞t=0 , a sequence of government policies {τt, et, gt}t=∞t=0 , a sequence of prices
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{wt, rt}t=∞t=0 , and a set of initial conditions {K0, h0} such that:
1. period t learners chooses Ct,t+1, Ct,t+2 and Kt,t+2 to solve their agents problem taking
prices and government policy as given,
2. the firm chooses Yt, Kt and Lt in period t to maximize profits taking prices, government
policy and the production possibilities (Equation (2.4)) as given,
3. the government chooses {τt, et, gt}t=∞t=0 subject to a balanced budget constraint,
4. the stock of human capital evolves according to Equations (2.1) and (2.7),
5. the goods market clears: Yt = (et + gt)Yt + Ct−1,t + Ct−2,t +K(t−1,t+1),
6. the capital market clears, and
7. the labor market clears: Lt = ht.
Definition 2: A balanced growth path satisfies Definition 1 and has the following additional
properties:
1. Government policy is time invariant, {τt, et, gt}t=∞t=0 = {τ, e, g},
2. The stock of human capital, the stock of physical capital, consumption by earners,
consumption by the old, and output all grow at the same and constant rate, γt. That












An implication of Definition 2 is that kt, yt, wt and rt are constant. Let us solve for the
balanced growth path. When subscripts are dropped, Equations (2.1) and (2.7) reduce to
1 + γ = ξ(ẽAkα)µ. (2.9)
We solve for k as a function of policy instruments and the parameters of the model.
























Putting this expression in Equation (2.9) and rearranging terms yields:














Recall ξ≡ ξ(q, e), where q is the quality of institutions. This is a central innovation to our
study. The fundamental intuition of our specification is that the human capital stock grows
in Equation (2.1) in proportion to education spending but also due to the scaling effect of ξ.
Here we present this scalar ξ as an interaction term of education spending and institutional
quality.
This is not the only way of modeling this relationship so we also provide an alternative
specification in Section B.2.1 for more intuition while we focus on the current form. We also
introduce χ1 and χ2 which respectively represent the importance of institutional quality and
its interaction with education spending to the scaling effect. Both parameters can be any
real number. In particular:
ξ ≡ exp(q)χ1exp(qe)χ2
so Equation (2.10) becomes















To arrive at a simpler expression for growth, we perform a monotonic transformation through
the natural logarithm of each side and use the approximation ln(1 + γ) ≈ γ to arrive at:
γ ≈ λ0 + λ1e+ λ2q + λ3qe (2.11)





1−α(1+µ) ] − αµ
1−α(1+µ)τ , λ1 =
µ(1−α)






This is the baseline specification of our growth equation including education spending
and the interaction term with institutional quality. In addition, we present a second speci-
fication including the government budget constraint to find the relationship between e and
τ . Equation (2.8) implies:
τ(wtht + rtKt) = (et + gt)Yt
which can be rewritten as:
τYt = (et + gt)Yt.
This implies:









1− α(1 + µ)
τ.
So we define












1− α(1 + µ)
τ.
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Therefore, the growth equation including the budget constraint is:
γ ≈ φ0 + λ1e+ λ2q + λ3qe+ λ4 [e+ g]
or
γ ≈ φ0 + (λ1 + λ4)e+ λ2q + λ3qe+ λ4g. (2.12)
This growth equation including e, q and qe conveys the fundamental intuition of the
model. The effect of education spending on economic growth is different depending on the
level of institutional quality. If we focus on Equation (2.12), the marginal effect of education
spending varies with the institutional quality:
∂γ
∂e
= λ1 + λ4 + λ3q.
Conceptually, λ1 represents the direct positive effect of education spending on growth.
The parameter λ4 represents the indirect negative effect due to education spending financed
through taxation5. In previous research, if the effect from λ1 dominates the taxation effect
from λ4 education spending positively impacts growth. Otherwise, the overall impact is
negative. In this paper, we extend the theory by including the effect coming from λ3 which
is the institutional quality effect. Three cases are possible with respect to institutional
quality.
First, if no complement or substitute relationship exists between education spending and
the latter, λ3 is zero and institutional quality has no bearing on the relationship between
education expenditures and growth. If λ3 is positive then both variables have a complemen-
tary effect in achieving economic growth. The third case is when λ3 is negative. This would
mean that there is a substitute relationship between education spending and institutional
quality. In other words, ceterus paribus, the better the existing institutions, the lower the
marginal impact of education expenditures on growth is. The marginal effect of education
spending would decrease in institutional quality. We emphasize that this does not mean that
5Blankenau et al. (2005) show that this effect is negative.
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institutional quality or education spending are detrimental to growth, but rather that when
high levels of one exist, the marginal benefit of the other diminishes.
In Section (2.5) we present the data used to empirically estimate this parameter λ3 and
test our model in a panel of countries.
2.4.5 Institutional quality and optimal growth spending
Our model of growth also offers the opportunity to derive the optimal level of education
spending within the boundaries of our framework. We use Equation (2.10):














Our objective is to derive the level of education spending that maximizes growth γ in this
expression. Taking the first order condition with respect to e after a logarithmic monotonic
transformation, we obtain:
e∗ = 1− g − αµ
(χ2 + µ)(1− α)
. (2.13)
Conceptually, as education expenditures are productive, countries below this threshold
of spending would still be experiencing a positive effect on growth. Conversely, spending
beyond this threshold would yields negative marginal benefits.
2.5 Data
In the previous section, we have modeled the joint impact of education spending and insti-
tutional quality in an overlapping generations model of growth. In this section, we provide
a detailed presentation of the core variables used to estimate this relationship in the rest
of the chapter. They include q, our measure of institutional quality, e, the measure of edu-
cation spending and γ, the measure of economic growth which is based on GDP data and
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additional control variables for robustness checks. We present some information about their
origin, their construction and their meaning in context. We show how countries are grouped
based on income levels and finally provide summary statistics to describe the data.
2.5.1 The measures of institutional quality
The main measure of institutional quality is the index of protection against expropriation.
Political Risk Services produces the data, but they are not free to access. Our data originate
from the Acemoglu and Robinson (2001). This measure of institutional quality was first used
in the literature by Knack and Keefer (2001). The index reports a value between 0 and 10
for each country and year where 10 represents the highest protection against expropriation.
For example, both Netherlands and the United States have a ranking of 10. Our measure
is the average of the index between 1985 and 1995. We note that there are many missing
values before that time.
One limitation of this measure is that it does not vary with time. However, because
national institutional quality is persistent through time, we do not believe this to be a major
challenge. We supplement our analysis with additional measures of institutional quality for
sensitivity analysis. Alternatively, we use property rights and government integrity. The
two indexes originate from the Economic Freedom database of the Heritage Foundation and
are available every year between 1995 and 2019 for several countries. We expect that high
measures of the three indexes will reflect the notion of strong institutional quality. According
to our hypothesis, this would be countries with a tradition of rule of law, enforcement of
property rights as well as legal rights.
2.5.2 The measure of public education expenditures
The World Bank database reports total education expenditures for all levels of government
as a percentage of GDP. This measure also includes expenditures funded by transfers from
international sources to government. The data is originally provided by the United Nations
Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO). This measure is useful to
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compare education spending relative to the size of an economy over time. It is important to
note that in many cases the data refers to education spending organized by the ministry of
education only and does not capture other ministries’ involvement. The estimate is based on
data collected from official responses to annual education surveys. As the school year spans
two years in most countries (for example September 2014 to June 2015) the referenced year
will be 2015 in our database. Unlike Devarajan et al. (1996), we measure education spending
as a share of total output rather than government expenditure. We follow Blankenau, Simp-
son and Tomljanovich (2005) since we are interested in the role of education expenditures
and not the bulk of government spending. Furthermore, the measure of education spending
includes not only the central government but also all other levels including local and state
government. In most countries, a majority of public education expenditures comes from
local and state governments rather than the central government alone6.
2.5.3 The Penn World Table and our measure of growth
If comparing income levels within a given country can be challenging because of price level
differences as well as living standards disparities, the task is even more complicated at the
international level across time. One widely used source of such data is the Penn World Tables
(PWT) maintained by researchers at the University of California Davis and the University
of Groningen. In this section, we present a brief overview of its data collection rules and
computations to understand the strength and limitations of the main source of growth data.
The Penn World Tables were built from the International Comparison Program (ICP) in
1968 at the University of Pennsylvania7. The ICP benchmark comparisons were themselves
based on 150 expenditure headings for which price analysis was made for 3 to 6 items per
basic category. At first, the benchmark comparisons were for 10 countries in 1970 and then
34 countries in 1975. This number rose to 150 countries by 2005. At first, expansion to more
countries was a problem, but Summers and Ahmad (1974) elaborated a new method and
published estimates for 101 countries. Their new method applied the relationship between
6https://educationdata.org/public-education-spending-statistics.
7This is the origin of the name Penn World Tables.
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per capita income and prices for benchmark countries to estimate the purchasing power
parity (PPP) of non-benchmark countries. Several challenges came with this approach and
the modern versions of the database have attempted to address them. Successive updates
throughout the past four decades have added more countries (183 in the PWT10) and more
years (1950-2019) with measures of capital, productivity, employment, population, exchange
rates, total factor productivity and GDP from several perspectives. In comparison with
other databases such as the World Bank Development Indicators (WDI), the PWT offers a
larger time coverage and also more data to compare productivity across countries.
The common practice in the literature had been to compare GDP across countries using
the exchange rate. The approach is problematic because it rests on the assumption that
relative prices (which are based on traded products) are representative of all prices across
countries. In other words, this approach assumed that these relative prices reflect well the
PPP of each currency. The PWT, in contrast, uses detailed prices within each country for a
vector of expenditures categories, including both traded and non-traded goods (i.e. clothing
as opposed to lawn mowing care). Then, these prices are aggregated in an overall relative
price level which is referred to as the country’s PPP. These detailed prices emanate from
data originating from the World Bank and mainly the ICP8.
Feenstra, Inklaar and Timmer (2015) document what is commonly known as the “Penn
Effect”. They find that real GDP is substantially underestimated when using the real ex-
change rate instead of the PPP in comparing GDP across countries. This is traditionally
attributed to the Balassa-Samuelson effect (see Asea (1994), Samuelson (1994) and Balassa
(1964)). Asea (1994) presents a dynamic two sector growth model with two countries and
an open economy with imperfectly competitive non-traded goods along with supporting em-
pirical results. Essentially, the idea is that as countries grow richer, productivity increases
mostly in the manufacturing sector and other trade related activities. This increases wages
and prices of other non-traded goods and services eventually raising the overall price level
in the economy. The result is that many rapidly growing countries like China are shown to
be much richer using PPP based real GDP compared to the exchange rate real GDP.
8Feenstra et al. (2013).
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The PWT is also a more detailed alternative because it includes data on consumption,
investment, government and more. Estimates are provided with the benchmark year 2011
either in current or constant chained prices. The database is extensively used in economic
research. We note that the OECD also provides PPP estimates that are more reliable for
their member countries. The measure is more reliable within the OECD because the countries
have more comparable goods harmonized by the PPP. In contrast, the PWT attempts to
provide a comparable benchmark for countries that have vastly varying levels of economic
development. For example, one unit of housing in the U.S. is likely different from one unit
of housing in the Congo, a poorer economy, on average. The main advantage of the PWT is
the number of countries and years covered. In contrast, the World Bank also provides PPP
estimates each year in their World Development Report9, but they are not formatted as
time series. The PWT also provides quality grades depending on the number of benchmark
comparison in which a country has taken part and how consistent are the estimates in
previous issues of the database.
One of the main concepts in the PWT is the measurement of real GDP in the international
context. For an accurate comparison of real GDP, merely evaluating GDP at constant prices
(as with a numeraire traded good) across countries is not enough. To address this problem,
the PWT holds all prices for goods and services constant across countries. Knowing there are
several ways to approach this problem as well as different measures of interests, the measures
of real GDP vary depending on the measurment objective of the researchers. For example,
some measures are better suited to assess difference across time within a country while other
measures are more advised for cross-country comparison. A basic distinction in the database
is drawn between GDP measured from the expenditure side and the production or output
side. Earlier issues of the PWT only reported expenditure side measures, but beginning in
2015, output side measures were added.
The output side measure of GDP was difficult to measure because its calculation involved
relative prices of consumption and investments as well as data on exported and imported
goods and services. The researchers thus started with the unit values of imported and
9http://pubdocs.worldbank.org/en/332341517441011666/PPP-brochure-2017-webformat-rev.pdf
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exported goods. Feenstra and Romalsi (2014) obtain quality adjusted prices across countries
which are much more reliable. After dividing exports by these adjusted prices, they obtain
quality adjusted quantities which are treated as output. Likewise, after dividing imports
by the adjusted prices, they obtain measures which are treated as inputs. This measure of
real GDP from the output side is particularly fit for analyzing the disparities in productivity
across countries in a given year. This measure will vary from the expenditure side to the
extent that countries have heterogenous terms of trade (Feenstra et al. (2009)).
The other important concept in measurement with the PWT is whether the prices of
goods are held constant across countries (variables prefixed with “C”) or across countries as
well as across time (variables prefixed with “R”). It follows from this distinction that the
previously mentioned values of GDP from the output side (suffixed with“o”) and expenditure
side (suffixed with“e”) come in current or real forms. In the database, real GDP based on
constant prices across countries but only in the current year are CGDP e and CGDP o. On
the other hand, real GDP using prices constancy across countries as well as over time are
labeled RGDP e and RGDP o. The first concept which uses the current year (changing from
year to year) is often referred to in the international comparison literature as “current-prices”
real GDP. As such, it is relatively straightforward to correct these measures for inflation in
a particular country, but it is not real in the common sense of the term.
Note that the set of prices at which the GDP is evaluated changes from year to year. As
such, this measure of real GDP is especially suited for comparison of GDP across countries in
a particular year. The measures starting with “R” hold prices constant across countries and
over time. It is closer in spirit to what is commonly referred to as “real”. We refer to it as
“constant prices” real GDP. These variables work well for comparisons across countries over
time. For example, they could be used to compare the productive capacity of an African
country now to the U.S. economy at a point in the past. Because of the way they are
constructed, the data of current and constant prices real GDP overlap in year the 2001
(CGDP e=RGDP e and CGDP o=RGDP o).
However, the main measure of real GDP in our study is the RGDPNA or real GDP
at constant national prices obtained from national accounts data for each country. This
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measure is advised by Feenstra et al. (2015) when focusing on growth of GDP over time in
each country. Furthermore, they recommend using RGDPNA over RGDP e for pure time-
series comparisons of growth rates but they also mention that the national prices present a
certain degree of limitation compared to other measures. Using nighttime lights data and
comparisons with the World Development Indicators (WDI), Pinkovskiy and Sala-i-Martin
(2016) provide several evidences that RGDPNA has better cross-sectional performances than
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Figure 2.1: Link between different measures of GDP in 2017
Figure 2.1 shows the relationship between the three measures of GDP. We see that
RGDPNA is highly correlated with both RGDP e and RGDP o. Note that this close proxim-
ity need not imply equality because of the added balance of trade in the case of RGDPNA.
The Penn World Tables have long been a preferential source of estimates for data overtime
and across countries. We have attempted in this section to present a brief introduction to its
10Pinkovskiy and Sala-i-Martin (2016) use these data because they are a measure of economic activity
unlikely to suffer the measurement problem of other databases. The study investigates several releases of
the PWT to provide insights on its evalution and performance over the years.
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content and construction to better understand the data colllection process and the choices
which have determined the use of certain variables over others and the meaning that is
attached to their respective construction. In summary, and for the data most important to
this study of economic growth, education spending and institutional quality, we retain that
GDP e and GDP o measure the relative level across countries and come either at current
prices “C” or real prices “R.” The first variable is best for comparative well-being or living
standards while the output version is best suited for productive capacity analysis. However,
we favor the national account measure of GDP in the rest of our study because it is more fit
to analyse growth rates across countries and time. We also note that there is a non-negligible
margin of error when comparing countries with largely different patterns and income levels
(see Section B.3.1). Finally, the national account data can also be different between the
PWT releases due to constant revisions and updates.
2.5.4 Additional control variables
We supplement our baseline regression with several control variables. We add measures of
human capital, government expenditures net of education, average hours worked per year,
capital stock per capita, depreciation rate of capital stock, GDP per capita in 1970 and
the latitude of the country’s capital to account for geographical differences. In this section,
we present them in more details but focus on the measure of human capital because of the
relative complexity of its construction. Furthermore, several analogous variables populate
the literature, so we provide a brief comparison of the PWT strengths.
Evidence supports the inclusion of government spending in the growth regression as an
additional regressor. Landau (1986) and Easterly and Rebelo (1993) find that real govern-
ment consumption net of education and defense has a significant negative effect on growth.
In comparison, Bleaney, Gemmell and Kneller (2001) show that non-education expenditures
can increase growth. In our study, we include it in many sensitivity analysis specifications.
We emphasize that our measure of government spending is net of education spending. It
represents the share of public spending allocated to compensation of employees, defense and
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security but exclude government military spending. We obtain the data from the WDI.
There is also a large literature which suggests that educational attainment and cognitive
skills are crucial determinants of growth. This is especially important for our model relying on
education spending and growth. In a cross-section approach, one of the most comprehensive
datasets on cognitive skills is provided by Hanushek and Woesmann (2012). The study shows
a positive significant link between these cognitive skills and long run growth. Another study,
Neycheva (2010), investigates a related question in a panel of 20 Europeans countries with
a number of post-communist economies. One result is that the positive effect of education
expenditures emanates from its impact on labor productivity. R&D spending is also strongly
linked to growth. The positive relationship is only positive and statistically significant for
the developed countries and appears either statistically insignificant or unstable for post-
communist countries.
However, we use the human capital measure of the Penn World Table as a proxy for
education attainment. Comparing average human capital, high institution countries have a
measure 73% higher than their lower insitution counterparts (Table 2.2). The human capital
index of the PWT is based on the average years of education found in Barro and Lee (2013)
and the internationally estimated Mincerian returns to education of Psacharapoulos (1994).
Barro and Lee (2013) contains data of 146 countries between 1950 and 2010. Their data
provided information on gender and age at 5 year intervals and are based on census data
which also provides estimates of mortality rates and completion rates by education level and
age. These estimates are regarded as reasonable proxies for countries’ human capital and
have been used in many studies aside from the PWT.
An earlier alternative measure is provided in Cohen and Soto (2007) for the period
between 1960 and 2000. This dataset is also based on surveys. The surveys were made by
the UNESCO and merged with educational attainments provided by the Organisation for
Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) databases. At the time, the dataset was
regarded as an improvement in quality fit to be a direct substitute for the Barro and Lee
(henceforth, BL) dataset. On the other hand, Psacharapoulos (1994) has been influential in
the development literature since its release because it provides a comprehensive exposition
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of the profitability of investment in education at the international scale. The study reports
that primary education is the main investment target for developing countries, that the
returns decline by the level of schooling and per capita income, that women’s education
was in general more profitable to men’s, that returns for those working in the private sector
is higher than their public sector counterpart and that the public financing of advanced
education is regressive. Another notable finding is that investment in schooling continued
to be a very attractive opportunity both from the private and public perspectives.
The computation of human capital has generally been controversial because of the diffi-
culty to assess average years of schooling while keeping a consistent use of the data source.
The BL dataset has faced related criticism because of such problems. De La Fuente and
Domenech (2006) construct their own estimates of educational attainment for 21 OECD
countries and include previously unused data remedying the sharp break in previous datasets.
This new dataset was then used in replication studies along with the BL data. The authors
find a clear positive correlation between their richer data quality and the size and signifi-
cance of human capital coefficients in growth regression across various specifications. Figure
2.2 presents a comparison of the average years of schooling in Germany (1950-2000) across
the different databases11. We note that although the reported levels are relatively close, the
BL estimate are essentially stagnant up to 1990 while the other database show a gradual
increase.
Essentially, the challenge in the computation of years of schooling is twofold. On the one
hand, it requires to combine information from decadal (each 10 years) population censuses
with information on school enrollment which are annual. On the other hand, this ought to be
done in the context of inconsistencies in classification systems between sources or censuses.
After the July 2013 release of the PWT 8.0, Cohen and Leker (2014) produced another
dataset which they judged superior to the BL dataset. Feenstra et al. (2015) does not take
a stand as to which dataset is accurate but uses the Cohen, Soto and Lecker (2014)12 as an
opportunity for comparison to the BL data. Furthermore, they use this comparison to make
11Source: PWT 9.0 documentation.
12Henceforth referred to as the CSL dataset.
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Figure 2.2: Average years of schooling in Germany (1950-2010)
.
a case that there are grounds for combining data from both sources as they construct the
PWT measure of human capital.
The PWT also provide additional control variables. We use data on the capital stock
available per capita. The estimate is available in 2017 U.S. dollars. We also utilize the
depreciation rates of capital in our sensitivity analysis. Finally, we obtain data on the
latitude of each country’s capital to account for geographical differences. Except for latitude,
all other data are annual and available at the country level.
Another important point in the growth literature is the role of original income in growth.
Historically, rich countries tend to grow at a slower rate than their poorer counterparts.
Among our specifications of the empirical equation, we include the logarithm of the per-capita
GDP in 1970 for each country. Our goal is to assess whether the convergence phenomenon
plays a role in the effect of education spending and institutions on growth. In Table B.1
(Appendix), we see a clear difference in the 1995 logarithm of GDP per capita between
countries with high versus low institutional quality.
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2.5.5 Countries’ classification
The PWT provides us with data on 115 countries between 1979 and 2019. This sample
represents our main dataset from which we later produce sub-samples for a variety of regres-
sions and sensitivity analyses. According to growth theory, different countries are at different
levels of development and researchers ought to take this into account. In this section we will
present how we organize these 115 countries when performing the empirical estimation.
First, an important consideration is the role of relatively small countries with unusually
large GDP per capita. Often, this can be the result of exceptional growth episodes due to
new natural resources but it can also stem from other fiancial activities. In a report issued
in 2000 by the OECD, a number of jurisdictions had been identified as tax havens according
to certain criterias13.
Table 2.1: 2000 OECD report tax havens compared to the U.S.





Cayman Islands 70,783 0.064
U.S. 62,490 329,064
Notes: The Gini coefficient for the so-called “tax-haven” countries was not reported by the WDI,
the OECD, or the United Nations report. The data on GDP and population originate from the
PWT 10.
Among the countries listed, 38 made commitments to increase transparency and more
information sharing. Table 2.1 shows a subset of these countries along with the U.S. for
comparison. Column (1) shows that in 2019, they recorded a relatively high GDP per capita
combined with a remarkably low population as seen in Column (2). For example, the Cayman
13https://www.oecd.org/countries/andorra/list-of-unco-operative-tax-havens.htm/.
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Islands had a GDP per capita 13% larger than the U.S. with a population of only 64,000
inhabitants. For the majority of these countries, data on inequality are hardly available.
These observations advise for a careful treatment of their GDP per capita fluctuations as
they could be related to factors beyond real economic activity.
Many of these countries are part of our original sample and although it may not be
necessary to eliminate them altogether from the analysis, we attempt to be mindful of this
issue. To address this uncertainty, we also present regressions estimated in a more restricted
sub-set of countries. In a study of economic convergence, Barro (2012) uses a sample of 77
countries (see Table B.2) which are also within the PWT. We run regressions in this smaller
sample (henceforth, Barro sample). An exhaustive list of the selected 77 countries is available
in Section B.1 in the appendix. We also present results based on the larger sample including
all the countries available14. Furthermore, the dynamics between education spending and
growth in the context of institutional quality likely varies for countries depending on the
country’s current development level. We present different subsamples of countries based on
their average GDP per capita in 1970. We use data for the 77 countries of the Barro sample
with varying sample sizes depending on specifications and data availability. We present both
cross sectional (see Table B.3 and B.4) and panel specifications. GDP per capita based on
output is from the Penn World Table 10 (Feenstra et al. (2015)) as explained before. This
measure is better suited to comparison of levels than the real GDP based on national account
data. We define rich countries as those with more than $11,000 in real per capita GDP in
1970 (in 2017 dollars), middle income countries had between $2,700 and $11,000 in real GDP,
and developing countries had under $2,700 in per capita term.
Overall this sample has 29 rich countries, 21 middle income countries and 27 developing
countries. For example, in the case of rich countries the Barro sample excludes Bahamas,
Bahrain, Kuwait, Quatar and Saudia Arabia among others. Two of these countries figured
on the 2000 OECD report as tax havens and the other three have had exceptional changes
brought in large part due to relatively recent oil extraction. We provide an exhaustive list
14For the remainder of our analysis we will use this sample except when we clearly mention the Barro
sample.
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of the member countries of each income categories in Appendix B. For the cross sectional
specification, we start with annual data which we convert into a 30 years average of growth
by country between 1989-2019. This construction is common in the literature (Hanushek
and Woessman (2012)).
2.5.6 Descriptive statistics
Depending on the specification, the explained variable is either the 30 years average growth
rate or the non-overlapping 10 years average growth rate in GDP per capita (1979-2019) for
each country. The fastest growing countries are the poorest with a growth rate of 2.02%
compared to 1.78% for the whole sample. Table 2.2 shows that richer countries have a growth
of 1.67% on average. Rich countries spend the largest share of their GDP on education
spending while the poorest countries have the smallest share (see Table B.1).
The next three rows show the measures of institutional quality. Unsurprisingly, our main
measure of protection against expropriation is highest in rich countries along with property
rights and government integrity. Rich countries also have the largest share of government
spending net of education. We also report an estimate of hours worked per year. Here
developing countries lead with an average of 2260 hours worked per year against only 1720
hours in developed countries. The capital stock per person available in richer countries
is about 12 times what developing countries have. Developing countries, however, have a
higher rate of depreciation of capital. We also note that richer countries appear to have
higher latitude than poorer nations.
Figure 2.3 helps visualize the data availability as well as some patterns of growth, ed-
ucation spending and institutions in our dataset. First, most variables are available in all
continents including Africa. The fastest growing countries are in Asia and other regions
of the world. This figure shows a noteworthy pattern. In most countries, high growth is
not accompanied by simultaneously strong institutions and high education spending. For
example Canada, Norway, France and the U.S. have relatively high education spending as
well as high institutions but only a modest 20 years average GDP growth rate.
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Table 2.2: Descriptive statistics
Variables All Rich Developing Middle Income
Average 10 year growth rate 1.78 1.67 2.02 1.67
per-capita real GDP (γ),% (2.81) (2.74) (3.05) (2.66)
Education expenditures (% GDP) 3.80 4.43 3.22 3.80
(1.69) (1.46) (1.80) (1.61)
Institutional quality 7.15 8.95 6.07 6.82
(Protection from expropriation out of 10) (1.76) (1.08) (1.34) (1.49)
Property rights 5.27 6.54 3.97 5.12
Index of Economic Freedom (IEF) (2.20) (2.36) (1.51) (1.87)
Government integrity (IEF) 4.27 5.83 2.85 3.96
(2.25) (2.58) (1.11) (1.67)
Government spending 11.86 14.11 9.74 11.39
net of education (%GDP) (4.58) (4.05) (3.78) (4.70)
Average hours worked per year (1000h) 1.93 1.72 2.26 2.02
(0.03) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Human capital 2.28 2.97 1.70 2.25
(0.74) (0.54) (0.51) (0.57)
Capital stock per capita 80.68 177.77 15.46 62.39
in 2017 U.S. dollars (1,000) (103.4) (128.2) (231.2) (65.2)
Depreciation rate (of capital stock), % 4.32 3.87 4.71 4.33
(1.29) (0.97) (1.43) (1.27)
Initial GDP per capita in 1970 ($1000) 4.77 10.11 1.49 5.11
(1.14) (0.81) (0.39) (0.40)
Latitude of capital (divided by 9015) 0.29 0.48 0.18 0.22
(0.19) (0.14) (0.11) (0.15)
Countries 115 29 21 27
Notes: The table reports means between 1970 and 2019 and the standard deviations in parenthesis.
75













































Figure 2.4: Institutional quality, education spending and growth among developing countries.
In contrast, other countries like the Russian Federation, China, Portugal, Spain and even
Tanzania have average or good institutions with modest education spending but still record
relatively high growth. This pattern will be the subject of our analysis.
Finally, we note that a concern in our analysis is the potential multicollinearity between
education expenditures and institutional quality. In Section B.2.2, we explore the question
and do not find evidence of this issue. On the other hand, rich countries have commonly
higher level of institutional quality as we have seen. However, the estimation of our model
requires a level of variation among institutions. In Section B.2.3, we show that variation
exist in the distribution of institutional quality even between developed countries (see also
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Figure B.3).
Figure 2.4 focuses on the developing countries of our dataset. The challenge to the theory
of greater marginal effect of high education spending in the context of strong institutional
quality is clearer. In particular, few developing countries with simultaneously high education
spending in a context of relatively strong economic institutions show large growth over the 30
year period. Among these countries are Côte d’Ivoire, Zambia, Egypt, and Togo. In contrast,
some countries with lower education spending and good institutions managed faster growth
rates.
Among these countries are Ethiopia, Thailand, Vietnam and Bangladesh. In addition,
based on log GDP 1970, China and Indonesia also belong to this group. Both countries are
in the bottom 20% of education spending among developing countries but had institutions
in the top 20% and recorded among the highest average growth rate with respectively 5.5%
and 3.5% between 1979 and 2019.
2.6 Empirical methodology
In this section, we show how our growth relationship obtained from the overlapping gener-
ation model maps to the empirical specification of our regression. Recall Equation (2.11)
as:
γ ≈ λ0 + λ1e+ λ2q + λ3qe.
The most elemental version of our empirical equation mirrors Equation (2.11) and provides
estimates of the coefficients λ0, λ1, λ2 and λ3 with:
γn,t = β̄0 + β1en,t−1 + β2qn + β3qnet−1 + δt + un,t. (2.14)
This is the baseline specification of our model. Countries are indexed by n and time
periods by t. Here, γn,t represents the non-overlapping decadal growth rate of each country,
en,t−1 is the average education spending of each country in the previous decade and qn is the
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measure of each country’s institutional quality. The equation presents the basic explanatory
variables of growth in this paper, their interaction and a time fixed effect component δt.
We account for the stochastic nature of the growth process by including an independent
and identically distributed error term un,t. Our error term is clustered at the country level.
The coefficient of interest is β3 and can provide insight into whether the effect of education
spending varies with different levels of institutional quality.
2.7 Empirical results
We now estimate the relationship between education spending, institutional quality, their
interaction and GDP growth. We present different specifications and samples (see Table B.4
and B.5 for cross sections). We only add fixed effects over time unless running specifications
that exclude the measure of institutional quality. In those specifications, we allow for two-
ways fixed effects across time (δt) and countries (ηt). Recall that our estimation periods are
not overlapping.
Our growth model theorizes that education spending and institutional quality affect
growth interactively. Therefore, we run different regressions with either variable and advance
with specifications which progressively include both variables as well as an interaction term.
In essence, the different specifications are cases of restrictions of different coefficients in
Equation (2.16). Later, we supplement the regressions with a range of control variables
including human capital (as measured in the PWT10) and log per capita GDP in 1970.
We present an exhaustive list of the regressions used. We begin by estimating the re-
lationship between education expenditures and the average ten years growth without any
controls. This basic form does not account for any original GDP level nor other controls. We
run a similar regression with only the measure of institutional quality. We respectively refer
to these regressions as Regression 1 and Regression 2. The next two regressions feature the
two variables at the same time. In Regression 3, we use education spending and institutional
quality as regressors without an interaction term. Regression 4 adds the interaction term of
the two variables. This specification is the most basic form of our theoretical model but does
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not yet include original GDP levels. Regressions 5, 6, 7, 8 are specififed in the same way
as the previous four. The only difference is that we estimate the relationship in the Barro
(2012) sample of countries16. The addition of initial GDP per capita in future specifications
will allow us to study the effect of education spending and institutions while controlling for
potential β-convergence predicted by exogenous growth models. A negative coefficient would
imply that developing countries grow at a faster rate than initially rich countries when other
variables are kept constant.
2.7.1 Panel approach
In many specifications, we find that the effect of education spending is either insignificant
or significantly negative even after controlling for institutional quality. However, once we
introduce the interaction term of the two variables, education spending is often positive and
significant and the interaction term has a negative sign. This points to a differing effect of
education expenditures depending on the level of institutional quality but also suggests a
certain substitutability between the two variables in achieving long run growth. We present
cross sectional results in Appendix B.
Rich countries
Panel A in Table 2.3 presents the estimation results for the developed countries separately.
Regression 1 shows that when no other variable is accounted for, public education spending
has a positive significant effect on growth. The same is valid for institutional quality as seen
in Regression 2. Regression 3 introduces both regressors and the positive effect of education
spending is no longer significant while institutional quality is still significantly linked to
growth. Regression 4 adds the interaction term of the two variables. When the interaction
effects are taken into account, we now find that both education spending and institutional
quality positively affect growth with significance.
16Recall that this sample is restricted to the 77 countries used in Barro (2012) to which we later add all
the additional countries on which we have data available.
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Table 2.3: Panel baseline results (1979-2019)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Variables Barro Barro Barro Barro
Panel A: Rich countries
Education spending 0.66** 0.18 2.94*** 0.12 0.03 3.95*
(0.32) (0.11) (0.79) (0.12) (0.08) (2.04)
Institutional quality 0.90*** 0.66*** 1.97*** 0.28* 0.26 1.52**
(0.18) (0.17) (0.54) (0.15) (0.19) (0.65)
Inst*Ed -0.31*** -0.41*
(0.08) (0.21)
Observations 121 112 107 107 84 84 84 84
R-squared 0.39 0.27 0.24 0.28 0.25 0.16 0.17 0.22
Panel B: Developing countries
Education spending -0.40 -0.51*** 1.09 -1.00*** -0.49** 1.48
(0.26) (0.14) (0.88) (0.35) (0.18) (1.13)
Institutional quality 0.62** 0.80*** 1.45*** 0.70** 0.80** 1.60***
(0.25) (0.25) (0.39) (0.33) (0.35) (0.48)
Inst*Ed -0.24* -0.30
(0.13) (0.18)
Observations 183 152 135 135 103 104 103 103
R-squared 0.48 0.24 0.29 0.31 0.58 0.21 0.25 0.27
Panel C: Middle Income countries
Education spending -0.10** -0.09** -0.31 0.06 -0.14 -0.92
(0.04) (0.04) (0.77) (0.23) (0.21) (1.48)
Institutional quality 0.45*** 0.36*** 0.21 0.43* 0.32 -0.05
(0.11) (0.12) (0.52) (0.22) (0.24) (0.79)
Inst*Ed 0.04 0.11
(0.13) (0.22)
Observations 241 184 170 170 114 120 114 114
R-squared 0.42 0.16 0.14 0.14 0.59 0.13 0.13 0.13
Panel D: All countries
Education spending -0.09 -0.15** 0.26 -0.29 -0.29** 0.31
(0.05) (0.06) (0.29) (0.21) (0.12) (0.48)
Institutional quality 0.21*** 0.21*** 0.47** 0.17* 0.25** 0.53*
(0.07) (0.07) (0.24) (0.10) (0.11) (0.30)
Inst*Ed -0.06 -0.08
(0.05) (0.06)
Observations 545 448 412 412 301 308 301 301
R-squared 0.42 0.09 0.09 0.10 0.48 0.05 0.07 0.08
Notes: The dependent variable in column (1)-(8) is the average 10 years growth rate of log GDP per capita. Institutional
quality is measured on a scale of 0 to 10 with higher scores indicating stronger institutional quality. The measure originates
from Political Risk Services and is averaged between 1985 and 1995. Education spending is obtained from the World Bank
World Development Indicators and is expressed as a percentage of GDP. Barro refers to the sample of countries used in
Barro(2012). The sample is more restricted as the study was an investigation of β-convergence. Asterisks between 1 and 3
respectively indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level. See Section 2.5 for a more detailed variable definitions and
sources.
The presence of this significant interaction term suggests that the effect of education
spending on growth varies given different levels of institutional quality as pointed out by
the large difference in coefficient magnitudes. More precisely, given an institutional level of
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zero, a 1% increase in education spending results in a 2.95% increase in per capita decadal
growth rate, a large effect. Conversely, given perfect institutional quality, a 1% increase in
education spending would be associated with a -0.16% change or (2.94 − 0.31 ∗ (1 ∗ 10)) in
GDP per capita, a negative effect. In addition, the negative significance of the interaction
between public education spending and institutions points to a substitute relationship in
achieving long term growth.
Regressions 5, 6, 7, 8 in the more restrictive Barro sample reflects the previous results
especially in term of magnitude. We note that this sample is more restrictive and we lose a
substantial number of observations in each regression. Regressions 5 and 6 show that both
education spending and institutional quality positively affect growth but only the latter
remains significant. Regression 7 which introduces both shows that significance is lost.
However, results in Regression 8 vary greatly from the previous three. Once more, when
we introduce the interaction term, all regressors regain significance although the magnitudes
are different from Regression 4. The effect of education spending on growth is shown to
vary according to the level of institutional quality. Here, given institutional quality of zero,
a 1% increase in education spending is associated with a 3.95 % increase in gdp per capita
growth. For a country with perfect institutions, a one percent increase in education spending
would be associated with a -0.15% or (3.95− 0.41 ∗ (1 ∗ 10)) change in GDP per capita. An
effect which is almost identical in sign and magnitude to Regression 4. We remark that the
relationship is relatively stable between the two samples although the Barro group of rich
countries excludes about 10 countries from the estimation. The effect reported is essentially
the same. In addition, the evidence for plausible substitutability is still observed.
Developing countries
We run the same regressions for the developing countries. Regression 1 now shows that
education spending is associated with slower growth, although insignificantly. Regression 2
shows a positive link for institutional quality that is also significant. Regression 3 results,
however, are different from the findings in rich countries. While institutional quality re-
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mains positively significant, the effect of education spending is now significantly negative.
In Regression 4 as we add the interaction term, we find that education spending has again
a positive effect although it is not significant, both institutional quality and the interaction
term are significantly associated with growth as before.
The last four regressions are run in the Barro sample of countries as before. Here again
the effect of education spending is reported to be negative but significant in Regression
5. The next regression also shows a positive link between institutional quality and aver-
age decadal growth. Regression 7 shows that both regressors have a significance effect on
growth. Education spending has a negative effect but the magnitude is only half compared
to the previous Regression 5. Institutional quality shows a positive association to growth
with a magnitude close to the previous estimation. The results of Regression 8 only shows
significance for institutional quality, but the signs are conserved. In Regressions 4 and 8 the
coefficient on education spending is not significant although the interaction term is.
Middle income countries
Among middle income countries, Regression 1 shows that education spending has a negative
effect as with developing countries although the coefficient is now significant. Institutional
quality is again positively linked to growth. When both regressors are introduced in Regres-
sion 3, their significance and signs are conserved and there is little change in magnitude.
When we add the interaction term in Regression 4, we find a markedly different pattern.
The interaction term is positive and the effect of education spending remains negative but no
regressor displays signficance. The results in Regressions 5, 6, 7, 8 follow the same pattern
(see also Table B.3).
All countries
Lastly, we investigate the relationship for all countries available. We use the same specifica-
tions and report similar signs to Panel A and B although significance is not reached except
for institutional quality. We find that the interaction of the two variables is still negative
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but not significant. Nonetheless the magnitudes are much smaller. This could be driven by
the rich and developing countries of the sample as middle income countries show mitigated
results as shown above.
2.8 Robustness checks
2.8.1 Additional controls
When we augment our regression with additional controls, we rely on Equation (2.14) and in
particular the β̄0 term. We define this parameter β̄0 as a function of a sequence of additional
control variables. We assume there are m items that can be used to approximate β̄0. That
is:




where xj,n,t−1 is the measure of item xj of country n in period t − 1. We control for the
effect of the average human capital in previous decade by adding hn,t−1. We also allow for
the possibility of convergence by controlling for the level of income in country n at the origin
denoted yn,1970. We also include the government’s budget constraint. Furthermore, when
possible, we control for heterogeneity over time and across countries by adding two-ways fixed
effects denoted by δt and ηn in the sensitivity analysis. Substituting Equation (2.15) into
Equation (2.14) and displaying some of the control variables gives our new growth regression
the form:
γn,t = β0 + β1en,t−1 + β2qn + β3qnet−1 + β4[en,t−1 + gn,t−1] + β5yn,1970 + β6hn,t−1 +
m−4∑
j=1
βj+2xj,n,t + δt + ηn + un,t.
(2.16)
We emphasize that we consider the growth effects of the lagged education spending with the
implied restriction that government expenditures take time to affect growth. This assump-
tion finds support in the growth literature. Atems and Blankenau (2020) find that education
expenditures can take between 3 to 13 years to impact output level due to the timing of im-
pacted students to join the labor force. The other important element is the time invariability
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of the institution measure. We use our measure of institution quality in this way based on
the assumption of persistence through time (Acemoglu and Robinson (2001)). Later, we
relax this assumption in our sensitivity analysis and use multiple proxies for institutional
quality. In particular, we use property rights, government integrity and business freedom.
Table 2.5 presents our panel results with additional controls (see Table B.7 for middle
income countries and all countries). The regressions are the same as Table 2.3 within the
same time period. As before, we regress the 10 years average growth rate of real per capita
GDP on institutional quality and education expenditures in the previous decade. Original
per capita income and human capital are the average in the previous decade. We focus on
results for rich and developing countries but report middle income countries and all countries
results in Appendix B. For all specifications, we add a list of additional control variables.
We include the depreciation rate of capital, an estimate of capital available per person,
latitude and government expenditures net of education to be consistent with other research
in the literature. All control variables are the averages from the previous decade to the
decadal growth rate we aim to explain.
Among rich countries, Regression 1 presents our baseline regression for comparison as we
progressively add controls. Regression 2 introduces the per capita level of income in 1970.
As expected, the coefficient is significantly negative. Education spending and institutional
quality keep their previous signs, significance and the magnitudes are also close to earlier
findings. For the remaining specifications, we keep the original GDP measure. Regression 3
introduces the share of total government spending net of educations spending. The coefficient
is not significant and the three baseline coefficients do not change greatly17. We note that
the coefficient on education spending is still positive, but the magnitude is lower. This
finding is consistent with the prediction of our growth model when including the government
budget constraint. Regression 4, shows the effect of including human capital in the equation.
Although the coefficient is not significant itself, the magnitude of the baseline coefficient
changes. In particular, the effect of education spending is remarkably larger. In Regression
5, we include the depreciation rate of capital in the economy. The effect is not significant.
17The significance level goes from the 1% level to the 5% level.
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Table 2.4: Panel regressions with additional controls (1979-2019)
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Panel A: Rich countries
Education spending 2.94*** 2.95*** 2.78** 3.26*** 3.01*** 2.97*** 2.91*** 3.47*
(0.79) (0.84) (1.30) (1.01) (0.85) (0.96) (0.86) (1.74)
Institutional quality 1.97*** 1.77*** 1.96** 1.75*** 1.74*** 1.99*** 1.78*** 2.04**
(0.54) (0.54) (0.79) (0.58) (0.51) (0.62) (0.54) (0.76)
Inst*Ed -0.31*** -0.31*** -0.30** -0.35*** -0.32*** -0.32*** -0.30*** -0.38*
(0.08) (0.09) (0.14) (0.11) (0.09) (0.10) (0.09) (0.19)
y1970 -0.65* -0.38 -0.57 -0.49 -0.47 -0.64* -0.09
(0.33) (0.39) (0.34) (0.45) (0.45) (0.32) (0.47)
Government Exp. 0.04 0.07
(0.04) (0.05)








Observations 107 107 101 103 107 107 107 97
R-squared 0.28 0.31 0.38 0.33 0.32 0.32 0.31 0.44
Panel B: Developing countries
Education spending 1.09 1.53** 1.26* 1.50* 1.29* 1.54** 2.55*** 2.27***
(0.88) (0.73) (0.68) (0.77) (0.67) (0.74) (0.71) (0.74)
Institutional quality 1.45*** 1.69*** 1.55*** 1.54*** 1.56*** 1.69*** 1.93*** 1.71***
(0.39) (0.39) (0.39) (0.41) (0.39) (0.38) (0.35) (0.33)
Inst*Ed -0.24* -0.30*** -0.25** -0.29** -0.26** -0.30*** -0.45*** -0.40***
(0.13) (0.11) (0.10) (0.11) (0.10) (0.11) (0.10) (0.11)
y1970 -2.22*** -2.27*** -2.37*** -2.11*** -2.23*** -2.22*** -2.04**
(0.62) (0.75) (0.61) (0.56) (0.65) (0.58) (0.83)
Government Exp. -0.07 -0.08
(0.07) (0.08)








Observations 135 135 120 130 135 135 135 116
R-squared 0.31 0.40 0.37 0.41 0.41 0.40 0.46 0.43
Notes: The dependent variable in column (1)-(8) is the average 10 year growth rate of log GDP per capita. Institutions are mea-
sured on a scale of 0 to 10 with higher scores indicating better protection against expropriation. The measure originates from
Political Risk Services and is averaged between 1985 and 1995. Education spending is obtained from the World Bank World De-
velopment Indicators and is expressed as a percentage of GDP. Standard errors are in parenthesis. Barro refers to the sample of
countries used the Barro(2012) study of economic convergence. Barro+ includes all countries. Asterisks between 1 and 3 respec-
tively indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level. See Section (2.5) for more detailed variable definitions and sources.
Next, we add the amount of capital per capita and the latitude of the countries’ capitals in
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Regression 6 and 7. Neither is significant and both signs are negative. The baseline results
are the same. In Regression 7, the original GDP is now significant at the 10% level. In
Regression 8, we apply all the control variables at once. The baseline signs and significance
are conserved although the significance level decreases. The effect of education spending
and institutional quality are both larger. We interpret that a 1% increase in education
expenditures is associated with a -0.10% change in the decadal growth rate.
Among developing countries, the baseline results of Regression 1 are similar in sign to
the findings of Regression 2. Nonetheless, adding the original GDP in the latter leads all the
baseline coefficients to become significant. The negative coefficient on original GDP suggests
that the poorest countries in the sample tend to growth faster than their richer counterparts.
The magnitude is large. In Regression 3, the addition of government expenditures net of
education does not change the results significantly. However, the magnitude of the effect of
education spending is lower. As for rich countries, when we add the human capital measure,
the baseline coefficients are significant and larger. In contrast, however, the positive effect
of human capital is significant. The addition of both the depreciation rate and the amount
of capital per person in Regression 5 and 6 keep the coefficients’ significance. We also add in
Regression 7 the latitude of the countries capital as before. The findings differ starkly from
the sample of rich countries.
Among developing countries, geography as measured by latitude appears to be a signifi-
cant positive driver of long term growth. Finally, in Regression 8 we add all the regressors
at once and find highly significant coefficients for the baseline equation. Among developing
countries, we interpret that given institutional quality of 0, a 1% increase in education spend-
ing is associated with a 2.27% higher growth rate. In comparison, for a poorer economy with
perfect institutions, a similar change in education spending would actually be associated
with a slower growth by -1.73%. This finding suggest a certain robustness to the hypothesis
of varying impact of education spending with respect to institutional quality in rich and
developing countries alike.
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2.8.2 Are the results driven by the measure of institutional qual-
ity?
In this section, we investigate the sensitivity of the results to alternative measures of insti-
tutional quality. Our assumption about the measure of institutions is that little variation
occurs in short periods of time following Acemoglu et al. (2001). We choose two proxies
for institutional quality originating from the Index of Economic Freedom (IEF) database18.
Property rights and government integrity measures are available between 1995 and 2019 at
a yearly frequency. We compute the average of each index based on their measure in the
year 1999, 2009 and 2019. This provides one observation per country.
These values show a relatively high level of correlation with the original measure of insti-
tutional quality of above 70% in both cases. All regressions are performed in the complete
dataset without use of the restricted Barro (2012) sample. Regression 1 to 4 present the
results for rich, developing, middle income countries and all countries sequentially. The orig-
inal GDP is added. Regression 5 to 8 uses the same sequence but includes more control
variables. The cross sectional results are reported in Table B.6.
Panel A presents the results based on the use of property rights while Panel B uses gov-
ernment integrity as a proxy for institutional quality. Regression 1 in both panels shows
consistent results with our previous findings for rich countries. In both specifications, the
interaction term is significantly negative as expected. Regression 5 in both panel also display
the same pattern for signs although only the measure of property rights is significant. Re-
gressions 2 and 6 in both panels show the results for developing countries. Although the sign
are conserved, only in the case of government integrity as a proxy for institutional quality
do we record similar coefficients to the baseline regressions. Regression 3, 4, 7 and 8 show
comparable results to previous findings for middle income countries and all the countries.
Notably in Regression 8 using government integrity all coefficients are significant even if the
magnitude as considerably lower. As before, the measure of latitude is a strong predictor for
18This is a publication of the Heritage Foundation. Several additional variables are available estimating
tax burden, business freedom, financial freedom and more.
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growth among developing countries.
Table 2.5: Panel regressions with alternative measures of institutions (1979-2019)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Variables Rich Developing Middle All Rich Developing Middle All
Income Income
Panel A: Institutional quality proxied by property rights
Education spending 1.30* 0.18 -0.02 0.07 1.57** 0.63 -0.04 0.10
(0.72) (0.49) (0.07) (0.09) (0.74) (0.43) (0.07) (0.06)
Property rights 1.13** 1.04** 0.49*** 0.62*** 1.01** 1.37*** 0.66*** 0.68***
(0.50) (0.49) (0.15) (0.13) (0.47) (0.43) (0.16) (0.15)
Pr*Ed -0.16* -0.10 -0.01 -0.03* -0.20** -0.21** -0.02 -0.05***
(0.09) (0.11) (0.03) (0.02) (0.10) (0.10) (0.03) (0.02)
y1970 -0.72*** -1.22* -0.81 -0.92*** -0.35 -1.39 -0.59 -0.86***
(0.24) (0.67) (0.51) (0.12) (0.50) (0.96) (0.52) (0.16)
Human capital t-1 0.53 0.69 0.42 0.47
(0.55) (0.82) (0.39) (0.30)
Depreciation -0.22 0.11 0.04 0.16*
(0.29) (0.17) (0.12) (0.09)
Capital per person -0.18 -0.29 -0.56** -0.21
(0.47) (0.47) (0.27) (0.17)
Latitude 1.37 6.01*** 0.31 1.30
(1.41) (2.08) (1.02) (0.82)
Observations 113 155 197 465 110 134 150 394
R-squared 0.30 0.20 0.18 0.17 0.30 0.39 0.37 0.26
Panel B: Institutional quality proxied by government integrity
Education spending 1.10** 0.34 -0.07 0.08 0.87 1.45*** -0.08 0.12*
(0.52) (0.57) (0.10) (0.09) (0.57) (0.45) (0.10) (0.07)
Government integrity 0.82** 1.65* 0.42*** 0.59*** 0.69** 3.02*** 0.59*** 0.65***
(0.33) (0.83) (0.14) (0.13) (0.26) (0.64) (0.18) (0.14)
Gvi*Ed -0.13* -0.19 0.00 -0.04* -0.10 -0.55*** -0.02 -0.07***
(0.07) (0.18) (0.04) (0.02) (0.07) (0.15) (0.04) (0.02)
y1970 -1.09*** -1.26* -0.76 -0.92*** -0.05 -1.37 -0.92 -0.97***
(0.12) (0.74) (0.53) (0.14) (0.37) (0.97) (0.58) (0.18)
Human capital t-1 -0.99** 0.76 0.81** 0.81***
(0.39) (0.69) (0.38) (0.25)
Depreciation -0.08 0.08 0.03 0.17*
(0.23) (0.18) (0.10) (0.09)
Capital per person -0.13 -0.40 -0.45* -0.20
(0.27) (0.45) (0.24) (0.17)
Latitude -1.08 5.51*** 0.67 1.27
(0.81) (1.62) (1.18) (0.81)
Observations 113 155 197 465 84 134 150 394
R-squared 0.29 0.20 0.16 0.15 0.22 0.42 0.36 0.24
Notes: The dependent variable in column (1)-(8) is the average 10 year growth rate of log GDP per capita. Institutions proxied by
property rights and government integrity averaged between 1999, 2009 and 2019. A large score indicates strong institutions, property
rights or government integrity. Education spending is obtained from the World Bank World Development Indicators and is expressed as
a percentage of GDP. Standard errors are in parenthesis. Asterisks between 1 and 3 respectively indicate significance at the 10%, 5%
and 1% level. See Section 2.5 for a more detailed variable definitions and sources.
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2.8.3 Institutional quality and the role of settlers’ mortality
Figure 2.5: OLS relationship between settlers’ mortality and institutional quality.
In this section, we link institutional quality and economic growth in a causal manner based
on the approach of Acemoglu et al. (2001). Following their method, we instrument insti-
tutional quality with the logarithm of European settlers’ mortality rates. The assumption
of this method is based on the time distance between the two events and their plausible
independence except through institutional heritage. According to Acemoglu et al. (2001)
the local environment in terms of diseases and other adverse conditions for Europeans set-
tlers can be reflected in the number of deaths recorded in earlier colonial times. The idea
is that the decision for settlement organization (extractive institutions vs. institutions with
property rights and establishment of the rule of law for market economy) depended greatly
on the mortality risks for Europeans.
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Table 2.6: Instrumental variable approach (1989-2019)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Variables Barro Barro Barro All Barro Barro Bottom Top
half half
Education spending 1.12 1.12 0.21 0.46 0.34 0.38 3.25
(2.93) (2.93) (1.66) (2.97) (1.94) (4.69) (3.76)
Institutional quality 0.26 1.27 1.27 0.58 0.50 1.76 1.55 3.40
(0.28) (2.25) (2.25) (1.28) (2.20) (1.66) (2.39) (2.76)
Inst*Ed -0.23 -0.23 -0.08 -0.10 -0.07 -0.07 -0.43
(0.48) (0.48) (0.26) (0.44) (0.29) (0.74) (0.49)
Government Exp. -0.06 -0.09 -0.06 -0.15** -0.07
(0.05) (0.08) (0.09) (0.07) (0.17)
Y1970 -2.22*** -2.94*** -3.07**
(0.83) (0.68) (1.19)
Observations 72 69 69 62 50 62 30 32
Notes: The explained variable is the 30 years average growth rate. Only a subset of countries have settlers mortal-
ity because no Europeans settlers died in the recent past during colonial activity. For example Great Britain does
not appear in these regressions while most African countries, New Zealand and Australia do. Education spending
and government spending are the average per country in the 1979-1989 decade. Bottom half are the countries under
the 50th percentile and top half is the complementary set. Institutional quality is instrumented by the measure of
European settlers of Acemoglu et al. (2001).
Figure 2.5 shows that there is a quasi-linear negative relationship between the levels of
Europeans settlers’ mortality and the modern institutional quality. The data on mortality
rates are originally from the work of Philip Curtin (1989). The first data starts around 1815
with organized military medical records and by 1870 most European countries published
medical reports on soldiers deaths. Curtin (1989) presents a detailed review of the construc-
tion of the estimates. The measure of European settlers’ mortality is the number of deaths
per thousand per annum.
In the spirit of Acemoglu and Robinson (2001) the regressions in Table 2.7 are under
cross-section specification. Only a few countries experienced a colonial influence in the
relatively close past so only those are included. For example, although Britain experienced
colonial influence from the Romans in the distant past, this event does not directly appear in
this analysis because no data on Roman soldiers death is available to our knowledge. So we
run the regressions on a sample of 72 countries which possess these data. As with previous
cross sectional approach, the explained variable is the average 30 years growth rate of per
capita GDP between 1989 and 2019. Our exclusion restriction is that settlers’ mortality can
affect current GDP growth rates only through the medium of inherited institutional quality.
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Regression 1 shows that institutional quality has a positive but insignificant causal impact
on growth. Across the other samples and specification, we consistently report a negative sign
on the interaction term and a positive sign for both education spending and the instrumented
institutional quality. The lack of significance could stem from low observations.
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2.9 Conclusion
This study investigates the link between economic growth and education spending in the
context of institutional quality. We begin by developing a theoretical model that yields a
growth regression later estimated under various specifications in different samples. We report
two main findings.
First, between 1979 and 2019, we find that economic growth was positively affected
by both public education expenditures and institutional quality especially in rich countries.
However, this relationship is sensitive to the addition of the cumulative effect of the two. This
positive relationship between education spending and growth finds precedent in the economic
literature. Blankenau, Simpson, Tomljanovich(2005) show this relationship by demonstrat-
ing that the mixed empirical results seen in the literature were due to unaccounted general
equilibrium effects. Specifically, they find that any positive effect of education expenditures
on growth requires the imposition of the government budget constraint and that no signif-
icant growth effects of public education expenditures can be detected unless crowding-out
effects are properly taken into consideration. One contribution of this paper is to show that
failure to account for institutional quality could be another explanation of the mixed results
in the empirical literature linking education spending and economic growth.
The second main finding is that in most specifications, the interaction effect of education
spending and institutional quality is significantly negative especially for rich and in some
cases for developing countries. We interpret this result as suggesting a substitution effect
between education spending and high-quality institutions. In other words, it is plausible
that growth could alternatively stem from skill enhancement due to education spending or
market conducive institutional quality. For countries to invest in both at the same time
appears to be somewhat redundant in achieving growth.
For middle income countries, we find mixed results at best. The interaction of education
spending and institutions does not yield a consistent sign or significance. Although most
specifications show a negative interaction term, it is safe to say that middle income countries
exhibit a pattern that requires further investigation. We leave it to future research.
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As all research is limited to particular contexts and sets of variables, policy implications
can be difficult to bring forth. However, our study suggests that because economic institu-
tions tend to persist through time, optimizing education spending is a more potent tool for
policymakers especially when the institutional context is properly taken into account.
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Chapter 3
The Kansas Tax Experiment: Did
industries benefit?
In 2012, Kansas began treating business income preferentially relative to wage income even
when both appear on individual income tax returns. This so called “pass-through” income
is more common in some industries compared to others. For example, more than half of
the real estate workers in Kansas were employed by pass-through businesses. Others sectors,
such as hospitals and telecommunications, have fewer pass-through entities and most of their
workers are employed by corporations, the local or the state government. A limited number
of states have implemented similar income tax reductions, and there are, relatively few
conclusive empirical investigations of their causal effects on industries with low pass-through
employment. This lack of evidence is the more unfortunate given the ongoing consideration
of similar tax reforms by other states and the Federal government. For example, to boost
business investment and jobs creation, The Federal Tax Cuts and Jobs Act of 2017 was
enacted based on a similar approach to taxation.
This paper revisits the debate on pass-through tax reduction and employment growth
among dis-aggregated industries. Despite the abundant research which finds no consistent
relationship between the two1, current tax policies continue to consider tax reductions as
1Debacker et al. (2019) and Turner and Blagg (2018).
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a viable option to spur job creation and long run growth. Among proponents of income
tax reductions, a common rebuttal to earlier research on the Kansas tax reform is that
unforeseen events and special industries’ outcomes drove the statewide inconclusive results2.
The out-of-state relocation of Boeing, an historical employer in the state, is an often cited
attenuating circumstance. To our knowledge, our paper is one of the first to reconsider
this link across Kansas’ dis-aggregated industries, attempting to account for these special
cases and re-assess whether the impacts of the Kansas Tax reduction of 2012 are different
especially among industries which had fewer pass-through businesses.
Considering the traditional perception of pass-through businesses as an engine of the
economy, Kansas lawmakers created the reform expecting several benefits for the real eco-
nomic activity and jobs creation. The rationale behind this policy is often attributed to
similar tax reductions belonging to the “supply-side” economics school of thought. King
and Peters (2013) present a more detailed exposition of the idea and how it has created
national attention.
Proponents of the reform subscribed to two main arguments (Norquist (2003) and Peters
and Mark (2013)). The first is that tax reductions create more jobs by leaving more capital
in entrepreneurs’ hands, spurring the expansion of existing operations, and creating new
businesses. Eventually, this is expected to indirectly create more revenue for the state. The
second channel is via incentives to relocate businesses in Kansas from higher tax states.
Indeed, a large share of the Kansas population is located in border counties so this appeared
as another appeal to the theory. On the other hand, detractors of the policy strongly
disagreed and predicted catastrophic harm to the state’s revenue and economic activity
(Johnson and Mazerov (2012)). The state and national debate surrounding this income tax
reform calls for further investigation of the mechanisms and outcomes of this policy change
and its ability to be a stimulus for economic prosperity.
While high expectations existed, relatively few studies had previously analyzed how effec-
tive these tax reductions could be. In this regard, the 2012 Kansas Senate Bill Substitute HB
2Alvord (2019) argues that the political articulation of fiscal challenges depends largely on the state’s
ability to run deficits. Given the greater capacity of the Federal government to run fiscal deficits, the
structural reckoning is delayed.
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21173 was an experiment. In addition to the possible real economic changes that the reform
could promote, it also had the potential to cause businesses to reorganize their finances while
creating no real economic benefit. One of the main challenge associated with the reform was
the opportunity for tax avoidance through income re-characterization. Take the example
of an insurance brokerage firm paying an employee based on a salary. In response to the
tax reform, he or she could change how the salary is received. Former wages would become
payment to a sole proprietor and thus income taxes would not be paid. In this example, the
state would lose tax revenue, gain a sole proprietor, and lose a wage employee while no real
employment change occurred. Debacker, Heim, Ramnath and Ross (2019) find a slight in-
crease (0.5%) in the probability of reporting sole proprietorship income in Kansas. They use
U.S. federal income tax data and conclude that this observation could be the result of a shift
in compensation from wage to self-employment income. Another important finding of the
paper is that sole-proprietors who previously reported both wage income and pass-through
income before 2012, were the most responsive to the reform. They suggest that these filers
would be the most susceptible to re-characterise their income.
Several papers have analysed the effects of the Kansas Experiment. These papers pro-
vide concordant results about the lack of positive effect of the reform at the state level. To
our knowledge, five other papers have analysed this tax policy change. They investigate
its effects on state revenue, real business activity, gross domestic product, creation of new
establishments and employment. Turner and Blagg (2018) measure the short-term effect of
the reform on aggregate measures of employment and proprietorship. The paper estimates
these two outcomes in three different fashions (log, per capita and growth rate). Among
other conclusions, they find that starting in 2012, the estimated impacts for both outcomes
are negative but are not statistically significant. The impact on the employment growth,
however, is positive but not statistically significant. For proprietors, estimates are all nega-
tive and not statistically significant. McCloskey (2018) considers the impact on employment,
real gross state product (RGSP) per capita and on the increase in business establishments.
The author finds that none of them is positively affected by the tax reform in a consistent
3The legal name of the bill signed in May 2012 by Governor Sam Brownback.
97
way with the findings of the previous studies. In Hayes (2017), the author relates not only
a drop in personal income tax revenue but also no statistically significant increase in either
GDP or the number of hours worked after the policy implementation.
Nevertheless, this body of research has left several questions unanswered. The Kansas
aircraft manufacturing industry suffered the loss of many employees due to Boeing’s depar-
ture from the state. Between 2012 and 2017, Kansan farmers also faced historically low
commodity and energy prices which could have negatively affected the agricultural and en-
ergy sector (Berck, Leibtag, Solis, and Villas-Boas (2009)). Furthermore, despite the focus
of the reform on pass-through businesses, earlier research has given limited attention to high
pass-through sectors leaving the possibility that job gains or losses have occurred in these
industries even if aggregate results are insignificant.
The goal of this study is to build on the existing research and investigate the effects
of the tax reform on dis-aggregated industries and different pass-through business sectors.
We report three main results. First, industries with more pass-through businesses seem
to have incurred less job losses compared to industries with less pass-through businesses
although the relationship is not statistically significant regardless of specifications or time
horizons. If anything, industries with fewer pass-through businesses may have incurred more
job losses after the reform. Second, after removing the aircraft manufacturing as well as the
oil and energy industries, the impact on Kansas employment is still insignificant. Over the 14
quarters post-reform, we estimate an insignificant aggregate loss of 0.15% jobs against 0.33%
when including aircraft manufacturing and energy sectors. Third, employment excluding the
agricultural sector has very similar insignificant results to previous aggregate findings. These
results could be evidence against the claim that the tumult in the energy markets and the
departure of Boeing from Kansas were coincidences that largely explain the null impact of
the reform. In addition, these results rule out the hypothesis that sectors with many pass-
through businesses significantly benefited from the tax reform but instead suggests lost jobs
in sectors with fewer pass-through businesses.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The next section provides a brief background
on the 2012 tax reform and the pass-through businesses categories. The third section provides
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a review of the literature on income tax and the Kansas experiment in particular. The fourth
section introduces and describes our data and their sources. The next section presents our
empirical methodology before the empirical results in section sixth. We end by presenting a
placebo analysis and a conclusion.
3.1 The background of the 2012 Kansas Tax Reform
Businesses choose different legal structures to organize their activity depending on several
factors. This decision has broad effects on how tax policy applies to them. One major
difference is whether they will pay corporate income taxes or be taxed as “pass-through”
businesses4. Income generated by sole proprietorships, partnerships and sub-chapter S-
corporations “passes through” to firm owners and is taxed as personal income. This in-
dividual tax level approach means that the owners directly report their business income on
Form 1040 of their tax return. In contrast, sub-chapter C-corporations pay “entity-level”
taxes through the corporate income tax system. S and C-corporations also differ because of
restrictions on the number of shareholders, and how shares and dividends work.
Historically, pass-through businesses have remained an important and celebrated form
of business in the United States. While no formal definition exists as to what is a small
business, the literature often classifies them under the umbrella of pass-through businesses.
For decades, they have represented an important segment of the American economy. Cooper
et al. (2015) reports that prior to 2012 they made up 20 to 50% of all business income in
the country. This proportion is remarkable when considering that, in general, pass-through
businesses are small businesses or self-employment5. Debacker et al. (2019) report that two
4There are three forms of pass-through businesses. Sole proprietorships, partnerships and S-corporations.
A sole proprietor is an individual entrepreneur who owns and runs a business where no legal distinction
exists between him or her and the business entity. A partnership will have the business income distributed
among each partner based on partnerships agreements. Taxes are filed at the entity level. A partnership
can be owned by individuals, non-profits and limited liability companies (LLC) can choose taxation as
partnerships. Finally, S-corporations file corporate tax returns although the income is passed-through pro-
rata to shareholders. They differ from partnerships as the number of shareholders is limited and shareholders
must generally be U.S. citizens.
5Krupkin and Looney (2017) relate that sole proprietorships are the most common form of
pass-through businesses. They represent 43% of all pass-throughs and 41% of all businesses.
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years after the tax changes as much as 30% of all Kansas taxpayers reported one form or
another of such self-employment income. This points to either a strong positive effect or
a potential re-characterization of income to take advantage of the tax break without new
output creation. The size and revenue generated by these pass-through businesses have made
them central in the debate around economic growth both at the state and national level even
before 2012. This perception of pass-through businesses explains, in part, why they were the
main target of the Kansas reform.
Even if this case has been profusely debated by the public and economic researchers, it
is far from being the only reform of its kind in recent years. In 2014, the state of Nebraska
eliminated capital gains taxes for companies that created a program for employee stock
options and Oklahoma signed its own income tax reduction law in 2014 which took effect
in 2016. The notable signing of the Federal Tax Cuts and Jobs Act of 2017 by the U.S.
president shows that this perspective on tax policy is still current6.
It was in May of 2012, that the governor of Kansas signed the reform into tax law which
was to be enacted in July of the same year. At the time, it was one of the largest income tax
cuts in the state’s history. Then, it was presaged to become “a shot of adrenaline into the
heart of the Kansas economy7.” The reform was expected to create more than 23,000 jobs by
the year 2020. The cuts had been part of the agenda as early as January 2011 and the tax
provisions were to come in effect in 2013. The reform brought the taxation of pass-through
businesses to zero which narrowed the tax base. The marginal taxation rate of individual
income were also reduced from three to two brackets along with higher deductions for heads
of households. However, in order to offset ensuing early revenue losses, sales taxes did not
decrease despite previous plans to do so.
Unlike some U.S. states which have personal income tax reciprocity, Kansas requires its
residents to pay taxes on all their income (in and out-of-state generated). For non-residents,
only the Kansas portion was taxable. Practically, this meant that for a business owner to
https://www.brookings.edu/research/9-facts-about-pass-through-businesses/.
6We note that income tax cuts have historically been based in the economic approach colloquially referred
to as “supply-side” economics.
7This metaphor was used by the former Kansas governor when talking about the expected effects of the
tax policy change. https://www.kansas.com/opinion/opn-columns-blogs/article1096336.html/.
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fully benefit from the tax break, he or she must have been a resident of Kansas. In the
newly formed top and low brackets of individual taxation, rates fell respectively from 6.45%
to 4.9% and 3.5% to 3%. The exclusion involved income originating from businesses, part-
nerships, rental real estate, royalties, S-corporations, farm income and trust. This bill lead
to large differences between Kansas and other states’ tax rates. There were few significant
tax reform targeting pass-through businesses at the time of the policy other than Nebraska
and Oklahoma’s tax reductions.
The Kansas tax experiment did not noticeably affect corporate income taxation; at least
not directly. McCloskey (2018) mentions that we should expect direct labor demand effects
to be limited to mostly non-corporate businesses. Between 2010 and 2012 this group formed
about 38% of the total Kansas employment. At the signing of the bill, proponents were
confident that it would be followed by a positive economic outcome for Kansas while others
predicted unrivaled business and budget crisis. The governor argued that the cuts would
pay for themselves through the increased revenue due to the expected real economic activity
boost. Since 2012, however, Kansas has faced multiple fiscal crises with public schools
funding sustaining major hits. Many schools lost accreditations and staff. Among several
categories including job creations, unemployment and average income per person, Kansas
was lagging behind surrounding states (Ritholtz (2017)).
Some political observers have argued that the ambivalent comments on the policy effects
should be considered in light of the environment surrounding the reform. Moore (2014)
emphasizes that the effects were in part due to the steep decline in the price of oil and
gas8 and the hit on farmers from historically low commodity prices. Boeing, a major aircraft
manufacturer and historical large employer also left Wichita around the same period. Michael
Mazerov (2015) responds by saying that the aircraft and energy industry represented less
than 1% of the total state employment and so could not be explaining the greater part of
what was witnessed. He further admonishes that while farm earning fell by 9.6 % in Kansas
8Kansas is an energy producing state. In 2020, The state’s three petroleum refineries accounted for 2%
of U.S. refining capacity and can process a combined 401,000 barrels of crude oil per calendar day. Kansas
is also one of the 10 largest ethanol-producing states, and its 13 ethanol plants have a combined production
capacity of about 609 million gallons a year. https://www.eia.gov/state/?sid=KS.
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between 2012 ans 2016, all of Kansas’ neighbors except Nebraska sustained even larger losses
along with the U.S. as a whole. In contrast to their more adverse situations, the Kansas
employment growth was still lagging behind them all.
3.2 Related literature
There is a sizeable economic literature exploring the impact of state income taxes on real
economic activity and employment. The results are mixed at best. This is in part because
many outcomes could be affected by income tax policy in the context of business activity.
For example, Gale, Krupkin and Rueben (2015) revisit the effect of state tax policy on
real growth, entrepreneurship and employment. Previous studies had found a significant,
negative and robust effect of taxes on growth. Through extension of the sample beyond the
earlier time window observed by these studies, they find no such stable negative relationship.
The paper suggests, besides other findings, that timing is important to properly address this
question. In contrast, Cullen and Gordon (2007) present a theoretical model analysing how
tax laws can influence individuals’ entrepreneurial risk taking. In addition, they use U.S.
tax return data to show that tax laws have sizeable impacts on agents’ behavior, and thus
affect the level of entrepreneurial risk taking. The study focuses on the different incentives
created by taxes on business income vs. wage income as well as the tax treatment of losses
compared to profits.
Tax changes could directly affect business employment, but also business creation de-
pending on the tax medium, rate and length of time. Borchers, Deskins and Ross (2016)
review several papers dealing with tax policy effects on a number of business related in-
dicators. The paper focuses on studies done within the state-panel framework. They find
that large businesses activity does not seem to be influenced by state tax policies but that
higher state tax rates and corporation income tax rates are associated with slower small
businesses growth. Another more recent survey of the literature by Rickman and Wang
(2020) concludes that a better understanding of tax policy has been achieved but universal
tax policy guidance is still beyond the ability of policymakers and researchers. They suggest
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instead a more specific state and local policies approach to income taxation policy. As pre-
viously mentioned, a plausible argument in favor of this suggestion is the several outcomes
under consideration. Tax cuts can potentially affect employment, business creation, real
growth, innovation and even inequality9. Although uniform impacts are possible, traditional
trade-offs are more likely to exist.
When considering the impact of tax cuts on employment, a sizeable number of studies
exist with mostly uniform conclusions. Zidar (2019) studies how different income groups are
affected by tax changes and finds a differing effect. Positive relationships between tax cuts
and employment are largely driven by tax cuts for low-income groups while the effect for
the top 10 percent earners is small. Although tax cuts were not allocated on the basis of
income group, the self-employed recipients could be more representative of higher earners.
Leachman and Mai (2014) show that the Kansas cuts led to higher inequality and taxes on
the lowest income families without showing signs of increased job growth.
Other studies have investigated the impact of tax cuts on real economic growth with
mitigated results. A landmark study by Grueber and Saez (2002) investigates how elastic
taxable income is to tax changes and concludes that a flat or even declining marginal rate
structure for middle and high income earners could be desirable due to their higher elastic-
ity. Atanassov and Liu (2020) hypothesize that higher corporate income taxes negatively
influence the firms’ incentive to innovate. Using a Difference-in-Differences (DiD) approach,
they show that 2 years or more after a tax reduction corporate innovation increases. Other
studies have instead found no impact on real growth or in certain cases a negative effect.
Gurley-Calvez and Bruce (2007) use a 12 year panel of tax return to examine the effect of tax
rates on entrepreneurial entry. They find that lower tax rates for entrepreneurs increase the
likelihood of entry. Ben-Michael, Feller and Rothstein (2021) use the augmented synthetic
control approach and find a significant negative effect on Kansas’ real economic growth.
Slemrod (1995) echoes the cautionary stance by investigating whether tax reductions
9Nallaredy, Rouen, Serrato and Suarez (2019) study the effect of corporate taxes on inequality and find
that tax reduction lead to higher income for both top and bottom earners. However, they report that the link
is positive in part because higher earners can shift compensation to reduce taxes and gain a comparatively
larger benefit from such reforms.
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stimulate income creation or income shifting instead. The paper focuses on the effects of the
Tax Reform Act of 1986 and presents two important insights. The first is that behavioral
responses to taxation changes are far from negligible. In the 1980’s substantial taxpayers’ re-
sponses occurred. The second insight is that the responsiveness of variables like employment
was not high enough to justify the marginal social costs of taxation. Long (1982) provides
evidence among male workers of such income shifting. The empirical analysis concludes that
rising income taxes induced labor to shift from wages and salaries toward self-employment.
Rohlin, Rosenthal and Ross (2014) also demonstrates new businesses’ tendency to favor one
side of a state border over another based on tax policy. The study uses a cross-border
tax variation approach and shows that states with higher tax rate recorded more business
creation when the reciprocity agreements did not exist10. More recently Debacker, Heim,
Ramnath and Ross (2019) utilizes tax return data between 2010 and 2014 to investigate the
impact of the reform on the Kansas economy. They find that the probability of reporting
sole proprietorship income had increased but that this appeared to have come about as a
result of income shifting.
3.3 Empirical methodology: The synthetic control method
The synthetic control method is a relatively recent alternative to DiD estimators. It allows
the effect of unobserved confounders on the outcome measure to vary over time by assigning
a weight to the control group units. This feature allows the relaxation of the parallel trend
assumption which is sometimes difficult to verify for DiD estimates.
The method was introduced in Abadie and Gardeazabal (2003) and applied in Abadie,
Diamond and Hainmueller (2010, 2015) in the context of comparative studies. In this section,
we will briefly present the basic requirements and procedures of this method and how it is
applied in our context. We also present a more detailed exposition of the algorithm used in
Section C.4 of the appendix.
10Reciprocity agreements allow entrepreneurs or workers to pay taxes to the state of residence instead
of the state where the business is located. In 2021, 17 states including Arizona, Illinois and Iowa did not
require non-residents workers to pay state taxes.
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3.3.1 The synthetic control method: The case of many industries
Let us consider one industry (see Section C.4.1 for an example involving the crop production
sub-sector). Let us assume for simplicity that there are J+1 similar industries across all other
U.S. states in the sample11. We index these industries by j and define j = 1 to denote our
tax treated state or the Kansas’ industry. The units are observed for time t = 1, 2, 3, ..., T .
We note that it is necessary to have as large a pre-treatment period as possible to train
the algorithm. We denote the treatment period as T0. Then, the algorithm constructs the
synthetic sector based on a weighted average of the other control states j = 2, 3, .., J + 1
industries based on the pre-treatment period. We refer to this remaining group as the donor
pool. The weighting vector is W = (w2, ..., wj+1) with all weights between 0 and 1. The
sum of all weights is equal to 1. The choice of W is based on minimizing the squared
difference between the full quarter employment in the Kansas’ industry and the synthetic
control over the pre-treatment period12. Our selected predictors include lagged values of full
quarter employment, quarter employment13 and payroll data. Once this is done in the one
Kansas industry, we repeat the same procedure for every 3 digit North American Industry
Classification System (NAICS) code in Kansas in the same way and obtain industry specific
effects.
Most studies using the SCM, only investigate a handful of outcome variables. In fact,
most analysis related to the impact of the Kansas tax reform have studied either employment
changes, GDP per capita, the creation of new businesses, state revenue or a combination
of them. In this paper, we focus exclusively on full quarter employment alone at the more
dis-aggregated level of industries within Kansas. This approach presents both advantages
and challenges considering the 99 industries and more than 40 states involved. Firstly, it is
important to emphasizes that the control groups and their weights do not remain constant
11In theory, there would be 50 of such industries (including Kansas) given the 50 U.S. states which
potentially have the same industry.
12The SCM does not allow for extrapolation, so we have a convexity constraint. In other words, no weights
of the W matrix is negative.
13Total employment for a quarter records all employees working during the quarter. The challenge with
this measure, is that it cannot deal with short spells of employment and employees who left a job and gain
another one during a particular quarter would be counted twice.
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throughout the mutiples SCM procedures. In this paper, we are dealing with several control
groups depending on the industry at hand. What this means in practice is that the states
which would be selected from the donor pool when studying the aircraft industry in Kansas,
would likely be different from those chosen when studying the food manufacturing industry
for instance. Furthermore, this means that when studying even the food manufacturing
industry as opposed to the beverage manufacturing industry, though very close, the states
and the weight each one would take could be much different. In Table C.2, we present a
more detailed list of the donor pool.
As emphasized by McCloskey (2017), there are two elements worth noting about the SCM.
First, unlike the DiD method, it does not require the parallel trend assumption. Second, if
a Kansas industry happened to be strictly larger or smaller than all donor states, values in
the same industry, the Kansas values would not be a reproducible convex combination of
the donor pool values. Fortunately, this case did not happen in our study because for all
considered sectors, Kansas does not have the smallest nor the largest industry in term of full
quarter employment.
Finally, to assess the quality of the pre-period match we rely on the root mean square













where Y1t is the outcome in Kansas at time t, T0 is the time of intervention, ws is the weight
on state s of donor pool and Yst is the outcome in state s at the same time.
3.3.2 Donor pool and predictors variables
The donor pool includes all the potential control units that will be used for estimation.
Unlike DiD estimators, we include as many units as possible in the donor pool to allow the
algorithm to select which ones should continue to be used. The donor pool consists of the
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47 U.S. states other than Kansas and with the exception of Massachusetts and Michigan for
recurrent missing data issues. We often exclude all states which do not have corporate income
taxes (South Dakota, Wyoming, Nevada, Ohio, Texas, and Washington). Occasionally, other
states also do not appear because the relevant industry did not exist (see Table C.1). This is
only true for particular cases meaning that the state could re-appear in other SCM procedures
for different industries. For example, Maryland is excluded from the analysis of the Oil and
Gas Extraction sub-sector because no data is available. However, in theory, it appears in
all other sub-sector estimations. Furthermore, the SCM relies on a strongly balanced panel
dataset and missing data for any quarter also resulted in the removal of the state. Every
valid donor state had a minimum of 41 quarters of data available including the third quarter
of 2012 which is the treament date. In Appendix C, we provide a sample of the states and
their participation in the donor pool.
Furthermore, the SCM requires predictor variables to compare outcome of the treated
state against the control states. We also refer to them as matching variables. We use three
variables in this study. First, we have the quarter employment, then the lagged values of
the full quarter employment, which is the outcome variable, and finally workers payroll per
quarter14.
3.3.3 Inference
The SCM relies on a mode of inference that differs from usual comparative methods. Abadie
and Gardeazabal (2003) use placebo or permutation methods (Abadie et al. (2010)). We
run placebo tests for every state in the donor pool. Each state has its own synthetic control
built and we end up with a distribution of placebo. There is a placebo for all other states
(the policy shift did not happen there). The obtained distribution gives an idea of how likely
the observed effect could be the product of chance. Because this can be done for many time
periods after the intervention, the researcher can calculate a “p-value” for every quarter
afterwards.
14One difficulty inherent to our approach at the dis-aggregated level, is the difficulty to find a proper
quarterly recorded variable that varies at the industry level within each state.
107
These values indicate the likelihood of estimating an effect as large as the real treated
Kansas. In cases when placebo estimates do not fit well in the pre-tax reform period, it is
expected that they would not fit better after the intervention. To account for this we can
introduce thresholds based on pre-intervention quality of fit. An alternative to avoiding the
cut-off option is to look at the ratio of the pre-period to the post period RMSP following
Abadie, Diamond and Hainmueller (2015). This allows to calculate the following ratio of
post to pre-RMSPE to see what share of placebo effects are larger than Kansas. The ratio
is given by:
where ws is the SCM generated weight on state s. A challenge peculiar to the synthetic
control method is the lack of traditional inference statistics. Instead, placebo methods are
used to ensure that the results are reliable. We perform placebo tests for every state in
the donor pool. In practice, this entails building a synthetic control state for each state.
Because the tax cuts only occurred in Kansas, all these constructed controls are labeled as
“placebo.” For this reason, these states should not, in theory, show large estimated treatment
effects. The distribution of these placebo effects is then used to compute empirical p-values
for average effects based on the quarter of observations. In other words, we observe one
p-value for every quarter post policy enactment.
The empirical p-values inform us as to the likelihood of the observed effect in each Kansas
industry for each post period of resulting from chance alone. The algorithm is documented
in details in Quirstoff and Galiani (2017) and follows Abadie, Diamond and Hainsmueller
(2010).
It is often the case that the placebo estimates display a poor fit in the pre-period phase
and thus the difference between observations and placebo could be very large adding no
meaningful information to a subsequent incorporation in the p-values group. To address
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this, two options apply. First, Abadie, Diamond and Hainsmueller (2010) advise the use
of thresholds based on the pre-intervention period for restriction. Three distinct cutt-offs
with either more than 20 times the treated state RMSPE, more than 5 times the treated
state RMSPE, and finally more than twice the treated state RMSPE (see Section C.1).
In our case this entails an approach case-by-case depending on the industry of interest.
Another approach expanded in Quirstoff and Galiani (2017) is to divide all effects by the
corresponding pre-treatment match quality to get “pseudo t-statistic” measures.
Still the placebo tests cannot rule out the possibility that other causes lie behind the
observed effects. The SCM method offers a more data driven procedure to select the control
units. Nonetheless, the selection of elements including donor pool members and even the
predictors variables specifications must be noted as independent of the algorithm decision.
3.4 Data
The industry-state data are from the Quarterly Workforce Indicators (QWI) which is pub-
lished by the U.S. Census Bureau. This nationally representative dataset originates from a
variety of sources including administrative records on employment collected by the states,
social security data and other survey data. It covers the 50 U.S. states and the District of
Columbia. The observations are available between 2001 and the present15 at a quarterly fre-
quency. In its original form, the QWI dataset contains 32 economic indicators including job
gains, workers’ demographics and firms characteristics (NAICS code16, geography, industry
and more).
The industry codes are listed at the 3 digits levels for a total of 99 subsectors. The dataset
also provides county-level data. At this fine level of observation, certain states occasionally
lack sufficient information for different reasons. The relatively new creation of an industry,
its non-existence in a particular state or issues of confidentiality are a few explanations (see
Section C.3). Notably, Michigan and Massachusetts systematically missed some industry
15The data are released with a 9 months lag.
16NAICS stands for North American Industry Classification System. The system was developed in 1997
for use by Federal Statistical Agencies for data collection and analysis related to the U.S. economy.
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measures and do not appear in the final analysis. We do not believe this to be a significant
loss. However, most industries are present in all other states for all periods.
The QWI is a superior database for its ability to track both workers and firms and
link them throughout time. These features also allow researchers to do analysis on workers’
characteristics and comparing desired outcomes across geographic units at the national, state,
local and even metropolitan level. The NAICS codes are available up to the fourth digits
at all the above cited geographic scales. The QWI is released quarterly and the available
data are always three quarters behind the time of release. For instance, the QWI released
in the fourth quarter or 2021 will have information up to the first quarter of that same year.
If data submission or quality problems arise, the QWI release for a state may be skipped
for one or more quarters, until the problem is solved. This explains the rare but recurrent
absence of some observations for particular units.
The QWI has noteworthy strengths and weaknesses for our particular analysis. On the
one hand, its link between employers and workers is one advantage along with the ability to
show a difference between real employment opportunity versus sporadic employment growth
in an area. Because a large part of employment opportunities do not emerge from new
job creation as much as workers’ turnover, the database offers a valuable distinction in this
regard by providing several measures of employment. Being released quarterly, the QWI is
a relatively high frequency database considering the scope of the data available while most
of the studies of the Kansas Tax reform have only used yearly data. It is also compatible
with the QCEW (Quarterly Census of Employment and Wages) released by the BLS (U.S.
Bureau of Labors Statistics). In addition, one of the greatest strengths of the QWI, is the
type of workers counted. Unlike other databases providing bulk measures at the state level,
the QWI does not report self-employed workers and independent contractors17. In other
words, the full quarter employment measure for each industry only involves the employees
on payroll. This peculiarity implies that our measure of employment is well suited to analyse
industry differences in terms of their employment creation or losses of payroll workers with
minimum noise from income re-characterization processes. Weaknesses include the fact that
17https://lehd.ces.census.gov/doc/Metadata4 QWI.htm/.
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the QWI reports the industry at the 4th rather than the 6th digits levels, a setback which is
mostly inconsequential unless endeavoring fine data mining exercises. This is not our aim.
Furthermore, like most databases of its kind, the QWI has many non-disclosed values due
to confidentiality concerns. Finally, we cannot differentiate between voluntary and forced
loss of employment. In other words, we are unable to know if workers left their job or got
terminated.
Our other source database is the County Business Patterns (CBP). This annual database
provides state economic data by industry. We get detailed information on the number of
establishments and their type as well as the number of employees on payroll. We use it
as the main source to calculate the percentage of employees working for a pass-through
entity within a given industry. The construction of buildings, repair and maintenance as
well as the real estate industry have the highest concentration of pass-through workers with
over 70% of their workforce in that category. Hospitals, utilities and telecommunications
are among the lowest pass-through industries with less than 5% of their workforce in a
sole-proprietorship, partnerships or S-corporations. Although government sub-sectors are
included in the database, they do not have pass-through entities. They thus have zero
pass-through employment share.
3.4.1 The outcome variable: the full quarter employment
We investigate one outcome of interest which is the employment during the full quarter.
This is a measure of stable jobs or jobs that were held both at the beginning and at the
end of the considered quarter. In particular, a worker is fully quarter employed with a firm
if the worker has positive earnings in the earlier, current and next time period. We believe
this measure minimizes the noise in the analysis and most importantly helps answer whether
or not a certain industry experienced steady job gains or losses after 2012. To match the
Kansas’ trend in this outcome, the SCM scales each state’s full quarter employment so that
it is 1 in the last pre-treatment quarter.
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3.4.2 Predictors or matching variables
To perform the algorithmic minimization procedure and the selection of controls, the SCM
relies on different predictor variables. There is little consensus in the literature as to which
variables are “the best predictors” and researchers often use historically good variables on
a case-by-base basis. For example, Hayes (2017) studying a similar question uses GDP
per capita, percentage job in agriculture and percentage jobs in construction. The author
also uses demographic predictors including state population, percentage of residents over
64 years of age and finally political predictors (for example an indicator for a divided state
government, or an index of citizens’ ideology). For the purpose of our current study we
use lagged values of full quarter employment per sector, employment at anytime during the
quarter18 and the amount of the payroll to workers for each industry between the second
quarter of 2007 and the fourth quarter of 2011.
3.4.3 Summary statistics
Given the large number of industries, and the many workforce attributes, we offer in this
section a subsample of the available information. For each industry, we have information
on several workforce characteristics and show them in contrast to neighbor states. We
also present information of the four border states, that are, Nebraska, Colorado, Missouri
and Oklahoma. We present descriptive statistics before the reform and after alongside the
difference between high pass-through and low pass-through industries.
18This measure has certain limitations. Double counting can occur if a worker left a job and gets another
one mid quarter. The other drawback, is that this measure also includes very short spells of work. Consider
a person working for a week and resigning.
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Table 3.1: Descriptive statistics of Kansas and border states’ workforce
Kansas(2016) Border states (2016)
Workers features (%) 2011 2014 2016 High pass- Low pass- High pass- Low pass- All
trough trough trough trough sectors
Female 49.76 49.17 49.33 41.91 56.52 46.94 52.39 49.51
Bachelor or more 24.11 23.00 22.46 18.27 27.25 21.00 24.35 22.46
High School 24.68 24.88 24.99 24.82 24.30 22.00 19.49 20.81
Less than HS 9.15 10.07 10.68 12.39 8.75 17.50 16.52 16.95
White 88.41 87.39 86.79 84.62 87.68 42.09 35.79 39.77
Black 6.33 6.93 7.22 8.16 6.96 13.53 9.73 11.74
14-18 2.47 2.62 2.87 4.96 1.46 9.55 9.31 9.26
35-44 20.62 20.68 20.82 20.31 21.41 15.38 16.56 15.79
55-64 16.31 17.07 17.54 13.64 20.35 13.01 14.41 13.63
Notes: High pass-through industries have above 51.2% of workers (above 75th percentile) employed by sole proprietor-
ships, partnerships or S-corporations. Low pass-through industries have less than 24.10% of workers (under 25th per-
centile) in the same categories. Border states include Nebraska, Missouri, Oklahoma and Colorado.
A lower percentage of the workforce are women compared to men both in Kansas and the
neighbor states. However, women’s employment seems higher in industries with less pass-
through businesses. An increasing share of the Kansas workforce appears to have a bachelor
degree or more although the change is not very large. In addition, a lower percentage of
workers in high pass-through sectors have a bachelor compared to low-pass through sectors.
There is more uniformity in term of high school diploma both across time and between sector
types. We note that a higher percentage of workers in high pass-through sectors report having
less than a high school diploma both in Kansas and in the border states. A large share of
the Kansas workforce is white (above 86%). The employment of teenagers (between 14 and
18 years of age) has been increasing since 2001 although the change is very small. A larger
share of the workforce in neighbor states are teenage workers. We also note that in high
pass-through Kansas’ industries, the employment of teenage workers is more than double
than that in the low pass-through sectors. This is not the case in border states as the shares
are essentially equal there. When considering the share of the workforce between 55 and




In this section, we present the different results that we obtain by investigating the industries
in the QWI. The majority of studies related to the Kansas tax reform investigate bulk
employment outcomes. Here, we look at sub-sectors of interest. For example, an unexplored
hypothesis is the role of Boeing’s departure in the loss of Kansas employment. We are able
to remove that industry and verify whether the outcome differs. We also investigate the
policy’s impact on low pass-through versus high pass-through industries as well as other
sub groups. Because of the volume of results inherent to our approach, we only present a
handful of outcomes and interpret them. We present the exhaustive results in Appendix
C. For each outcome we present the path of the Kansas variable versus its corresponding
synthetic control as well as the estimated difference between the two.
3.5.1 The impact of the tax reform on the aggregate Kansas em-
ployment
We begin by revisiting the effect of the 2012 tax reform on the aggregate Kansas employ-
ment using quarterly data. The pre-treatment match is better 12 quarters before the policy
intervention and the vertical line indicates the time of the tax reform. The left side of Figure
3.1 shows the difference between Kansas and it’s synthetic control. The second panel of
Figure 3.1 shows that at the time of intervention, the number of employees in the Kansas
workforce was close to 1.28 million. In line with earlier related studies, we do not find a
significant gain of employment (see Figure C.6 with p-values consistently beyond 0.1). The
path of the actual Kansas is very similar to it’s synthetic control. The SCM effect on full
quarter employment of the aggregate Kansas employment is an -0.5% loss in the 14 quarters
after the tax reform. This change is not significant as shown by Figure C.6 as no p-values is
ever lower than 0.1.
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Figure 3.1: Trends in full quarter employment: Kansas vs. synthetic control
3.5.2 Did industries with more pass-through businesses benefit?
In this section, we focus on industries and regroup them based on the percentage of workers
employed by either form of pass-through business. Our measure of pass-through employment
emanates from the Country Business Patterns (CBP). We obtain detailed data on the forms
of establishments in each sector and compute the percentage of workers employed by a form
of pass-through entity as opposed to large corporations, the government or others. We choose
to rely on the year 2011, as it is close enough to the reform date without plausibly suffering
any effect from the tax reform one year later. Our assumption is that the measure reflects
the tendency of businesses organization in each sector.
We define industries where less than 24.10% of the workforce is employed by a pass-
through business as “low pass-through” sectors. This number represents the 25% percentile.
Conversely, we also define industries where more than 51.2% of workers are employed by pass-
through businesses as “high pass-through” sectors. This number represents the share above
the 75% percentile. Based on this measure, we regroup the workforce of low pass-through
sectors and rerun the SCM in a similar fashion as before.
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Figure 3.2: Trends in full quarter employment for low pass-through industries: Kansas vs.
synthetic control
Figure 3.3: Trends in full quarter employment for high pass-through industries: Kansas vs.
synthetic control
As before, Figure 3.3 shows that the pre-period match between Kansas and its syn-
thetic control is better after the recession of 2008. For so-called low pass-through industries
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we record an insignificant 1.47% decrease in full quarter employment (see Figure 3.5). In
contrast, we record an also insignificant -0.4% change for high pass-through industries em-
ployment as seen in Figure 3.4. In Figure 3.4, we also see that two years after the policy
change, the effect across high pass-through industries is normally distributed across zero
with few positive and negative outliers.
Figure 3.4: Distribution of effects 2 years after the tax reform.
Figure 3.5: Low (left) vs. High (right) pass-through full quarter employment p-values.
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Figure 3.6: 2015 First quarter effect on industry employment versus pass-through level.
Figure 3.4 shows the distribution of effects 2 years after the tax reform enactment for low
versus high pass-through industries. Low pass-through industries appear to have lost jobs
more significantly than high pass-through industries. Among high pass-through the effect is
distributed around zero. The significance of the finding for low pass-through businesses can
be seen by considering Figure 3.5. The p-values are lower in the 14 quarters post enactment.
This suggests that it is unlikely that the full quarter employment was lower by chance. To
provide more insights into the results, we present in Figure 3.6 the relationship between
the job growth in several sectors and the percentage of pass-through employees. We focus
on industries with better pre-period fit and the size of the dots represents the size of the
workforce of each industry.
Figure 3.6 shows that while most industries were negatively affected by the tax reform,
the negative effect on high-pass-through sectors is less pronounced. This reveals another
important observation that we can observe at the industry level. Although the fitted line
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has a positive slope, most sectors record negative job creation in the first quarter of 2015.
In addition, in Table 3.2, we regress the recorded employment effects across all industries
and quarters on the 2011 pass-through classification measure while including quarter fixed
effects. Column (1) shows that the full quarter employment growth in Kansas has a positive
but non-significant relationship to the percentage of the workforce employed in pass-through
businesses. Similarly, regardless of other specifications and time horizons, the higher pass-
through levels never appear to be correlated with statistically significant growth in full
quarter employment.
Table 3.2: Industries’ job gains and pass-through employment in 2011
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
All 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 All(better Better Better
fit) fit 2015 fit 2016
2011 Pass-through % 0.074 0.020 0.032 0.074 0.113 0.133 0.032 0.078 0.086
(0.047) (0.039) (0.041) (0.049) (0.077) (0.081) (0.035) (0.053) (0.065)
Quarter FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 1,328 166 332 332 332 166 704 176 88
R-squared 0.015 0.006 0.012 0.018 0.020 0.033 0.010 0.041 0.031
Notes: The explained variable is the percentage change in jobs for Kansas. Clustering is done at the industry level. We
refer to indutries with pre-treatment RMSPE under the 25th percentile as better fit. Alternative cutoffs are shown in
Appendix. Government sectors are included with an imputed passthrough percentage of zero.
One explanation for the observed job losses in the low pass-through sectors could be an
indirect effect of the well documented state revenue loss in Kansas19. It could be that jobs
were lost in response to budget cuts or government contract cancellations with large or mid-
sizes corporations due to the lack of revenue. For example, most public schools in Kansas
had to cut their staff and expenses to accommodate the large loss in revenue. Other non
pass-through companies also lost jobs. For example, Affinis Corp, a C-corporation, faced
some of the negative effect of the state revenue losses. They specialize in small government
projects such as levies and dams. In response to project cancellations they have had to let
employees go20.
19Hayes (2017) finds that there is an almost 50% difference between Kansas and its synthetic control
personal income tax revenue. Studies have shown that individual income tax revenue is a large contributor
to state and local governments’ revenue (Malm and Kant (2013)).
20https://www.theatlantic.com/video/index/558143/kansas-tax-cuts/.
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3.5.3 Were the Kansas employment outcomes driven by the air-
craft manufacturing and oil industry shocks?
Figure 3.7: Trends in employment excluding aircraft manufacturing, oil and gas extraction
Kansas vs. synthetic control
After the Kansas Tax cuts were implemented and the effects witnessed, supporters and critics
of this policy were still debating what lessons could be learned. A major contention point
raised by several policymakers is that the state of Kansas in 2012 was not actually a level
business field to draw the sort of final inference critics of the cuts were making. In particular,
around the time of enactment there were steep declines in oil and gas prices and Kansas is an
energy producing state. Perhaps this could have been a large burden on farmers. Another
point of the debate is the aircraft manufacturer Boeing who left Wichita (KS) with more
than 2000 direct job losses at the time and with no accurate estimate of the potential support
activities job losses.
In a piece published by Center on Budget and Policy Priorities, Michael Mazerov (2018)
supports that none of these events can actually account for nearly enough to explain the
outcomes observed. He points out that the energy price drops did not affect Kansas alone
but also the neighboring states, even harder in fact, while the earning in this sector for
120
Kansas was behind all of them but Nebraska. On the other hand he argues that the segment
of employees lost in Wichita to Boeing’s move is definitely too small to be a valid explanation.
To our knowledge, there has currently been no economic study which has investigated the
question from this angle. An industry disaggregated approach could provide an adequate
setting to study the issue to provide further elements of answers. To address the question
we compare the aggregate outcomes (sum of all industry outcomes) to a state of Kansas
without the industries of aircraft manufacturing and the energy sector in order to find out
if the results vary substantially.
Figure 3.7 shows the impact on the full quarter employment in Kansas when the aircraft
manufacturing and the energy industry are removed. The effects are almost identical. This
provides evidence against the possibility that events in these industries largely explain the
aggregate outcomes in Kansas. Figure C.7 also shows that the effect is not statistically
significant regardless of the quarter considered.
3.5.4 Removing the Wichita Metropolitan Statistical Area (MSA)
to account for Boeing’s departure
Figure 3.8: The effect of removing the Wichita counties.
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To further explore the potential effect of Boeing’s departure from Kansas, we remove the 4
counties (Sedgwick, Butler, Harvey, Kingman) forming the Wichita metropolitan statistical
area. Wichita is the largest city in the state of Kansas21 with an estimated 644,000 in the 4
above cited counties alone. Starting in the 1920s, several aircraft companies including Cessna
and Steerman Aircrafts started manufacturing operations in the area. More companies joined
eventually with Airbus, Spirit AeroSystems and Textron Aviation. Wichita has been called
over the years the “Air capital of the world22.”
Thus, the role of Boeing’s departure from the state could be a relevant question for
employment fluctuation in Kansas. In this section, we address the question by removing
Wichita from Kansas and re-run the SCM method. Figure 3.8 and Figure C.8 show that
we do not find evidence of significant loss or job gains when this is done. Essentially, the
results are very similar to the previous one including Wichita. This offers evidence against
the hypothesis that Boeing’s departure from Kansas is an important explanation for why




3.5.5 What effects when excluding the agricultural sector?
Figure 3.9: Trends in employment excluding agricultural sector: Kansas vs. synthetic control
Another concern with the outcome of the tax reform is the effect of the agricultural sector
downturn. Combined earnings of farm proprietors and employees was reduced by 15.8%
in Kansas between 2012 and 2016 (Mazerov (2016)). We explore the effect of the reform
excluding the agricultural sector in Kansas. Once more, Figure 3.9 results look close to the
aggregate ones. Figure C.9 shows that the p-values do not report significance.
3.6 Placebo studies
We focus on the full quarter employment in the low pass-through industries. Previously
we have shown that a negative significant effect was recorded in these industries. We use
placebo studies to show what significance means in this case. In essence, we run similar
SCM procedures for non-treated states with the assumption that the effect should be close
to zero. We then compare the distribution of these effects to Kansas which should be larger
if the reform had an effect.
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Figure 3.10: Full quarter employment in Kansas low pass-through industries and placebo
gaps in all 43 control states.
Figure 3.10 displays the results for this test. The light gray lines represent the gap
between placebos and actual state outcomes for the 43 other states of the donor pool. In
other words, they show the difference between each states’ full quarter employment in low
pass-through industries and its corresponding synthetic control. The dark line represents
the outcome for Kansas. The graph shows that although the gap post 2012 is modest, it is
lower than most U.S. states. Figure 3.11 excludes states with pre-RMSPE 1.5 times higher
than Kansas’. This removes only two states. The graph shows more clearly that the Kansas
outcome is consistently lower than the remaining states.
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Figure 3.11: Full quarter employment in Kansas low pass-through industries and placebo
gaps in 41 control states.
3.7 Conclusion
The 2012 Kansas tax reform will remain an important historical event for many reasons. To
date, it is the largest income tax reduction policy to ever occur in the state and very mixed
interpretations still surround many consistent findings. While the objective of the tax cuts
was to achieve economic growth through incentive geared toward pass-through businesses,
the results have been different from the expectations of the proponents. Still, other states
and federal governments continue to express interest in similar tax reduction policies. Thus,
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understanding the effects and mechanisms involved in this reform at a deeper level than the
aggregate results motivated our study.
In line with previous research, we find that no significant aggregate employment effect
can be detected in Kansas. However, we also find that a few sectors suffered sizeable em-
ployment losses possibly due to state revenue reductions. First, industries with more pass-
through businesses seem to have incurred less job losses compared to industries with less
pass-through businesses although the relationship is not statistically significant regardless of
specifications or time horizons. If anything, industries with fewer pass-through businesses
may have incurred more job losses after the reform. Second, after removing the aircraft
manufacturing as well as the oil and energy industries, the impact on Kansas employment is
still insignificant. Over the 14 quarters post-reform, we estimate an insignificant aggregate
loss of 0.15% jobs against 0.33% when including aircraft manufacturing and energy sectors.
Third, employment excluding the agricultural sector has very similar insignificant results to
previous aggregate findings. Nevertheless, we are unable to rule out that the non-significant
job creation observed for high pass-through sectors is but income re-characterization.
Our lack of a significant positive impact on employment is consistent with the related
literature on the Kansas reform. To our knowledge, our study is the first presenting an
analysis of high pass-through sectors’ employment and finding negative effects in several
categories.
A number of caveats of our study are necessary to acknowledge. First, the 3 digits
level NAICS code offered relatively few reliable covariates besides payrolls and alternative
employment measures as explanatory variables. Although additional variables would improve
the SCM fit, we believe it is unlikely that largely different results would emerge. Second,
the large number of industries (99 industries) increases the likelihood of false positives.
However, we refrain from using particular outlier industries as evidence for or against our
original hypothesis and try the present findings in the context of other estimated effects.
Our results do not unambiguously show that the 2012 Kansas tax reform failed to increase
employment but present cases that were object of debate. This includes the departure of
Boeing and the energy crisis happening at the time as attenuating circumstances. The
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negative impact on government sectors’ employment excluding the executive branch is in
line with previous estimates of state budget loss of 8% and future estimates as high as 16%
in the five years post 2012 (Leachman and Mai (2016)). In light of our results, policymakers
and researchers considering similar reforms should be aware of the negative impacts on
several sectors even while aggregate employment could appears stable. This stability could
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We present a list of forecast error decompositions of shocks to renewable energy to food
prices.
Table A.1: Percent contribution of shocks to renewable energy consumption to the variability
of aggregate food prices
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Table A.2: Contribution of biomass and wind to variability of cereals and baked goods prices
Table A.3: Contribution of biomass and wind to variability of alcoholic beverage prices
Table A.4: Contribution of biomass and wind to variability of non-alcoholic beverage prices
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Table A.5: Contribution of biomass and wind to variability of meat and poultry prices
Table A.6: Contribution of biomass and wind to variability of fruits prices




B.1 List of countries by group
B.1.1 Developed countries (21)
Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Switzerland, Denmark, Spain, Finland, France, United
Kingdom, Greece, Iceland, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, New Zealand,
Sweden, Trinidad and Tobago, United States.
B.1.2 Middle income countries (29)
Algeria, Argentina, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Gabon,
Ghana, Gambia, Guatemala, Ireland, Jamaica, Jordan, Sri Lanka, Malaysia, Mexico, Nicaragua,
Panama, Peru, Paraguay,Portugal, Singapore, Tunisia, Turkey, Taiwan, Uruguay, Venezuela,
South Africa.
B.1.3 Developing countries (27)
Bangladesh, Bolivia, Botswana, China, Cameroon, Cote d’Ivoire, Egypt, Honduras, Haiti,
Indonesia, India, Kenya, Republic of Korea, Morocco, Mali, Malawi, Niger, Pakistan, Philip-
pines, Senegal, Sierra Leone, El Salvador, Togo, Thailand, Uganda, Zambia.
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B.2 Additional summary statistics
Table B.1: Descriptive statistics
By quartiles of protection
from expropriation
All Rich (1) (2) (3) (4)
Average GDP growth 2.20% 2.69% 1.35% 1.82% 2.88% 2.76%
1970-2017 (1.50) (1.43) (1.31) (1.44) (1.65) (1.15)
GDP per capita in 1995 8.47 9.49 7.32 7.72 8.72 9.91
(1.19) (0.53) (0.74) (0.82) (0.71) (0.21)
Education spending 4.04 4.44 3.19 3.93 3.98 5.03
(1.30) (1.32) (0.88) (1.23) (1.26) (1.15)
European settlers mortality 4.56 3.69 5.28 4.81 4.41 2.47
(1.40) (1.31) (1.25) (1.00) (1.06) (1.20)
Overall freedom 62.61 68.21 56.48 55.45 63.10 74.00
(10.88) (11.37) (6.72) (5.74) (11.87) (2.33)
Trade freedom 76.79 81.57 70.38 70.86 78.56 86.64
(9.91) (8.94) (10.51) (6.91) (8.27) (2.33)
Government integrity 46.64 60.46 28.95 33.93 44.20 76.78
(21.44) (21.35) (6.94) (7.16) (14.00) (11.52)
Investment freedom 63.14 70.65 52.75 52.95 61.36 82.17
(20.35) (21.31) (19.22) (14.28) (22.21) (7.80)
Number of countries 91 46 19 22 22 23
Notes: The GDP per capita and European settlers’ mortality rates are reported in logarithmic forms.
Education spending is expressed as a share of total output. Overall Freedom, trade Freedom, govern-
ment intergrity and investment freedom originate from the Heritage Foundation database of economic
freedom indicators. The index is averaged or each country between 1999, 2009 and 2019.
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Table B.2: Countries inside the Barro (2012) sample
Countries Years of education data Countries Years of education data
Argentina 1979-2019 Jordan 1979-2019
Australia 1979-2019 Japan 1979-2019
Austria 1979-2019 Kenya 1979-2019
Belgium 1979-2019 South Korea 1979-2019
Bangladesh 1979-2019 Sri Lanka 1979-2019
Bolivia 1979-2019 Luxembourg 1979-2019
Brazil 1979-2019 Morocco 1979-2019
Botswana 1979-2019 Mexico 1979-2019
Canada 1979-2019 Mali 1979-2019
Switzerland 1979-2019 Malawi 1979-2019
Chile 1979-2019 Malaysia 1979-2019
China 1979-2019 Niger 1979-2019
Cote d’Ivoire 1979-2019 Nicaragua 1979-2019
Cameroon 1979-2019 Netherlands 1979-2019
Congo, Republic No data Norway 1979-2019
Colombia 1979-2019 New Zealand 1979-2019
Costa Rica 1979-2019 Pakistan 1979-2019
Denmark 1979-2019 Peru 1979-2019
Dominica Republic 1979-2019 Philippines 1979-2019
Algeria 1979-2019 Panama 1979-2019
Ecuador 1979-2019 Portugal 1979-2019
Egypt 1979-2019 Paraguay 1979-2019
Spain 1979-2019 Senegal 1979-2019
Finland 1979-2019 Singapore 1979-2019
France 1979-2019 Sierra Leone 1979-2019
Gabon 1979-2019 El Salvador 1979-2019
United Kingdom 1979-2019 Sweden 1979-2019
Ghana 1979-2019 Togo 1979-2019
Gambia 1979-2019 Thailand 1979-2019
Greece 1979-2019 Trinidad 1979-2019
Guatemala 1979-2019 Tunisia 1979-2019
Honduras 1979-2019 Turkey 1979-2019
Haiti 1989-2019 Taiwan No data
Indonesia 1979-2019 Uganda 1979-2019
India 1979-2019 Uruguay 1979-2019
Ireland 1979-2019 United States 1979-2019
Iceland 1979-2019 Venezuela 1979-2019
Italy 1979-2019 South Africa 1979-2019
Jamaica 1979-2019 Zambia 1979-2019
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B.2.1 Alternative specification of the scaling effect
The scaling effect in the human capital accumulation process, ξ, can be defined alternatively to help concep-
tualize the substitutability between education spending and institutional quality. To see this more clearly,
let us consider an alternative definition of ξ given by the CES form:
ξ ≡ [aeρ + (1− a)qρ]
ν
ρ (B.1)
where a (between zero and one) is the share parameter of inputs, ρ is the substitution parameter, and ν
denotes the level of homogeneity of the production process where ν < 1 gauges the extend of decreasing




= aeρ−1(µ− ρ)(1− a)qρ−1 [aeρ + (1− a)qρ]
µ−2ρ
ρ .
These cross derivatives are negative if the elasticity of substitution is less than 11−ν . In other words,
education spending and institutional quality are sufficiently substitutable.
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B.2.2 Is there multicollinearity between education spending and
institutional quality?
Figure B.1: Average education spending (1979-2009) and institutional quality
In our baseline model, education spending and institutional quality are the main explanatory variables for
economic growth. However, if the level of education spending is strongly correlated to existing institutions,
there is an endogeneity problem that must be addressed. Figure B.1 presents the relationship between the
two variables. We see that no strong positive nor negative relationship emerges. The correlation coefficient
is also low around 26.14%.
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B.2.3 Does institutional quality vary among rich countries?
Figure B.2: Distribution of institutional quality index among rich countries
We can expect that richer countries would have higher institutional quality scores, ceterus paribus. Yet, the
empirical estimation procedure requires a level of variation in this measure. Figure B.2 shows that most
rich countries have a high level of institutional quality as expected, but a number of rich countries also have
relatively lower scores. Quatar, Kuwait, Greece and Saudia Arabia, among others have scores lower than
7.8/10. We also look at the variable from the perspective of Figure B.3 which shows variation not only in


















































Figure B.3: Education spending, institutional quality and growth among rich countries.
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B.3 Additional tables
Table B.3: Panel of middle income countries (1989-2019)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Variables Barro Barro Barro Barro Barro Barro Barro Barro+
Education spending 0.06 -0.14 -0.92 -0.77 -0.77 -0.55 -0.16
(0.23) (0.21) (1.48) (1.53) (1.47) (1.51) (0.93)
Institutional quality 0.43* 0.32 -0.05 0.15 0.02 0.27 0.41
(0.22) (0.24) (0.79) (0.86) (0.74) (0.79) (0.63)
Inst*Education Spending 0.11 0.10 0.10 0.08 0.01
(0.22) (0.23) (0.21) (0.23) (0.15)
Government Expenditures -0.06* -0.08** -0.02
(0.04) (0.04) (0.03)
Y1970 -1.17 -1.32 -0.91
(0.87) (0.81) (0.65)
Observations 114 120 114 114 114 114 114 164
R-squared 0.59 0.13 0.13 0.13 0.17 0.15 0.20 0.15
Notes: The dependent variable in Column (1)-(8) is the average 10 year growth rate of log GDP per capita.
Institutions are measured on a scale of 0 to 10 with higher scores indicating better institutional quality. The
measure originates from Political Risk Services and is averaged between 1985 and 1995. Education spending
is obtained from the World Bank World Development Indicators and is expressed as a percentage of GDP.
Standard errors are in parenthesis. Asterisks between 1 and 3 respectively indicate significance at the 10%,
5% and 1% level. See Section 2.5 for a more detailed variable definitions and sources.
Cross sectional results
Table B.4 presents our cross sectional specifications of the baseline equation. The regressions are run in the
same spirit but with a different measures of long run growth. We regress the 30 year average growth rate
of real per capita GDP on institutional quality and education expenditures in the previous decade. The
boundary years are 1989 and 2019. The education spending is the average in the previous decade that is
1969-1979.
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Table B.4: Cross sections (1989-2019)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Variables Barro Barro Barro Barro
Cross section A: Rich countries
Education spending 0.05 0.09 0.76 0.02 0.09 2.90***
(0.10) (0.10) (0.89) (0.12) (0.15) (0.87)
Institutional quality 0.12 0.10 0.41 -0.25 -0.29 0.78**
(0.21) (0.23) (0.42) (0.30) (0.30) (0.32)
Inst*Ed -0.07 -0.30***
(0.09) (0.09)
y1970 -0.21 -0.42 -0.11 -0.08 0.23 0.50 0.36 0.31
(0.18) (0.30) (0.27) (0.27) (0.60) (0.53) (0.59) (0.61)
Observations 31 28 27 27 21 21 21 21
R-squared 0.07 0.31 0.12 0.13 0.03 0.13 0.16 0.39
Cross section B: Developing countries
Education spending -0.11 -0.16 0.73 -0.11 -0.22 1.57
(0.14) (0.12) (1.58) (0.20) (0.20) (1.83)
Institutional quality 0.58*** 0.62** 0.95 0.52* 0.57* 1.26*
(0.20) (0.23) (0.60) (0.28) (0.29) (0.72)
Inst*Ed -0.13 -0.27
(0.22) (0.26)
y1970 -0.94 -2.59*** -1.95** -2.01** -1.33 -1.81* -1.65 -1.61
(0.71) (0.71) (0.77) (0.80) (0.89) (1.03) (1.11) (1.01)
Observations 46 38 34 34 26 26 26 26
R-squared 0.05 0.39 0.34 0.35 0.11 0.25 0.28 0.31
Cross section C: All countries
Education spending -0.11 -0.11 -0.08 -0.08 -0.14 -0.22
(0.07) (0.08) (0.40) (0.11) (0.11) (0.66)
Institutional quality 0.32*** 0.29*** 0.31 0.33** 0.33* 0.29
(0.09) (0.09) (0.26) (0.16) (0.17) (0.37)
Inst*Ed -0.00 0.01
(0.06) (0.09)
y1970 -0.41*** -0.79*** -0.69*** -0.69*** -0.38** -0.85*** -0.77*** -0.78***
(0.10) (0.14) (0.15) (0.16) (0.17) (0.27) (0.27) (0.28)
Observations 138 112 103 103 75 77 75 75
R-squared 0.13 0.22 0.19 0.19 0.10 0.15 0.16 0.16
Notes: The dependent variable in Column (1)-(8) is the average 30 year growth rate of log GDP per capita. Institutions are
measured on a scale of 0 to 10 with higher scores indicating better protection against expropriation. The measure originates from
Political Risk Services and is averaged between 1985 and 1995. Education spending is obtained from the World Bank World De-
velopment Indicators and is expressed as a percentage of GDP. For rich countries, the Barro sample excludes Bahrain, Bahamas,
Isral, Kuwait, Quatar, the Russian Federation and Saudia Arabia. Standard errors are in parenthesis. Asterisks between 1 and 3
respectively indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level. See Section 2.5 for a more detailed variable definitions and sources.
We note that relative to the panel specifications, the cross sectional approach severely reduces the number
of observations per country. Each country only appears once in the regressions. The Barro sample is even
smaller. In particular, the regression for rich countries has either 27 or 21 countries, developing countries
either 34 ot 26 and all countries only either 103 or 75. To further clarify the rationale of the Barro sample,
we note that the sample of rich countries in that specification excludes Bahrain, Bahamas, Kuwait, Quatar
and Saudia Arabia among others. Two of these countries were listed in the 2000 OECD report reporting tax
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havens and the other have experienced large growth episode due in part to relatively recent oil production.
Overall, the results in the cross sectional approach mimic the findings of the panel specification at least
in term of signs. In most specifications the log GDP per capita in 1970 has a negative significant sign
suggesting that richer countries grow at a slower pace which is consitent with traditionnal growth theory.
Both in rich and developingcountries the inclusion of the interaction term shows a negative sign which is
seldom significant. In Regression 8, however, we see significant results close to the panel specification for rich
countries. Here, for a country with perfect institutions, we interpret that 1% increase in education spending
would be associated with a −0.10% change in growth or (2.9− 3).
Table B.5: Cross section: Middle income countries (1989-2019)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Variables Barro Barro Barro Barro+
Education spending -0.13 -0.13 -1.01 -0.10 -0.12 -2.34
(0.10) (0.14) (0.79) (0.20) (0.19) (1.67)
Institutional quality 0.32** 0.25 -0.30 0.30 0.22 -0.88
(0.13) (0.15) (0.51) (0.29) (0.34) (0.95)
Inst*Ed 0.14 0.32
(0.13) (0.24)
y1970 -0.44 -0.83 -0.82 -0.74 -0.87 -1.15 -1.10 -0.87
(0.55) (0.66) (0.69) (0.72) (0.88) (0.93) (1.02) (1.03)
Observations 61 46 42 42 28 30 28 28
R-squared 0.04 0.10 0.10 0.12 0.07 0.09 0.09 0.15
Notes: The dependent variable in Column (1)-(8) is the average 30 year growth rate of log GDP per capita. Insti-
tutions are measured on a scale of 0 to 10 with higher scores indicating better protection against expropriation. The
measure originates from Political Risk Services and is averaged between 1985 and 1995. Education spending is obtained
from the World Bank World Development Indicators and is expressed as a percentage of GDP. For rich countries, the
Barro sample excludes Bahrain, Bahamas, Isral, Kuwait, Quatar, the Russian Federation and Saudia Arabia. Standard
errors are in parenthesis. Asterisks between 1 and 3 respectively indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level.
See Section 2.5 for a more detailed variable definitions and sources.
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Table B.6: Cross section (1989-2019): Alternative measures of institutional quality
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
VARIABLES All Developing Rich All Developing Middle Rich Barro+
Income
Panel A: Institutions proxied by property rights
Education Spending 0.17 0.76 0.65 0.13 1.53 -0.72 0.27 0.36
(0.42) (0.64) (0.95) (0.38) (0.89) (0.76) (0.85) (0.27)
Property rights 0.35 1.38*** 0.39 0.49 1.59** -0.06 0.34 0.53**
(0.28) (0.37) (0.25) (0.30) (0.63) (0.61) (0.20) (0.23)
Int(PR*ED) -0.07 -0.27* -0.08 -0.05 -0.43* 0.13 -0.03 -0.08*
(0.06) (0.13) (0.11) (0.06) (0.22) (0.13) (0.10) (0.04)
Human capital 0.50 0.60 0.24 -1.14* 0.52*
(0.53) (0.96) (0.74) (0.56) (0.31)
Y1970 -1.01*** -1.89 -1.07 0.41 -0.83***
(0.27) (1.18) (0.82) (0.64) (0.16)
Observations 69 22 21 69 22 26 21 106
R-squared 0.06 0.26 0.09 0.27 0.43 0.30 0.22 0.26
Panel B: Institutions proxied by government integrity
Education Spending 0.06 2.39*** 0.36 0.05 2.39** -1.20** 0.30 0.27
(0.31) (0.66) (0.42) (0.29) (0.90) (0.45) (0.43) (0.19)
Government Integrity 0.23 3.90*** 0.16 0.33 3.85*** -0.53 0.16 0.45***
(0.22) (0.88) (0.22) (0.21) (1.29) (0.36) (0.22) (0.17)
Int(GVI*ED) -0.05 -0.93*** -0.04 -0.04 -0.90** 0.26*** -0.03 -0.07**
(0.05) (0.24) (0.05) (0.05) (0.34) (0.09) (0.05) (0.03)
Human capital 0.74* -0.10 0.46 -0.86* 0.65**
(0.42) (0.76) (0.62) (0.45) (0.29)
Y1970 -1.00*** -1.58 -1.10 0.46 -0.84***
(0.28) (1.22) (0.75) (0.70) (0.16)
Observations 69 22 21 69 22 26 21 106
R-squared 0.03 0.42 0.04 0.23 0.54 0.35 0.13 0.24
Notes: The dependent variable in Column (1)-(8) is the average 30 year growth rate of log GDP per capita.
Institutions are measured on a scale of 0 to 10 with higher scores indicating better institutional quality. The
measure originates from Political Risk Services and is averaged between 1985 and 1995. The measure of prop-
erty rights and government integrity come from the Heritage Foundation. Education spending is obtained from
the World Bank World Development Indicators and is expressed as a percentage of GDP. Standard errors are
in parenthesis. Asterisks between 1 and 3 respectively indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level. See
Section 2.5 for a more detailed variable definitions and sources.
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Table B.7: Additional controls: Middle income and all countries (1989-2019)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Variables Barro Barro Barro Barro Barro Barro Barro Barro+
Panel A: Middle income countries
Education spending -0.31 -0.21 -0.16 0.40 -0.19 -0.19 -0.04 0.42
(0.77) (0.83) (0.93) (0.68) (0.81) (0.73) (0.84) (0.67)
Institutional quality 0.21 0.37 0.41 0.55 0.42 0.35 0.46 0.54
(0.52) (0.59) (0.63) (0.48) (0.57) (0.49) (0.60) (0.42)
Inst*Ed 0.04 0.02 0.01 -0.08 0.02 0.02 -0.01 -0.08
(0.13) (0.14) (0.15) (0.11) (0.14) (0.12) (0.14) (0.11)
y1970 -0.84 -0.91 -1.08* -0.72 -1.33* -0.93 -1.49**
(0.65) (0.65) (0.56) (0.66) (0.73) (0.68) (0.72)
Government Exp. -0.02 -0.04
(0.03) (0.03)








Observations 170 170 164 159 166 166 170 152
R-squared 0.14 0.16 0.15 0.24 0.16 0.19 0.17 0.26
Panel B: All countries
Education spending 0.26 0.22 0.14 0.47* 0.14 0.19 0.46* 0.48*
(0.29) (0.25) (0.28) (0.25) (0.24) (0.25) (0.27) (0.28)
Institutional quality 0.47** 0.76*** 0.69*** 0.69*** 0.75*** 0.74*** 0.81*** 0.68***
(0.24) (0.21) (0.22) (0.20) (0.20) (0.22) (0.21) (0.21)
Inst*Ed -0.06 -0.05 -0.04 -0.09** -0.04 -0.05 -0.09** -0.10**
(0.05) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04)
y1970 -0.93*** -0.92*** -1.14*** -0.92*** -0.97*** -0.99*** -1.09***
(0.13) (0.15) (0.15) (0.13) (0.20) (0.13) (0.24)
Government Exp. -0.02 -0.02
(0.03) (0.03)








Observations 412 412 385 392 408 408 412 365
R-squared 0.10 0.20 0.19 0.24 0.21 0.21 0.22 0.25
Notes: The dependent variable in Column (1)-(8) is the average 10 year growth rate of log GDP per capita.
Institutions are measured on a scale of 0 to 10 with higher scores indicating better institutional quality. The
measure originates from Political Risk Services and is averaged between 1985 and 1995. The measure of prop-
erty rights and government integrity come from the Heritage Foundation. . Education spending is obtained
from the World Bank World Development Indicators and is expressed as a percentage of GDP. Standard er-
rors are in parenthesis. Asterisks between 1 and 3 respectively indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1%
level. See Section 2.5 for a more detailed variable definitions and sources.
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B.3.1 Additional information on the Penn World Table 10
Table B.8: Description of PWT variables
Variables Description Units Usage
CGDP e Expenditure-side real GDP, using prices Millions of Living standards across
for final goods that are constant across countries 2011 US $ countries in each year
CGDP o Output-side real GDP, based on final goods prices, Millions of Productive capacity across
exports and imports that are constant 2011 US $ countries in each year
across countries
CCON Real consumption of households and government, Millions of Living standards across
using prices that are constant across countries 2011 US $ countries in each year
CK Capital stock using prices for structures and Millions of Capital stock across
equipment that are constant across countries 2011 US $ countries in each year
RGDP e Expenditure-side real GDP, using prices for final Millions of Productive capacity across
goods that are constant across countries 2011 US $ countries and across years
and over time
RGDP o Output-side real GDP, using prices for final goods Millions of Productive capacity across
exports and imports which are constant 2011 US $ countries and across years
across countries and time
RGDPNA Real GDP at constant national prices, obtained Millions of Growth of GDP over time
from national accounts data for each country 2011 US $ in each country
PLCON Price level of CCON , equal to PPP US value =1 How consumption price levels
divided by the nominal exchange rate in 2011 $ differ across countries
PLGDP
o Price level of CGDP o,equal to the PPP USA value =1 How output price
(ratio of nominal GDP to CGDPo) in 2005 levels differ across countries
Notes: The extended version of this table is availble in Feenstra, Inklaar, and Timmer (2015). It
presents further details on absorption measures and other measures of economic consumption and
production.
Table B.8 shows a subsample of PWT variables and their prescribed usage. CGDP e is based on consump-
tion investments and government expenditure alone and is a good measure of living standards. CCON is
a “consumption-equivalent” welfare measure based on real consumption, the sum of real consumption of
households and government. This measure is especially suited for answering the question of indifference to
life in the United States versus another country. By how much should the person’s consumption be adjusted
to achieve comparable welfare levels. The question was asked by Jones and Klenow (2011) and CCON
would be a good candidate in this case. Jones and Klenow (2011) incorporated further measure of welfare
as leisure, mortality and inequality and found that Western Europe was closer to the United States in terms
of needed adjustments. The next closest were emerging Asian countries and most developing countries after
those. Another study, by Fleurbaey and Gaulier (2009), also compares living standards between countries.
They include corrections for income, labor, risk of unemployment, healthy life expectancy households fea-
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tures and inequality as well. Their method consists in computing the equivalent variations that would make
populations differing in non-income dimensions indifferent to living in one country over another. Their study
is based on OECD countries which are, we note, more comparable to each other.
Starting from the CCON variable, and adding the real investment and the real trade balance (Net
Exports), the CGDP e is obtained. This measure from the consumer’s perspective treats the net balance
of trade as an income transfer which is deflated by local prices. This measure is a representation of living
standards in a country with an extension to the trade balance. Its comparable measure from the output
side CGDP o is most relevant for studies dealing with development accounting. Hall and Jones (1999)
inquire as to why certain countries produce more output per worker than others. This seminal study
explores the proximate determinants of GDP levels and identifies many with various levels of importance.
Physical capital and educational attainment are shown to only partially explain the disparities. It shows
that “social infrastructures”, meaning the quality of institutions and government policies, are deeper drivers
of disparities in productivity and output per workers. They show how these infrastructures are endogenous
and determined historically and captured by languages. Caselli (2005) asks a similar question, but focuses
on factors of production and efficiency. Hsieh and Klenow (2010) go further to study why these proximate
determinants of growth vary and argue that total factor productivity (TFP) has a strong influence on output
channeled though physical and human capital accumulation. They propose misallocation of inputs across
firms and industries as a key explanatory variable for TFP disparities. In these studies and other related
replication attempts, CGDP o would be a good candidate.
CK is a measure of capital stock. It is computed based on time series data of buildings and different types
of machines investments and converted with relative prices for structure and equipment that are constant
across countries.
Relative to past versions of the PWT, the growth rate of RGDP e and RGDP o which was only based
on the growth rate of the real GDP emanating from national account data, since PWT8, a new method has
been adopted. The measures of RGDP e and RGDP o are based on growth rates which are linked to many
ICP benchmarks enabling a correction between those benchmarks. The measure relies on an interpolation
between available benchmarks and as such is not necessarily the same with the national account growth
rate 1. Johnson, Larson, Papageorgiou, and Subramanian (2013) pointed out some concerns with the earlier
method, thus the revision since PWT8. The study argues that two problems arise with the earlier approach.
First, the estimates of growth varied substantially across different versions of the PWT (newer versions as
1Feenstra et al. (2005) explain that India for instance has a higher standard of living in the 1975 ICP
benchmark compared to what was predicted from the 1985. This entails that the change in real GDP from
1975 is proportionately underestimated.
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opposed to previous). This despite the underlying method of computation being preserved. The methodology
led to systematic variability which was larger for smaller countries with further benchmark year. The second
criticism was that the estimates were not valued at purchasing power parity which defeated the original
intent of the PWT to adjust national estimates of GDP by valuing output at constant international prices for
comparability across countries. Furthermore, they undertake a replication study showing that this variability
is important for the growth literature. In response to this concern, the more recent version of the PWT
includes a second real GDP variable “rgdpl2” which instead relied on national accounts growth of total
absorption2 and did not suffer this problem.
The measure of capital RK is also based on the cumulative investment on buildings and other machinery
but unlike CK, it is deflated with national prices in a way that allows comparison between countries over
time. The reference time period is 2011. The database also includes various measures of price levels as
PL GDP o which is the ratio of nominal GDP in local currency to CGDP o providing the exchange rate
relative to U.S. dollar. These estimates allow the study of prices levels disparities across countries when
converted to the nominal exchange rate.
Figure 2.5, from the PWT documentation, shows us the time path of the estimated average schooling
in Germany between 1950 and 2010 across the four datasets. Recall that Barro and Lee (2013) covers 146
countries at 5-year intervals, Cohen and Leker (2014) has 95 countries at 10-year intervals, De La Fuente
and Domenech (2006) provide 21 countries’ estimates at 5-year intervals and finally the UNESCO with
125 countries at annual frequency but only covering the 2000s. After 1985, the BL (2013) dataset shows
a relatively sharp increase in schooling attainment until 2005 while DD (2006) and the Cohen-Soto-Leker
dataset both register a more gradual increase. Moreover, DD (2006), CSL and the UNESCO data are
close both in trend and levels in a way that argues against the BL data at least in the case of Germany.
Nevertheless, for the computation in the PWT, this situation provides an opportunity for combining the
different datasets. The authors of the PWT show that the datasets are broadly comparable except the slight
different in mean (5.4 in the BL versus 5.6 in the CSL data). The correlation across countries/years pair is
also high at 94% and even for Germany is as high as 80%.
Regarding the computation of the human capital index however, the choice of dataset turned out to be
much more important due to the non-linear return to education based on the level achieved. Psacharapoulos
(1994) provides global Mincerian return to education. Based on this calculation, the PWT undertakes to
choose the most appropriate series on average years of education among the available datasets. Only BL and
2The total absorbtion is the total demand for all marketed final goods and services regardless of their
origin. It is equal to national income minus the balance of trade Y = C + I +G+ [X −M ]. The term was
coined in 1953 by Sidney Alexander in his paper “Effect of devaluation on a trade balance.”
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CSL cover a long enough period of time to be candidates, and they chose between the two whenever data was
available. 56 countries are covered by BL exclusively and 5 covered by CSL exclusively. In summary, for 61
countries, the only available series where the ones used by default. The choice between the two datasets was
motivated by the proximity to DD and/or UNESCO in trends and levels. If no other clear criteria allowed
to make the cut, the PWT reverts to the BL series since it starts in 1950 versus only 1960 for the CSL data.
After the necessary combinations, the PWT9.0 included 150 countries.
We use the 10th release of the PWT. It is very close to the earlier issues except for a few changes 3,
that we discuss briefly. PWT 10.0 has a new purchasing power parity (PP) measure incorporated, revisited
and extended national accounts data, the change of the reference year from 2011 to 2017, a reevaluation
of the computation of employment and finally a change in the methodology to estimate investment by
assets. Employment calculations changed as well as the source data. The incorporation of more up-to-date
information has led to the improvement of estimates in African, South East Asian and Latin American
countries.
Previous issues of the dataset relied on three main data sources: The conference Board’s (TCB) Total
Economy Database, the International Labor Office (ILO) and the World Bank’s employment and labor force
statistics in the WDI. In the PWT10, for countries where the TCB relied on secondary data, the researchers
use employment data directly available from the Economic Transformation Database (ETD, de Vries et
al. (2021)) combined with data from EASD (Mensah et al. (2018)). Whenever ETD or TCB data were
unavailable, the PWT10 reports ILO data instead.
Figure B.4: Revision to nominal investment for Argentina. (Source: PWT10 Documenta-
tion)
The earlier version of PWT has asset specific data based on National Accounts statistics from TCB
3https://www.rug.nl/ggdc/docs/pwt100-whatsnew.pdf
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and estimates from the Commodity-Flow Method (CFM). This release, however, updated the connecting
procedure between the two sources. Initially, there were only 9 levels of finals assets, which meant that
TCB data were used at the most detailed level. The current release incorporates data only if it is of
higher levels assets. In the organization, you have ”children” referring to the nine lowest level assets and
”parents/grandparents” for several higher level assets. Investment shares were expressed relative to the
direct parent category. This revision impacted the investment component of the GDP measure as we can
see on Figure B.4 with Argentina. We can see that the share of investment going to “Total Construction”





We present the distributions of the pre-RMSPE, the restricted pre-RSMPE and the post RMSPE. We present
the effects at different quarters for all industries given that the policy was in effect until 2016. We also show
the linear relationship between industries’ job creations and the level of pass-through employment. We
present this relationship for each year between 2012 and 2016. In addition, we show the same relationship
restricted to the industries which had a better fit in the pre-period1.
1Industries for which the pre-period RMSPE was under the 50th percentile are considered to have a better
fit compared to others.
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Figure C.1: 2012 All industries effects vs. pass-through percentages: All vs. better fit
Figure C.2: 2013 All industries effects vs. pass-through percentages: All vs. better fit
Figure C.3: 2014 All industries effects vs. pass-through percentages: All vs. better fit
164
Figure C.4: 2015 All industries effects vs. pass-through percentages: All vs. better fit
Figure C.5: 2016 All industries effects vs. pass-through percentages: All vs. better fit
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C.2 Inference
In this section, we present the p-values for each outcome presented. This measure gives insights as to the
likeliness of having the results occur randomly.
Figure C.6: Overall Kansas full quarter employment p-values.
Figure C.7: Kansas full quarter employment p-values without aircraft manufacturing and
energy sectors.
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Figure C.8: Kansas without Wichita: p-values for full quarter employment.
Figure C.9: Kansas without agricultural sector: P-values for full quarter employment.
C.3 On missing industries and states
For various reasons, certain industries in Kansas and some states do not appear in the analysis. Hereafter,
we have given a summary of the missing and the reason for their absence. In terms of industries, the size
or non-existence of a particular industry are the most common reasons found. For states as well, certain
industries do not exist in certain states as well.
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Table C.1: On missing Kansas industries
Industry NAICS Code Employment range Comment on missing
Forestry and Logging 113 0-10 employees Confidentiality
Rail and transportation 482 0-10 employees Confidentiality, but also zero recorded.
Non-zero payroll
Water transportation 483 No data Non-zero payroll.
Scenic and Sightseeing 487 0-10 employees Confidentiality with non-zero payroll
Transportation
Postal service 491 0-20 employees Confidentiality, but also zero recorded.
Monetary authorities 521 No data Non-zero payroll
Central bank
Funds, Trusts, and 525 Over 200 employees Only 2013q1 is missing
other financial vehicles
Space research and 927 No data No data
technology
Table C.2: On missing states in donor pools
NAICS Missing NAICS Missing
114 Vermont, Oklahoma, North Dakota, 211 South Carolina, Rhode Island, Georgia
New Mexico, New Hampshire, Nebraska, Oregon, North Carolina, Maine
Iowa, Indiana, Delaware, Colorado, Minnesota, Maryland, Idaho, Hawaii
Kentucky, Montana, Arizona Delaware, Connecticut, Arizona
212 Delaware 315 Alaska
213 Vermont, Rhode Island, Delaware, 313 South Dakota, North Dakota, Nevada,
New Hampshire, Maine, Hawaii, Hawaii, Delaware,Alaska.
316 Vermont, South Dakota, North Dakota 486 Vermont, Oregon
Hawaii, Delaware, Alaska New Hampshire, Hawaii, Delaware.
322 Montana, Alaska 324 South Dakota, Idaho
335 Hawaii, Alaska 331 North Dakota, Hawaii, Alaska.
524 Maine 533 Maine, Delaware, Alaska
611 Connecticut 924 Hawaii, Delaware
925 Delaware, Alaska 928 Utah, Rhode Island, Pennsylvania,
New Mexico, Michigan, Maryland
Illinois, Idaho, Hawaii, Delaware.
Notes: Massachussetts is out of the donor pools.
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C.4 The synthetic control method for comparative stud-
ies
This section presents the detailed steps of the synthetic control method based on Abadie, Diamond and
Hainmueller (2010) in the context of our particular study of tax reform. In this event study, we observe J+1
states and only Kansas is exposed to the income tax cuts. Based on the matching literature, we refer to
all potential controls (New York, ..., Alaska) as the “donor pool”. We also assume that the state of Kansas
is uninterruptedly affected by the tax cut policy after the third quarter of 2012. Let Y Nit be the outcome
of interest in state i at time t in the absence of any intervention with i = 1, ...., J + 1, and time periods
t = 1, ..., T . Let T0 be the number of pre-tax cuts quarters, with 1≤T0 <T. Let Y Iit be the outcome observed
for state i at time t assuming state i is exposed to the intervention in period T0 + 1 to T. Our assumption
is that the Kansas Tax Cuts have no effect on the outcome of interest before the implementation period
(2012q3 in our case). In other words, for 1≤ t ≤T0 for all states we have Y Nit = Y Iit . Abadie, Diamond and
Hainsmueller (2010) note that in practice, the impact of the policy change could be felt earlier than the legal
enforcement date. In such cases they advise to reconsider T0 in order to have it be the first period in which
the outcome can possibly be affected.
The authors also assume that the notation implies no interference between units (see Rosenbaum (2007)).
Let now αit = Y
I
it−Y Nit be the effect of the Kansas Tax Cuts for state i at time t, and let Dit be an indicator
that takes value based on exposition. In other words, Dit is one if the state is Kansas and zero otherwise.




We consider Kansas as state 1. It is the only state exposed to the tax cuts and only after period T0 (with
1 ≤ T0 ≤ T ), we have that:
Dit =

1 if i =1 and t > T0
0 otherwise.
We target the estimation of (α1T0+1 , ...., α1T ). For t > T0,
α1t = Y
I
1t − Y N1t = Y1t − Y N1t .
Each states beside Kansas is assigned a non-negative weight wi such that all weights sum up to one. We
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thus have a (J + 1) vector of weights W = (w2, ..., wJ+1). The weights defining a given synthetic control W
∗
are chosen to minimize the sum of squares:
‖X1 −X0W‖V =
√
(X1 −X0W )′V (X1 −X0W ), (C.1)
where X1 is a vector of predictor variables for Kansas, X0 is a matrix of the same predictor variables for each
donor pool state, and V is a symmetric, positive semi-definite matrix of weights assigned to the predictor
variables. Abadie and Gardeazabal (2003) select predictor variables weights such that the outcome variable
path for the treated unit in the pre-intervention period is best reproduced by the resulting synthetic control.
Once the weights vector W ∗ is obtained, we combine it with a matrix Y0 of each donor state outcome
values. We thus create the counterfactual outcome path Y ∗1 = Y0W
∗. The tax reform impact is given by
the difference between the observed and the counterfactual value for Kansas after the reform. The dynamic
treatment effect is thus:




where j = 1 is Kansas and j ∈ {2, ..., J+1} are the donor pool states, and T0 is the number of pre-intervention







The outcomes in both the treated and the donor pool states are assumed to follow a linear factor model:
Y 0jt = δt + θtZj + λtµj + εjt
where Y 0st is the outcome without intervention, δt are common time effects, θt is a vector of parameters, Zj
are observed covariates not affected by the reform, λt are unobserved common factor shocks, µj are unknown
factor loadings, and εjt are unobserved, mean zero, state level transitory shocks. When λt = 1 and µj = δj ,
the model is simplified to a two-way fixed effects model. Hayes (2017) emphasizes that the SCM method
has certain strengths, including:
• It is less arbitrary than many analogous methods of comparative studies because it uses a data driven
process to the select the “control group”. We show weights for each state involved.
• The SCM allows many robustness checks that include testing for statistical inference.
• The results can be reported visually, showing the disparity between actual Kansas and its synthetic
control overtime.
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Of these advantages, the last one is sometimes thought of as also the one that represents a challenge. In
practice, the SCM does not provide an R2 or other comparable statistics to rule for or against significance.
To address this the authors expand on placebo procedures in Abadie, Diamond and Hainmueller (2015) and
Abadie(2019).
C.4.1 An example with the crop production industry
We present a sample output from the SCM with the different weights and generated synthetic industry.
Table C.3 shows that the actual crop production sector in Kansas is relatively similar to its constructed
synthetic control. For each measure, the pre-treatment variables means are almost identical. Although this
is not the case for every sub-sector, it is the ideal in the SCM framework.
Table C.3: Comparison of variables mean before the Kansas tax reform of 2012
Variables Kansas crop production sector Synthetic Kansas crop production sector
Full quarter employment 2667 2670.97
Quarter employment 3636.105 3641.215
Log payroll to workers 16.921 16.906
Notes: All variables except full quarter employment are averaged between the first quarter of 2006 and the first quarter of
2012. Full quarter employment is the variable of interest. A worker is recorded as employed only if he or she was employed
before the quarter, during and after the quarter of interest. Quarter employment counts all workers employed in a quarter
whether or not they were employed before and after. This measure is less stable due to possible turnover. The log payroll
is the logarithm of the payroll received each quarter by workers of a particular industry.
Table C.4: States weights in the synthetic Kansas crop production industry
State Crop production weight State Crop production weight State Crop production weight
Hawaii 0.144 Iowa 0.018 Maryland 0.839




Figure C.10: Full quarter employment in crop production from 2005 to 2017: Kansas versus
synthetic Kansas.
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